FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1940

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 18 JULY 1940 No. 4

OUR PACIFIC FRONTIER

By John Gunther

WHERE is the American frontier in the Pacific Ocean? What are our vital interests in this vast region? How adequately are we prepared to defend them? What is our present policy in regard to them? These questions are of peculiar urgency at a moment when warfare is lacerating both Europe and Asia. In a way these two wars are the same war, and it is our great good fortune that this continent stands apart, guarded by two oceans. But modern warfare can expand unpredictably, and there are times when fire jumps over water.

As these lines go to press, the full weight of the Nazis' furious "total war" has been unleashed against France and Britain in the West. For the moment we cannot foresee the outcome. Yet obviously the measure of German success already achieved makes it doubly imperative that we in America survey our national defense problem with stern, relentless realism. More than ever before it has become necessary for us clearly to determine just what our interests and commitments are — in other words, to see where our frontiers really lie. In this article we shall take only the Pacific area for our immediate province, though of course Pacific problems are necessarily interlocked with others farther afield.

The Pacific is the greatest of the world's five oceans. It measures almost ten thousand miles from east to west at its broadest point, and about seven thousand from north to south. It has an area of roughly 68,000,000 square miles, or nearly one half of the total water surface of the globe. Along its northern rim, the Soviet Union and the United States are less than sixty miles apart. It is flanked by three British dominions — Canada, Australia and New Zealand; by eleven American republics in addition to the United States; by the 4,072 volcanic islands that form the Japanese archipelago; and by China, the Philippine

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Islands and the Dutch East Indies. It is a tremendous repository of wealth and commerce, the cross roads of a dozen trade routes, the scene of multitudinous adventures in national policy, and a possible nexus of future conflict.

Before we proceed, let us define very briefly what we mean by "policy." In the abstract, one might say, policy is merely the defense and furtherance of "national interests." But this term "national interests" must also be broken down. It can include anything from a missionary stranded in a Chinese village to a corporation worth a hundred million dollars. It comprises sympathies, aspirations, atavisms, phobias, as well as concrete items like geography, military establishments, and cold dollars and cents. American foreign policy, especially in regard to the Far East, has traditionally been based on two general concepts. First, we sympathize with the right of nations to preserve their independence. Second, we maintain and support the right of our citizens and our commerce to equal treatment everywhere.

More specifically, our attitude towards Far Eastern and Pacific problems is dominated by three explicit policies, each of which is so familiar that we need merely mention them: (1) The Open Door policy enunciated by John Hay in 1899. In its simplest definition this means equality of opportunity for citizens of all nations to trade at will in China. (2) The Washington Treaties of 1921–22. Under the terms of the Naval Treaty the principal maritime Powers of that time agreed to maintain certain naval ratios. The United States also promised in the Four Power Pact not to alter the *status quo* in regard to fortifications and military bases in the western Pacific, while in the Nine Power Pact signed at the same time Japan undertook to respect the territorial integrity of China. Though this treaty has, as everyone knows, been flagrantly violated by Japan, we still adhere to it. (3) The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition. This policy, enunciated following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, states that we refuse to recognize "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary" to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

To support its policy, to protect its frontiers, a nation has to maintain diplomatic, military and naval establishments. Every country, we might say, has four or five different frontiers. First, at home, its actual geographical frontier. Then, either coterminous with this or beyond it, depending on the size and power of

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the nation, comes the military frontier, the specific line which it is prepared to defend with its military and naval forces. Third, there comes what might be called the economic frontier. For instance, our economic frontier certainly includes coffee in Brazil and tin in Bolivia. Fourth, a diplomatic frontier, which presumably protects our interests and explores any possible danger to them in areas considerably beyond the geographical frontier. Fifth comes the moral frontier, as is suggested by such a phrase as the White Man's Burden, or for that matter the Open Door. Viewed from this angle, the whole world is everybody's frontier.

Generally speaking, the diplomatic frontier of a country roughly represents its *policy* at a given moment, while the military frontier represents its *power* to defend that policy. The purpose of this article is to discuss these two frontiers in regard to American interests in the Pacific. What are these interests, and how well are we prepared to defend them? Where is our diplomatic frontier? Where is our military frontier? Obviously, they do not correspond. Should, then, our diplomatic frontier be pulled back? Or should our military frontier be pushed forward? Or is it unnecessary that the two frontiers coincide?

II

First let us outline our interests in the Pacific area. These we may classify into several fields.

1. Territorial. We own various Pacific islands, like the Hawaiian group, Guam, Midway, Wake and part of the Samoan group. (The Commonwealth of the Philippines is not included in this list because our control over it is to end in 1946, according to the Tydings-McDuffie Act.) Recently we embarked on a system of joint control with Great Britain over Canton and Enderbury Islands, in the Phoenix group below Hawaii.

2. Nationals. About 7,000 American citizens live in China, some 8,000 in Japan. There are also many Americans in the Philippines, and smaller numbers in the Netherlands Indies (625), and the Straits Settlements (525). Of our nationals in the Orient, those in China cause our State Department the most worry. Presumably, it is the duty of every civilized nation to give protection to its nationals. If we permit traders and missionaries to go abroad, we cannot avoid a certain responsibility for their welfare. Yet in recent years we have become much less assiduous in bearing this responsibility and our neutrality legisla-

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

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tion seeks to reduce the number of Americans who live or travel in agitated countries.

3. Investments. Figures are difficult to procure, and they differ widely. A reasonable estimate would put our investments in China at about $250,000,000, those in Japan at perhaps $350,000,000. But as Japan pushes forward in China, our opportunities for investment in the Orient will become increasingly limited. However, the approximately $750,000,000 which we have invested throughout the Far East represents only about six percent of our total foreign investments.

4. Trade. In 1938 American exports to China amounted to about $35,000,000, our imports to $47,000,000. Our exports to Japan were very much greater, almost $240,000,000, and our imports — mostly silk and cotton goods — were $126,820,000. Much of our export trade to Japan consists of potential war material like machinery, scrap iron and petroleum. That we thus help to make Japan's war against China possible is a glaring anomaly in view of our traditional friendship for the Chinese people. Our trade with the Philippines is considerable, amounting to $86,000,000 in exports and $94,000,000 in imports.

5. The air factor. Civil aviation not only follows established trade routes but opens up new ones. It unlocks the door to future trade. Pan American's air route across the Pacific is important both for its commercial and its prestige value. It also constitutes a distinct American military interest, since pilots obtain training over Pacific waters as well as valuable information on weather conditions and the like. The bases built by Pan American along the Honolulu-Midway-Wake-Guam-Manila run are of potential military importance.

6. Beyond these categories is another which can best be termed cultural. In China, particularly, we have important interests represented by such educational institutions as Yale in China, Peking Union Medical College, and the multifarious smaller schools, missions, hospitals and so on which have done so much to give America a good name in the Orient. The United States could not withdraw its political influence from the Far East without sacrificing this important and valuable, even if intangible, interest.

7. Finally, politics. The world is interlocked and events in Finland or in the Low Countries have repercussions in Singapore, Java or Honolulu. All over the world, and particularly in the Far East, the United States carries a political burden based on its

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power and prestige. By protecting that prestige in the Far East and in Pacific waters, we contribute to political stability throughout the world. If the United States should, for instance, surrender its Far Eastern position, it would cardinally weaken Great Britain *vis-à-vis* both Japan and Russia. Our status and our policy in regard to Japan and China will, moreover, inevitably be decisive factors in our future relationship to Europe, and in particular to Germany if she is victorious.

III

All this, then, is what we have to protect. In what position are we to protect it?

To answer this question one must first discuss the putative enemy. In the present state of world politics, as far as the Far Eastern and Pacific areas are concerned, this can only be Japan. Should Germany win the European war the situation might radically change. Then indeed we would have to alter all our defense conceptions. We might find Japan confronting us in one ocean, while a greatly expanded and strengthened Germany confronted us in the other. But at the moment, the only possible antagonist we have to fear in the Pacific is Japan. This is not to say that Japan intends at some future date to make war on the United States. Most sane critics regard the possibility of any such adventure as still remote. Nevertheless, every country, when planning its national defense and its ultimate political aims, must take account of whatever *potential* enemy is in the field. Under present circumstances, Japan is the only nation that can possibly threaten our Pacific interests, the only Power — with or without Allies — with whom a Pacific war is conceivable. Therefore, American military and naval policy in the Pacific is predicated on the assumption that Japan is the principal "enemy" to be faced.

Should, in fact, war unhappily occur between Japan and the United States, the Japanese would presumably strike first at our exposed outposts in China.[1] Our forces there are isolated from any possibility of substantial defense. We have 1,100 marines in Shanghai, which since 1927 have coöperated with the troops of other nations to defend the International Settlement. In northern China we have another 500 marines, divided between Peiping and Tientsin. We have four gunboats in the Yangtze area, and one near Canton. The Asiatic Fleet, based on either Shanghai

[1] EDITOR'S NOTE: A map covering Far Eastern waters will be found on page 736.

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or Manila depending on the season, consists of only one 10,000-ton cruiser, one old 7,000-ton cruiser, a dozen over-age destroyers, twelve submarines and a few small auxiliary ships. We do not station any capital ships or aircraft carriers in the Far East. In the past we have not even based our fleet on Hawaii, its natural pivot, because we did not wish to annoy Japan. If it is now stationed at Pearl Harbor, the obvious reason is that we are using its presence there to help persuade Tokyo not to attack the Netherlands East Indies. In any event, our fleet stays well this side of the 180th Meridian, which bisects the Pacific.

The Philippines might very well be the first object of a Japanese attack, if war should come. The question of our capacity to defend these islands has been hotly debated by many experts. The majority opinion is that they could not be held against a sustained or large-scale Japanese assault. General Douglas MacArthur, head of the Philippine military establishment, holds naturally enough a contrary view; he makes an elaborate case with particular emphasis on the growing strength of the Philippine Army, which is training 40,000 recruits a year. But most observers in the United States sharply disagree with General MacArthur. Few of our generals and admirals think we could hold the Philippines; most of them do not think we should even make the attempt.

Their arguments are as follows. First, the Philippines are in effect located in Japanese home waters, whereas our nearest base for serious operations, Pearl Harbor, is about 5,000 miles away. Second, our present armed force in the islands is exceedingly small. On land we have perhaps 4,500 regular troops, including Philippine scouts, and on the sea only the minuscule Asiatic Fleet. Third, our coastal defenses are inadequate, although Corregidor in Manila Bay is heavily fortified, and some experts hold that Manila itself could hold out thirty days. But it would be extremely difficult to prevent Japanese landings at several points.[2] Fourth, the Philippines have no munitions industry sufficient to maintain warfare for any length of time. Fifth, the Philippines — as at present defended — provide no satisfactory base for major operations by the United States fleet. Cavite, near Manila, has scarcely been improved since the Spanish-American War and has

[2] The Japanese, incidentally, have a remarkable facility for landing operations. In August 1937, they got 75,000 troops to Shanghai in ten days, a feat most military experts thought would have been impossible.

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no repair facilities for big ships. There is a good natural harbor at Olongapo, in Subic Bay, some 60 miles north of Manila, but it is not adequately fortified. We keep there a floating drydock, the *Dewey*, because Cavite is too shallow to hold it. Although the *Dewey* has been in Philippine waters for thirty years, it is still in operating condition. But it will not dock ships exceeding 10,000 tons; in other words, it could handle a damaged cruiser, but not a big aircraft carrier or battleship — vessels of this size would have to go back to Pearl Harbor or borrow Singapore.

To make the Philippines impregnable would probably cost at least one billion dollars, a sum that no American Congress in present circumstances would dream of appropriating for such a purpose. Our best experts say that, in order to make the islands even reasonably possible of defense, we should have to maintain there a garrison of 100,000 men, amply protected by at least 500 aircraft, and with a substantial naval force. In the event of war, it is estimated that we should need three million tons of merchant shipping — roughly one-quarter of our entire merchant fleet — to keep the islands in steady and effective communication with the American mainland. We should also need a much more powerful navy, since doubtless we would be risking important ships close to Japan.

Under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which will presumably liberate the Philippines in 1946, we are bound to give up the Cavite and Olongapo bases. The question of American *naval* bases (Cavite and Olongapo are technically defined as *military* bases) in the islands after we withdraw is left open by the Act. One school of American naval opinion feels very strongly that we should reserve the right to build future bases at three or four strategic points after we leave the islands. These points, it is suggested, should be held in perpetuity as "restricted but undefended areas," somewhat on the model of Guantanamo in Cuba, which we hold but do not fortify. Such suggested points, outside of Manila Bay, are Dumanquilas Bay in Mindanao, Coron Bay, Malampaya Sound, the Tawi-Tawi area, and Polillo on the east coast of Luzon. The Japanese are, on their side, very quick to see the potential importance of bases of this sort. For instance, they have occupied an atoll called Pratas Reef, just north of Luzon, where they are reported to have established a radio station.

So much for our comparatively weak position in China and the Philippines. It is quite clear that in case of war with Japan our

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main reliance would have to be on our line of defense in the mid-Pacific. That line of defense is, and must always be, the United States Navy.

IV

As of January 1, 1940, the comparative naval strengths of the United States and Japan — insofar as we know what Japan has been building — were the following:

	United States		*Japan*	
	Number	Tonnage	Number	Tonnage
Battleships	15	464,300	9	272,070
Aircraft Carriers	5	120,100	6	88,470
Heavy Cruisers	18	175,200	12	107,800
Light Cruisers	19	157,775	15	97,555
Destroyers	182	236,070	84	113,476
Submarines	63	71,175	35	52,432

It should be understood that of these ships, one of our battleships, two light cruisers, 115 destroyers and 32 submarines are technically listed as "over-age," *i.e.*, nearing obsolescence. Of the Japanese total, one battleship, five heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, 36 destroyers and 19 submarines are over-age.

American ships under construction on January 1, 1940, included eight new battleships (300,000 tons estimated), two aircraft carriers (34,700 tons), six light cruisers (44,000 tons), one large mine layer, 31 destroyers (49,980 tons) and 15 submarines (20,820 tons). The building program of the Japanese is unknown in its complete details: they make a fetish of naval secrecy. But, as far as we can tell, it consists — including ships building and appropriated for — of four battleships, two aircraft carriers, five light cruisers, nine destroyers, and three submarines. The new Japanese battleships will apparently average around 40,000 tons. In fact, our naval experts are convinced not only that the new Japanese ships are of this unprecedented size, but that Japan may have four or even eight of them under way.[3] The United States has replied to this challenge in kind. Of our new ships, six will displace 35,000 tons, two 45,000 tons. These are bigger than anything we now have afloat. They will also be faster and more powerful. Moreover, as quoted by *The New York Times*, Admiral Stark stated that the two additional battleships pro-

[3] Testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate. *The New York Times*, April 19, 1940.

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vided for in the 1941 appropriations may be "somewhat larger," possibly reaching 52,000 or even 55,000 tons. There is, however, a limit to the size American ships can reach, a limit imposed by the 110-foot width of the present locks in the Panama Canal.

Late in April, 1940, the Senate passed a $963,797,478 navy bill, the largest in our history except for the war years 1918 and 1919. The bill, which provided for an eleven percent increase in the Navy, was approved by the Senate by a vote of 63 to 4 after only four days of debate. Eleven percent is a considerable augmentation; but the Navy does not consider it enough. Admiral Stark thinks that we need a flat twenty-five percent increase, not merely to achieve security, but actually in order to reëstablish the old 5-5-3 ratio which collapsed when the Japanese began their heavy secret building in 1936. As these lines are written, President Roosevelt, under the shattering impact of Hitler's Blitzkrieg, has asked Congress to vote an additional billion and a half dollars for the Navy.

If war should come between Japan and the United States, the giant navies of the two countries would be somewhat like two heavyweights sparring but unable to come to grips. It is almost inconceivable that the Japanese would risk a fleet action in American waters or that we would send our fleet to attack Japanese home stations. Presumably the Japanese plan of campaign would be to seize the Philippines and perhaps the Netherlands Indies, and to harass American merchant shipping in the Pacific. If this effort were successful, we would probably lose most of our imports from the Indies area. Our most serious losses would be rubber, tin, quinine and coconut shell, which provides the best charcoal for gas masks. Rubber we could manufacture synthetically, but only at an uneconomic cost. The production of raw rubber in South America might be increased; however, at present that continent supplies only about two percent of the world's output. Tin we could obtain from Bolivia, though here again there would have to be a drastic speeding up of production, since the present output of that country is less than half the American demand. Meantime the Japanese could pinprick our advanced forces from bases in their mandated islands. Conceivably, they might attack the Panama Canal with aircraft based on carriers, though that possibility is remote; they might even, by going around Cape Horn, establish commerce raiders in the Atlantic. Beyond this, it is difficult to see what Japan

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could do, unless she were to have the active support of "Fifth Column" elements in one of the small republics near the Canal. Any frontal attack by her on Hawaii or our Pacific coast is considered by most military experts to be literally impossible. Nor could an assault on Alaska promise greater success.

The American forces, on their side, would in the first instance attempt to frustrate these Japanese designs. We have submarines capable of cruising from American bases to Japanese waters and back, and presumably we would attempt to cut the absolutely vital Japanese imports of oil from the Netherlands Indies. American warships based on the Philippines could attack and destroy Japanese commerce in this and other areas, and by so doing enforce a virtual blockade against Japan. The Japanese could, it is true, import enough foodstuffs from China and Manchuria to keep from starving; an effective blockade, however, would in time very seriously cripple — if it did not completely crush — Japanese economy. We could meantime proceed cautiously to the laborious and dangerous task of mopping up the Japanese mandated islands, and thus expand the area safe for American naval operations. Until these islands had been made innocuous, we would find it extremely difficult to send our capital ships much beyond the 180th Meridian. Our activity beyond Hawaii would, at least in the opening stages of the war, consist mostly of commerce raiding.

The Japanese mandated islands, formerly belonging to Germany, cover a vast area in the southwestern Pacific. They consist of four main groups, the Palaus, the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls, and there are 1,400 of them. But the total *land* area of all is only 829 square miles. Most of them are quite insignificant coral atolls; only a few have any military importance. One group, that centering on Truk, has a good harbor, and is believed to be fortified; another potential or actual base is at Saipan, north of Guam. In 1939 the Japanese opened a commercial air service from Yokohama to Saipan and on to the Palaus. For years Japan has stringently forbidden foreigners to visit these islands, or to traverse the area; consequently very little is known about them, especially whether or not they are being fortified. To attack these islands, which even unfortified afford excellent hide-and-seek facilities for submarines, would obviously be no easy matter.[4]

[4] North of the mandated islands are the Bonins, Japanese property since 1861, in which there is a naval base at Port Lloyd.

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In essence, then, two probabilities seem implicit in a war between the United States and Japan. First, we would have, in time, a chance of blockading Japan to her knees. Second, Japan would have very little chance of blockading us or causing us deep injury. If, however, the Japanese took the Philippines and then, as it were, called off the war by simply suspending further hostilities, a long deadlock might ensue. If we were to break it by trying to reconquer the Philippines, we would find ourselves launched on a long and arduous campaign.

V

Our strength in the Pacific, in any war now foreseeable, is dependent not only on the Navy but on the bases from which the Navy functions. Therefore, we are building bases as well as ships. The American defense line in the Pacific is being erected on these bases. When they are completed they will form a massive irregular triangle, from Alaska to Hawaii to the Panama Canal, and will effectively deny this part of the Pacific Ocean to any enemy force. Subsidiary to the three dominant points of this triangle are other bases, such as Midway and Wake Islands, which form a kind of protective apron in front of Hawaii, and the islets south of Hawaii — like Johnston, Palmyra and Canton — which are potentially a screen covering the sea between Hawaii and the Canal Zone. Farther south is American Samoa, which is not yet a base but could be made into one.

Modern conceptions of warfare, as revised by the lessons of the present war in Europe, demand active as well as passive systems of defense. Our chain of Pacific bases is, first of all, intended to be a great patrol line for the protection of the eastern Pacific and, if necessary, our own shores. It will be patrolled by the Navy's new scout-bombers — powerful planes easily capable of the long jumps necessary in that area. The major portion of our fleet will center, of course, on Hawaii, the geographical and military keystone of the whole system. The smaller bases will be useful for protecting Hawaii and as headquarters for auxiliary ships and squadrons of bombing planes.

Let us begin with Alaska and the Aleutian area. Bases here are important because they guard the Great Circle route between Japan and the United States, which is by far the quickest path across the Pacific. In the Alaskan region our plans include a naval station at Dutch Harbor and bases for naval aircraft at Sitka and

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Kodiak Island. Kodiak (on Unalaska Island) is to be the Navy's main headquarters in Alaskan waters, and $8,570,000 has been appropriated for work there. The Army, too, is interested in Alaska, and has airfields at Anchorage and Fairbanks. The War Department asked for $12,734,000 to improve the Anchorage base, but the House of Representatives refused to grant it.

Our military and naval program in Alaska is predicated on fear of a conflict with Japan. Nevertheless, it may also have a possible relevance to Soviet Russia. American and Russian territory almost meet, not only at the Bering Strait but also at the end of the Aleutian archipelago. In fact, strange as it may seem, Russia is our nearest neighbor, Canada and Mexico excepted. Today few people anticipate war between the United States and the Soviet Union. American authorities nonetheless follow Russian activities near Alaska with close attention. The Soviets are understood to be fortifying two islands of the Kamandorsky group,[5] which lie close to the Aleutians east of Kamchatka. A submarine base is said to be in construction on Bering Island, one of this group, and German experts are believed to have visited it and to have given technical advice. At present, Soviet military activity in the Kamchatka region is almost certainly directed, not against the United States, but against Japan, with whose fisheries Russian submarines could play havoc. Nevertheless, such activity is not without indirect interest for us.

Proceeding southward from the Alaskan zone we come to Hawaii. Here, on the island of Oahu, we have built what is incontestibly the strongest fortified position in the world — Pearl Harbor. It has cost $700,000,000 thus far, and next to the Panama Canal is America's most important and ambitious military-strategic establishment. Pearl Harbor compares to the Alaskan bases as a mastodon compares to mice. It has a submarine base, a drydock, a navy yard, fuel and ammunition depots, a naval station big enough to handle the entire American fleet, a fleet air base, an important military garrison, and fifty days' supply of food. Nearby are other airfields, and $5,800,000 was recently appropriated to improve airdrome facilities at Kaneohe, also on Oahu Island. Kaneohe is to house five squadrons of long-range planes.

Screening Hawaii are Midway Island, 1,315 miles to the northwest, and Wake Island, 2,315 miles almost due west. Midway,

[5] *The New York Times*, March 19, 1940.

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which lies just within the 180th Meridian, is definitely inside the American defense scheme; while Wake, just outside it, is a bit beyond our theoretical limit for operations by capital ships. Midway was allotted $5,350,000 in the last appropriations; Wake $2,000,000. Improvements are to consist of dredging channels and building better facilities for big planes. Later, submarine bases may be constructed. Both Wake and Midway are, it should be repeated, regular stops on Pan American's air route across the Pacific.

When we turn to the small islets hidden below Hawaii we reach virtual *terra incognita*. Naval plans call for the "earliest completion" of bases for aircraft at both Johnston and Palmyra Islands and "later completion" of similar bases at Canton Island and Rose Island (adjacent to Samoa). Johnston Island is approximately 800 miles southwest of Hawaii, and Palmyra and Canton are roughly 2,000 miles southeast of Wake. All are almost inconceivably remote and tiny. They are atolls barely rising above the surface of the sea, uninhabited for the most part, and visited only occasionally by fishing vessels. The sum of $1,100,000 has been appropriated to improve Palmyra, which was privately owned by American citizens in Honolulu until acquired recently by the Navy. It consists of a chain of fifty-two islets, surrounding a lagoon that can be turned into a satisfactory seaplane station; the whole group measures only five miles by one and a half. Canton was so inconspicuous that until last year no one knew clearly whether it belonged to Britain or to the United States. However, on April 6, 1939, an arrangement was made setting up a joint administrative control by both countries. The agreement runs for fifty years, and in it the United States promises to allow British aircraft to utilize the base we build.

Finally we come to the Panama Canal. Though a detailed description of that vital waterway is hardly within the province of this article, there are three details which we cannot overlook. First, most of our experts consider the Panama Canal to be almost immune to an attack from the Pacific due to the tremendous distances involved. Japan is almost 8,000 miles away, and any Japanese aircraft carrier which might attempt a bombing foray against the Canal would have to be protected so heavily that the venture would be almost out of the question. Second, the Senate has recently voted $15,000,000 — plus $99,000,000 for future work — toward the immediate construction of a third series of

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locks in the Canal, not only independent of the present ones but wide enough so that ships with a beam greater than 110 feet can utilize them. At present our biggest aircraft carriers can only just scrape through. Third, there is considerable sentiment in American naval circles for the purchase of the Galapagos Islands from Ecuador and Cocos Island from Costa Rica. If fortified, these would serve as a protective curtain for the Pacific entrance of the Canal.

This program for improving and expanding our bases took concrete form in what is known as the "Hepburn Report," a document prepared by Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn and his staff following authorization by the Naval Expansion Act of 1938. Admiral Hepburn and his advisers proposed that the United States create a defense chain of 41 bases — not all of them, however, new or in the Pacific. (Naval authorities have declared that we should maintain four hundred long-range patrol planes — as against a present strength of 285 — so that the bases may be properly and permanently linked.) So far Congress has appropriated $65,000,000 toward the realization of this program.

The Hepburn Report further recommended the creation of an air and submarine base at Guam. This provoked the liveliest dispute that has taken place between Congress and the Navy in recent years. Congress has thus far refused to appropriate the $5,000,000 requested by the Navy for preliminary work at Guam. In January 1940, Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, reopened one phase of the controversy by asserting to the House Naval Affairs Committee that the Navy might, if it wished, withdraw $4,000,000 from its budget for the Hawaiian district, and apply it to Guam without specific authorization from Congress. Meantime, within the Navy itself and among military experts generally, the Guam dispute continues to blaze fiercely.

So let us therefore turn to Guam. It admirably illustrates two rival theses in regard to American Pacific policy.

VI

An island 250 square miles in extent and populated by 21,000 natives known as Chomorros, Guam lies far beyond the 180th Meridian, far outside the inner sphere of American Pacific interests. It is about 3,300 miles west of Honolulu, 1,500 miles east of Manila and about 1,350 miles from Yokohama. It is thus much closer to Japan than to the United States. Except for the Philip-

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pines, it is the most westerly of our possessions. Moreover, it is completely surrounded by a veritable shoal of Japan's mandated islands. The Japanese base at Saipan is only 100 miles away.

Until 1898, Guam was a nominal possession of Spain, but no Spaniards lived there and it was quite undefended. An American cruiser steaming toward Manila called at its main harbor, Apra, in 1898, and planted the American flag there without opposition. Then by the Treaty of Paris which concluded the Spanish-American War, we formally annexed it. We did not, however, take the other Marianas, an archipelago which Spain proceeded to sell to Germany. Germany held them until 1919, when they were mandated to Japan along with the Carolines and Marshalls. Guam has been administered by the United States Navy since 1899. We fortified it in a somewhat sketchy fashion, but these fortifications have since been dismantled and at present Guam has no defenses except a detachment of some 500 Marines.

Some of our naval experts, doubtless influenced by Admiral Mahan's dictum that Guam should be made into a "Gibraltar of the Pacific," want to turn the island into an elaborate advance base, comprising both submarine and aërial units, and capable of being the spearhead of the American position in the Pacific. A more modest school of opinion asks merely that we spend perhaps $5,000,000 for dredging Apra harbor and building breakwaters and ramps for seaplanes. Guam is, at present, an essential link in Pan American's trans-Pacific air route and can hence service ordinary peacetime aërial traffic. The harbor, however, could be used for military purposes only after being considerably improved. Still other experts, the most modest of all in their demands, merely hope that the harbor will be improved for civil and commercial purposes, with the idea that eventually this improvement may serve a military end. They point out that Japan, in nearby islands, is carrying out a similar plan of development.

There are several reasons why opposition to the Guam project has been so fierce. First, Guam is in an exposed and isolated position in the very heart of an important Japanese-controlled area; therefore it will be extremely difficult to defend. Second, if Guam actually is to be developed into a first-class base — whether or not war with Japan ever comes — the cost will be tremendous. Reliable estimates put it at $200,000,000 at least. Coast defenses and anti-aircraft guns will be necessary; so will beach defenses

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and at least three airfields; so will measures for the provisioning of the local population; so will a garrison of perhaps 20,000 men supported by at least 1,000 airplanes. Third, many experts say that creation of an important base at Guam is at complete variance with our traditional Pacific policy. If we fortify Guam, they assert, we shall be leaving the 180th Meridian far behind, we shall be penetrating for the first time into purely Japanese waters with a base that has offensive as well as defensive potentialities. It might be justifiable, they hold, to make Guam merely a secondary base, useful perhaps as headquarters for a few submarines (which would, indubitably, be of great value if an attack were ever necessary on Japanese shipping in this area). But to make the island a primary base would, they maintain, be a needless and wanton affront to Japan, one that would be bitterly resented. Fourth and finally, some circles maintain that full-dress fortification of Guam is completely useless *unless* we are prepared to fight for and hold the Philippines. If so, Guam has cardinal importance. If not, it is an expensive nuisance.

VII

To recapitulate, our policy in the Pacific has consistently been defensive and peaceable. We have a tremendous navy and we are in the process of creating an important triangle of defense from Alaska via Hawaii to the Panama Canal. So far we have been content — as have most countries — to allow our diplomatic frontier to remain ahead of our military frontier. We stand at the 180th Meridian; no one can easily menace us behind this line; we have no wish to proceed beyond it. As reflected in the reaction of Congress to the Guam proposal, this policy seems to be supported by most of the American people. It is a compromise policy. But it has worked so far.

It is a characteristic of liberal, democratic states — especially if they are world Powers with farflung interests — to compromise, to permit their interests and commitments to advance beyond their immediate capacity to defend them. Totalitarian states do not compromise; they adopt, by and large, a policy of active coalescence among geographic, diplomatic, military and strategic considerations. They have only *one* frontier. But the United States, so far as we can now know, is in a peculiarly advantageous position in the Pacific. It is almost inconceivable that Japan alone could destroy us, whereas we alone could destroy

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Japan. However, should Germany win the war in Europe, we might then have to reckon with more than Japan.

Which brings us, as is inevitable, to considerations of higher international policy. Obviously, the present explosive state of Europe makes any reasoned calculation almost impossibly difficult. But one thing may be said with complete assurance: if the British and French should lose the war, our entire national defense problem, in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, will have to be sharply altered. We shall have to adjust to quite a different scale our attitude in regard to our frontiers and our means of defending them. The frontiers themselves may change. Suppose, for instance, that the British lose Singapore. This would all but wreck American conceptions of Pacific strategy, since we practically take it for granted that in a war with Japan we should have to borrow Singapore's facilities. Singapore under friendly British rule is almost as important as Pearl Harbor in our presumptive Pacific operations, should we have to carry them into Japanese waters.

Much loose talk exists about our need for a "two ocean" navy. As a matter of fact we have a "two ocean" navy now. Our navy is perfectly capable of efficient operation in both the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time, and will continue to be as long as the Panama Canal remains intact. (To people impressed with the destructive power of modern saboteurs and "Fifth Columns" this may seem like a large "if.") When people talk about a "two ocean" navy, what they usually mean is a "two *fleet*" navy — that is, a navy big enough to maintain independent and unrelated operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific without regard to the Canal. To create and to maintain such a navy would cost a great deal — in money, effort, time and national will. But if the Allies lose the war in Europe and if the British fleet disappears, we might find that we needed a navy bigger than all the other navies in the world combined.

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THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE

By André Géraud
(*"Pertinax"*)

THE Anglo-French Alliance is as complete an alliance as one can imagine. It has virtually no parallel in history, and only the coöperation between Germany and Austria-Hungary from 1879 to 1918 admits of comparison. But the Austria-Hungary which in the years following Sadowa gradually associated its destiny with that of Germany, was no longer a free country. The two ethnic majorities — the Germans and the Hungarians — dominating the Dual Monarchy were frequently more obedient to instructions from Berlin than from Vienna. Austria in particular was a hothouse for Pan Germanism and for the emotional ideas that went to make up "Mein Kampf." The Austro-German Alliance of 1879 — which should never be confused with the Triple Alliance of 1882 between Germany, Austria and Italy — was really a form of annexation on the part of the Hohenzollern Empire. The Anglo-French Alliance, in contrast, joins two peoples and two governments whose sovereignties remain equal, both in theory and in fact — though of course the German propaganda bureau announces daily that France is being run by the British Cabinet and that Britain will fight on the Continent to the last Frenchman.

This Alliance, which has been growing empirically since 1936, was completed only after the outbreak of war on September 3, 1939. It is not the result of a long-deliberated plan of which all the details were worked out in anticipation of the deepening European crisis of the last few years. It took shape only gradually as an inevitable response to the intensification of that crisis. Neither nation has anything to be proud of in this trial-and-error method. If France and Britain had really presented a unified front back in 1935, the history of Europe would have taken a far different turn, and we would not today be fighting a Hitlerian empire covering Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway and the Low Countries. There would be no such thing as a Russia occupying the eastern half of Poland and dominating the Baltic States and Finland. Nor would Italy, who now insults and threatens us, be occupying Ethiopia and Albania or holding Spain in tutelage.

Only reluctantly, then, and under pressure did Britain and

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France consent to merge their destinies. It is important that Americans have no doubt on this point, for too often they proceed on the convenient assumption that alliances are the cause of war. In reality, war comes when alliances are all on one side or when the military preponderance of one country is not balanced by the close coöperation of such other countries as are obviously in line to become the victims of aggression.

II

When Hitler rose to power in January 1933, Franco-British relations, insofar as they were concerned with the essential problem of maintaining peace, were determined by the Locarno Pact of October 16, 1925. Locarno stipulated that France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, would not go to war against one another except in certain well-defined contingencies. The latter included: legitimate self-defense; flagrant violation of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles (demilitarization of the Rhineland); execution of paragraph 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes by the Council of the League; and Article 16 of the Covenant providing for concerted economic and military action against an aggressor. Britain and Italy guaranteed, by arms if necessary, to enforce these terms.

Locarno was a system of security built in the clouds. No provision was made for General Staff consultations between guarantors (Britain and Italy) and guarantees (France, Belgium and Germany). The guarantors, because of their rôle as impartial arbiters, could not consider the hypothesis of a German attack as more probable than a French attack. Furthermore, the parties concerned never unanimously admitted that enforcement should be automatic in case France, Belgium or Germany flagrantly violated their promises. Indeed, Sir John Simon declared in the House of Commons on November 7, 1933, that in each instance the League Council would have the last word, with the consent of the guarantors. Because of the Council's rule of unanimity, either of the guarantors could prevent a final decision. And lastly, a fatal duality was established between Germany's western and eastern frontiers. The treaties of arbitration between the Reich on one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other set up such a complicated procedure that, by the time a dispute had gone from Conciliation Commission to World Court to League Council, the parties might find themselves legally at war.

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The Locarno system collapsed on March 7, 1936, when Hitler, overriding the objections of his generals, ordered the Reichswehr to reoccupy the Rhineland. According to the interpretation always given to Article 4 (paragraph 3) of the Locarno Pact by the Quai d'Orsay, Hitler's action would have authorized France to start marching. By her own example she could thus have forced the guarantors to fulfill their duties. But France did not move. All the ideological sections of the treaty, therewith, fell one after the other. For example, on March 19, the Council of the League — to whom the men of Locarno had assigned so important a rôle — stated that Germany had violated the Locarno Pact as well as Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty, but refused to do anything further about it. The Council's bankruptcy immediately caused Belgium to resume her pre-1914 policy of neutrality; while Italy, already pointed in the direction of an alliance with Germany, definitely canceled all of her Locarno obligations when in the fall of 1936 she joined with Germany in the Rome-Berlin Axis. Thus in the end France and Britain found themselves alone. The British Cabinet was at first inclined to fight a rear guard action. For a while it flirted with the strange theory that Germany, by her own initiative, had destroyed the obligations which the treaty placed on the signatories. In other words, an umbrella is useful only as long as the sun shines. It was left to Titulesco to find the correct answer: "Locarno is more alive than ever because the contingency, in anticipation of which it was drafted, has now become a reality."

III

The British Government therefore had to reconcile itself to making an arrangement for mutual aid with France. On March 9, 1936, Foreign Minister Eden declared in the House of Commons that "should there take place, during the period which will be necessary for the consideration of the new situation which has arisen, any actual attack upon France or Belgium which would constitute a violation of Article 2 of Locarno, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the German repudiation of the Treaty, would regard themselves as in honour bound to come in the manner provided in the Treaty to the assistance of the country attacked." On March 19, this initial promise was strengthened, so that the obligations of Locarno were continued in their entirety insofar as France, Britain and

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Belgium were concerned. It also provided that conversations were to take place between the three General Staffs in order to work out the technical details of a program of action for meeting unprovoked aggression. Moreover, if the negotiations then going on with Germany for a second Locarno should fail, an annex to the Agreement of March 19 would immediately become effective. This annex — which was delivered on April 1 to both the French and Belgian Governments, since the latter had not evolved its new policy — envisaged the transformation of the understandings of March 9 and 19 into an agreement for mutual assistance which would include the collaboration of the General Staffs. In November 1936, the British Government decided to put it into effect; hence the public declarations of Mr. Eden and M. Delbos on November 27 and December 4 of that year. The Anglo-French Alliance was at last on the road to becoming a reality.

It should be emphasized that the Alliance was not the result of a free choice on Britain's part. Rather, it was forced on her by the logic of events and by the need of self-preservation. Eleven years earlier, at Locarno, the British Government had constructed a system which, if enforced, would have made such an alliance unnecessary. We must never forget these origins of the Alliance. They set in bold relief the fact that Anglo-French solidarity was, in the beginning, quite experimental and that it was imposed on both countries by the necessity of protecting themselves. It took form and grew only when their governments had their backs to the wall. "Hang together or hang separately" — these were the words that constantly rang in the ears of the British and French Governments each time one or the other agreed to abandon a little bit more of its freedom of action.

The Anglo-French entente, as constituted late in 1936, dealt only with the French and Belgian frontiers, and quite inadequately even with these, as we shall see in a moment. Belgium was anxious to repudiate the arrangement of March 19, 1936, and to free herself from the agreement of September 1920 between the Belgian and French General Staffs which, though it had survived every vicissitude thus far, had long been in abeyance. Consequently, a *modus vivendi* was arranged in April 1937. The two great Western Powers guaranteed Belgium from invasion without receiving any reciprocal engagement in return. The Belgian Government merely promised to maintain an adequate military force and to resist if attacked by another Power. True,

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Belgium was still bound by the League Covenant, particularly Article 16 and its implication about the right of passage for armies coming to the assistance of a victim of aggression. But her obligation in this respect was so flexible that she has easily avoided it. She has now paid the price for her illusions.

A great deal could be said about the easygoing way France and Britain handled the problem posed by Article 16, which provided for obligatory economic sanctions against an aggressor as well as discretionary military sanctions. To be sure, the Covenant was in a bad way after the Ethiopian War and the blows which M. Laval had struck against it. Thereafter Paris and London lacked the moral authority necessary to demand that states rigorously adhere to this clause of the Covenant. But they should nevertheless have insisted that neutrals — for they assumed that the juridical concept of neutrality had been reëstablished — should distinguish between Powers that defended the smaller nations and those that wished to enslave them. The lesser states should have been asked to give, if not active "coöperation" against aggression, at least "assistance" in the form of passive acquiescence. In this connection let us record the resolution of the League Assembly of December 14, 1939, recommending assistance to Finland while scrupulously avoiding any application of Article 16. The consequences of Anglo-French negligence and forbearance can be measured by the events of September 1939 and May 1940. If in the early days of the war France could have sent her troops across Belgium, she might have been able to outflank the Siegfried Line — which at that time did not extend northward along the German-Belgian border — and thus force Germany to release her Polish victim. Likewise, a contractual obligation on the part of the smaller states to render assistance would have permitted the Allies to take the initiative in Norway or to have embarked on a preventive occupation of Belgium in November 1939 or January 1940.

If the Anglo-French agreements of 1936 did not adequately protect Western Europe from German invasion, what can be said for Central and Eastern Europe? Here France had several obligations. In the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921 she had promised aid to that country in case of attack. She had a similar engagement towards Czechoslovakia according to the terms of the Franco-Czech declaration of 1925 annexed to the Locarno Pact. Furthermore, she had underwritten Germany's arbitration treaties with

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Poland and Czechoslovakia made at Locarno. Britain, on the other hand, had no obligations to these countries beyond Article 16 of the Covenant, which had already collapsed. It is useless to recapitulate the events of the summer of 1938, now known to everyone. The essential question was: Would Britain support France if the latter went to the assistance of her ally, Czechoslovakia? The hesitation of the British Cabinet influenced the Quai d'Orsay, and by the time Mr. Chamberlain decided on action, M. Bonnet was on the road leading to Munich.

IV

Only in 1939 did the policies of Britain and France coincide exactly, and only then were guarantees extended to other countries. In January of that year the two governments recognized that it would be to their common interest to assist The Netherlands and Switzerland if the German Army should march into either country. As concerns The Netherlands, the offer was futile. Before effective assistance could be given, The Netherlands would have to link its defenses with those of Belgium. This it repeatedly declined to do. In Eastern Europe, French and British guarantees multiplied after Germany incorporated the remnants of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939. Indeed, the two Great Powers now undertook to maintain the political and territorial structure of Europe in its totality. There was Britain's guarantee to Poland and a reaffirmation of the Franco-Polish Alliance; there were also Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania,[1] Greece, Turkey, and more recently to Norway. Rumania and Greece have proceeded to act as passive beneficiaries, accepting guarantees from the Allies while pretending to Germany that they were not a party to the arrangement. Turkey, however, definitely associated herself with the Western Powers by the Treaty of Ankara (October 19, 1939). This provides for: coöperation in the event of war in the Mediterranean, a Turkish endorsement of the Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania and Greece, and consultation if one of the signatories finds that a German attack on a country not guaranteed is a threat to its own security. The latter clause was probably drafted to include Jugoslavia, which since 1927 has had only a consultative and non-aggression pact with France.

Henceforth, the two Western democracies recognize, in fact as well as in theory, that they are protecting the continent against

[1] The promise to Rumania applies only against Germany and does not underwrite Bessarabia.

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aggression from Germany and from any Power that conspires with Germany. The system was completed by (1) the Anglo-Polish and Franco-Polish Treaties of September 12, 1939, pledging England and France not to make peace with Germany without the consent of Poland; and (2) the resolution of the Supreme War Council of March 28, 1940, by which France and Britain promised not to enter into preliminary conversations concerning peace, or to examine the proposals of a neutral, until they had first arrived at a common program between themselves. In the diplomatic and military spheres, the solidarity of the two countries is complete.

Does the Polish guarantee mean that the Western Powers must go to war with Russia? No, for it has been interpreted in such a way as to avoid extending hostilities. In fact, Britain and France refused to declare war on Russia when that country marched into eastern Poland, a fact which the Polish Government of that day, as well as the one subsequently set up at Angers, tacitly accepted. The Allies' military effort is directed exclusively against Germany; but if Russia crosses the firing line, they will not spare her. Thus, if in February and March Finland had called on the Allies for help, they would have dispatched an expeditionary force on the assumption that the annihilation of that country would open the way for a German adventure in Scandinavia. But, while aiding Finland, they would not have taken the initiative in breaking off relations with Moscow: they would have fought Russia in Finland in the same way that Russia is fighting Japan in China. It should be remembered that the Treaty of Ankara does not obligate Turkey to support her Western allies against the Soviet Union. Turkey is free to give or withhold assistance though she is to receive the support of France and Britain if Russia attacks her. In general, it is felt that Turkey will go to war with Russia only if the latter begins talking of the Straits and Constantinople in terms of nineteenth-century Tsarist imperialism. The Allies have an effective weapon that will make Stalin and his advisers think twice: airplanes from Syria and 'Iraq can blast Baku and its oil reservoirs without much difficulty. And Moscow knows it.

This, in its broadest aspects, is the program to which the Western democracies are committed. Its object, in short, is to destroy the German military machine. The promise given to Poland, for example, implied that the Allies would assume this task. By guaranteeing other countries the Allies merely succeeded

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in disposing them towards the Allied cause, without however causing them to abandon their neutrality. Turkey is an exception. This country, without any coercion from Paris or London, has entered the Allied camp deliberately; the other countries have entered it only after being attacked and invaded — in other words, not until they had first allowed Germany to occupy their country by force of arms.

V

To end Germany's military power, France and Britain must regain that superiority in armaments which they permitted the Reich to snatch from them between 1933 and 1939. Above all, they must acquire air superiority. The main problem as concerns man power is to create a British Army at least half the size of the French. This will be a gigantic task. For practical purposes, it cannot be done before the end of 1940. As for Germany, she has devoted all of her resources during the last seven years to the creation of a tremendous military machine, in particular to amassing Blitzkrieg weapons — planes and tanks — against which the smaller nations are unable to put up any real resistance.

The formidable military task of the Allies makes it vitally necessary that they act together and use their resources systematically. Since last September, the British Government has proceeded on the assumption that the war may last three years. This does not mean they have three years at their disposal in which to create an adequate army, navy and air force, and that in the meantime reverses can be regarded as unimportant; but it does mean that the British are determined to conscript enough men and wealth to win victory.

The agreements cementing the intimate collaboration of the French and British Empires — those which made the Alliance a very real thing — were made since the beginning of the war. They can be divided into four classes: (1) The virtually spontaneous decision, taken in September, to create a Supreme War Council to which the two Prime Ministers summon those of their colleagues whom the day's business warrants, as well as the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces, the heads of the various General Staffs, etc. (2) The two all-important acts of November 17, establishing a common economic front, and of December 4, linking the pound and the franc. (3) The agreements between particular British and French ministries for the intensification of

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the war effort in a certain field, *e.g.*, blockade, armaments, etc. (4) Collaboration between certain national groups such as Deputies and Members of Parliament, the French Socialist Party and the Labor Party, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* and the Trade Unions, and between industrial groups.

The importance of the November 17 and December 4 agreements merits special comment. Seven executive departments have been permanently established in London: air, munitions, war materials, oil, food, shipping, and economic warfare. The latter has special characteristics: its function is to coördinate everything that is done by Britain and France to prevent Germany from obtaining supplies from outside her borders. It is in constant touch with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and the French Ministry of Blockade. The function of the other executive departments is to apportion basic raw materials between the two countries regardless of whether these originated in the British or French Empires or were acquired by purchasing missions in neutral countries. The departments are staffed with equal numbers of French and British delegates. A coördinating committee resolves whatever disputes may arise within or between departments — in regard, for instance, to the bitterly disputed question concerning priority for shipping space. And last, each country has its national committees, presided over by their respective Prime Ministers, to draw up estimates of their own particular needs and how they can be met, for submission to the relevant executive departments in London. In France, this body is called "the committee on planning and purchasing" and it includes the appropriate cabinet ministers; in Britain it includes the general secretaries of the relevant ministries. If certain questions cannot be solved by the arbitration of the coördinating committee — of which the chairman is M. Jean Monnet — the Supreme War Council intervenes and cuts the Gordian knot. In all this the guiding principle is equality of sacrifice.

This economic organization was articulated by the agreement of December 4 establishing the monetary basis of the coalition. Its general features can be described as follows: (1) The stability of the franc and the pound is assured by introducing the principle of balance between the British and French stabilization funds. The two governments have agreed to supply one another francs for pounds and pounds for francs without transferring gold, at the fixed rate of 176 francs to the pound. As between Britain and

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France the tripartite monetary agreement of September 1930 has been suspended, though it still applies to the United States. The sterling which France has at her disposal will, if necessary, be converted by the British Treasury into the particular moneys of the sterling area. Thus, they can be spent not only in Great Britain but in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, British India, the crown colonies, mandated areas, Egypt, the Egyptian Sudan and 'Iraq. (2) The two countries may, by prior arrangement, buy from a neutral in terms of the other's currency, in case one of them should have a surplus of such funds. Thus, Britain can balance her purchases in Switzerland with French francs, Switzerland being obliged to convert them into her own currency in Paris rather than in London. The aim of both countries is to preserve their gold and, as far as possible, to use it only to purchase arms. Thus the world has a new autarchy with a broad base that extends into every continent. (3) The two governments have promised not to adopt, *vis-à-vis* one another, measures for the protection of their industries or currencies. In fact, the two Empires might well lower their tariffs against one another. Such a step was, indeed, foreshadowed in an agreement negotiated in February 1940 between the French Minister of Commerce and the President of the Board of Trade. (4) If either Ally does not have its proper share of the common resources, it will be reimbursed by the other in gold or exchange. Thus, if France has to buy copper at the world price in America or the Belgian Congo, while England obtains hers within the Empire at a lower price, France will be duly compensated. (5) Britain has agreed, in view of her larger resources and wealth, to pay certain charges common to the Allies in the proportion of 3 to 2. Such charges are: the cost of the blockade, maintenance expenses of the Allied armies, the cost of distant expeditions, financial advances to neutrals (*e.g.*, the subsidies given to Finland under one form or another), etc.

Such is the Anglo-French economic alliance. To deepen it we must eliminate certain wartime obstacles restricting the circulation of peoples and goods between the two countries. A few beginnings have been made, such as the February agreement mentioned a moment ago; but much remains to be done. In the realm of actual practice, union is far from being complete. We must anticipate some opposition from public opinion and expect that class or other interests will try to check the growing momentum. But the necessity of winning a life-and-death struggle will silence all

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opposition. Moreover, these agreements provide that this union shall continue not only for the duration of the war, but after hostilities have ceased. That charter of financial solidarity, the agreement of December 4, is to run for six months after the signing of peace — which is only another way of saying that it will continue indefinitely.

VI

According to the official communiqué of the Supreme War Council issued on March 28:

> The government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland mutually undertake . . . not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security . . . they [also] undertake to maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law and the maintenance of peace in Europe.

It is clear, then, that the Anglo-French union is an instrument from which we expect not only victory but the reconstruction of Europe.

When the peace treaties of 1919 were negotiated, two types of preoccupation dominated the minds of Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen: (1) to safeguard Western Europe from further aggression by setting up material guarantees of security — *e.g.*, the occupation of the Rhineland and the project of Anglo-American assistance to France; and (2) to create an international system in which everyone, victor and vanquished, would have equal authority and influence. In the long run, the second part of the 1919 program prevailed over the first — the Locarno Treaties are a case in point. This time, however, material guarantees will prevail and the Anglo-French tie will not be diluted in a wider system of general or universal commitments. The hard lesson of experience has taught us that he who commits himself to everything for everybody in reality commits himself to nothing. If the League of Nations is revived, the two Western Powers will in effect constitute its executive — an executive whose decisions and acts will not depend on the deliberations of the Council or the Assembly. Is this to say that France and Britain will not seek the concurrence of other Powers? By no means. But paralleling the

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group of states charged with everyday tasks, including procedure under Article 15 of the Covenant, will be another group gathered around France and Britain in a military alliance for the application of Article 16. The system of 1919 was characterized by the predominance of Article 15. The new system will be placed under the aegis of Article 16 — or its equivalent, since the Covenant is likely to be altered. The juridical equality among states will remain untouched. But there will be no equality of responsibility, for it is absurd to pretend that all European states are equally capable of resisting aggression.

Through bitter experience the statesmen of France and Britain have come to know that a paper peace is of little value by itself; that there is no such thing as a plan of European reconstruction, however perfect, which can rally and hold all peoples; that the profound feelings of the vanquished, whatever their docility and flexibility on the morrow of the war, cannot really be known until one or two generations later; that Anglo-French military preponderance must be preserved until experience gives us something better; that the Rhineland should become the instrument of this preponderance but without involving any annexation or transfer of sovereignty; and that henceforth general disarmament should be the sign that peace has been reëstablished, not just the initial step towards its reëstablishment. Heaven knows that twenty years ago most men found these ideas repugnant. But the cruel events of 1938–40 have hammered their lessons home to all of us.

All this does not mean, however, that in time of peace French and British armaments will necessarily be maintained at their present level. But they will be of sufficient size to permit the two nations, in collaboration with the greatest possible number of other states, to impose respect for law and order on any recalcitrant. Let us not forget that Britain will continue to remain a military nation, or rather a military empire; that she will not abolish conscription; that she knows her fate is tied up, not only with the free countries of Western Europe, but with those of Central and Eastern Europe as well.

Will French and British efforts to bring order out of chaos result in a European federation? It is impossible to say. A federation does not fall ready-made from the sky. Two acorns must be planted: one in the West (the Anglo-French union) and another in the East (a modest Polish-Czech federation). We cannot be too

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confident that they will become great oaks. In any event, if a European federation is achieved, it will only be because of the Anglo-French union.

Certain American commentators have created the impression that many people in the United States resent the alliance of the Western Powers and, in particular, object to the formation of the great economic area to which that alliance has given birth. I would suggest that these critics recall that there are other large economic units already in existence: Greater Germany with some 90 million inhabitants (not including the four North and West European kingdoms recently overrun by the Nazi armies); a Soviet empire of 170 millions and covering one-seventh of the earth's land surface; and even an American empire containing nearly 150 million souls. If they will keep these facts in mind, they will then understand that France and Britain, only if joined to each other in the closest bonds, can hope to uphold their traditional civilization.

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THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS A HAVEN OF PEACE?

By Stephen Duggan

FOR some time the public mind in this country has shown a certain confusion concerning the realities of Inter-American relations. Considerable misapprehension prevails as to the nature and aims of such things as the Monroe Doctrine, Pan Americanism, the Good Neighbor Policy, Hemisphere Solidarity, and the Declaration of Panama. The one characteristic that all these have in common is that they all embody a firm desire to make of this hemisphere a refuge of peace.

As these lines are written, we in the Americas are faced, as we have not been faced since the days of the Holy Alliance, with the possibility that the devastation of war may be brought to our very doors. We have come to the realization that peace can be maintained in this hemisphere only if it is based on a system of adequate defense. It behooves us therefore to examine carefully the legal and organizational apparatus upon which our twenty-one American Republics can rely if they are to achieve common action against the possibility of armed interference from the Old World.

First in point of time among these implements of solidarity is the Monroe Doctrine. Let us therefore turn to it.

I. THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The Spanish colonies had hardly become free when their independence was threatened by the Holy Alliance, desirous of restoring them to Spain. In his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe referred to this danger in several widely separated paragraphs that collectively have come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. The two parts of the Doctrine pertinent to this article are: (1) ". . . the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," and (2) ". . . we should consider any attempt on their part [the Holy Alliance] to extend their system [monarchical autocracy] to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

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Though idealism undoubtedly played an important part in motivating this declaration, it was primarily inspired by a selfish consideration for our own "peace and safety." That it also gave assistance to the newborn nations of Latin America was incidental. Nevertheless, the Latin Americans were grateful. Nor was the Monroe Doctrine a sudden resolve in the face of an emergency. From the first day of their independence the American people had been determined not to permit Europe to interfere in affairs on this side of the Atlantic. We regarded the old continent as a center of opposition to our republican institutions and to our growing democracy. Britain's attempt in 1844 to persuade Texas not to join the Union, her intrigues to prevent American domination of the Caribbean and especially the Isthmus, the French invasion of Mexico during our Civil War in order to establish a monarchy, only confirmed Americans in these opinions, and they have never wholly lost them.

A happy relationship thus arose between the United States and Latin America, which lasted until President Polk, inspired by "Manifest Destiny" and taking advantage of a decade of frontier disturbances, entered into war with Mexico in 1846. This war, which resulted in the transfer of a vast amount of Mexican territory to the United States, not only embittered relations between the two countries involved but diminished the friendly feeling of Latin America in general towards the United States. However, for the next fifty years both the United States and Latin America were chiefly occupied with internal affairs and any latent animosity between them was allowed to slumber. This period ended for the United States with the disappearance of the frontier in the early 1890's. Under the influence of an expansionist impulse long germinating among our people — no doubt stimulated by Kipling's glorification of the White Man's Burden — we developed a Messiah complex which remained with us until disillusionment came after the World War. The first overt manifestation of American imperialist aspirations occurred after the Spanish-American War of 1898, when we secured possession of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, and, by means of the Platt Amendment, a disguised protectorate over Cuba. At the same time we also annexed Hawaii and in the following year gave further evidence of our new expansionist vitality by challenging the Great Powers in China with our Open Door doctrine.

The great apostle of this policy was Theodore Roosevelt. In

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1903 he secured the right to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama by what Latin Americans regarded as shady and imperialistic means. In his message to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt announced what became popularly known as the "Big Stick" policy, namely, that the Monroe Doctrine justified the United States in exercising an international police power in case of "wrongdoing or . . . impotence" in the Western Hemisphere. In the opinion of Latin Americans this pronouncement transformed the Monroe Doctrine from a policy of self-defense into one which envisaged interference by the United States in the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries. As a result, resentment against the United States and apprehension as to the objectives of its policy became intense throughout Latin America. Our acts of open intervention in Mexico and the Caribbean area during the following decade, and even more so during the World War, naturally augmented these fears.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 President Wilson secured the incorporation of Article 21 in the Covenant of the League of Nations, stating that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of . . . regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." This Article was bitterly resented by Latin Americans. They pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine had never at any time been recognized as a part of international law. Indeed the United States had not wished it to be so recognized, because, had it been, international tribunals would have had a right to interpret it — and that right, we then insisted, belonged to us alone. But the Latin Americans maintained that, with the adoption of the League Covenant, the Doctrine had become incorporated into the very constitution of the world. Moreover, they denied that it was a "regional understanding," for an understanding requires at least two parties. And then on top of all this, the United States refused to join the League, though Article 21 remained in the Covenant to bring confusion into the foreign policy of the Latin American countries. They now found themselves members of two international organizations, the League of Nations and the Pan American Union, of which the latter was to a great extent under the domination of the United States.

On August 30, 1923, Secretary of State Hughes delivered an address before the American Bar Association at Minneapolis in which he stated emphatically that the Monroe Doctrine was a

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principle of self-defense for the United States and that it "reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application." Because of our insistence on this unilateral interpretation of the Doctrine, and also because of our intervention policy in the Caribbean area, criticism of the United States increased both in amount and bitterness throughout Latin America, as well as in certain circles in Europe and even among our own citizens.

But the years 1927 and 1928 saw our whole Latin American policy undergo a change in the direction of conciliation. This shift became even more pronounced during the Hoover Administration. Immediately upon his election in November 1928, Mr. Hoover made a good-will tour of Central and South America. He made it clear that while every effort would be made to expand our commerce with Latin America, it would not be done in the ways of Dollar Diplomacy. In 1931 he withdrew the American administrative officers from Haiti. Already in December 1928, J. Reuben Clark, Jr., the Under Secretary of State, had drawn up an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine at the request of Secretary of State Kellogg. In this important state paper, he stripped the original message of President Monroe of the various excrescences, such as the Roosevelt corollary, that had been fastened upon it by later Presidents and Secretaries of State. He made it clear that in its interpretation of the Doctrine the United States had returned to the original purpose for which it was proclaimed, namely, the safeguarding of the Western Hemisphere from European and Asiatic interference.[1] Nevertheless, this new interpretation failed to dissipate completely the deep-seated suspicion with which the principal Latin American countries viewed the Doctrine, though they were of course gratified by Secretary of State Kellogg's statement that the Clark Memorandum was to be regarded as officially adopted by the United States. What they awaited was a positive announcement of American intentions with reference to their own status. Such a statement did not appear until President Franklin D. Roosevelt promulgated his Good Neighbor Policy.

II. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

The Good Neighbor Policy was enunciated by President Roosevelt in his first inaugural address on March 4, 1933. He described it as a policy of "the neighbor who resolutely respects himself, and

[1] Asia was included because of the Magdalena Bay Incident in 1912, when Japan was suspected of seeking naval privileges on the west coast of Mexico.

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because he does so, respects the rights of others." This, together with subsequent statements by the President and by Secretary of State Hull, forms a philosophy of international relations based on a respect (1) for international law and treaties, (2) for the sovereignty of every nation, large and small, and (3) for the principle of mutual trust and good will. Mr. Roosevelt's further declaration that the sending of troops across a national frontier would be regarded as an evidence of aggression pleased the Latin Americans most of all, for they interpreted it to mean that the United States would no longer intervene in their domestic affairs. The way was thus paved for the personal triumph of Mr. Hull at the Montevideo Conference in 1933 at which the Latin American delegations gave a cordial reception to his peace program. This shift in our policy towards Latin America — of which the repeal of the Platt Amendment was only one concrete evidence — changed Pan Americanism from a principle founded upon mere sentiment to one based on political realities.

President Roosevelt's statement of the Good Neighbor Policy was couched in general, even vague, terms. The real problem was to apply it in specific cases. Of these there have been a good many. The limitations of space, however, will permit us to discuss only one of them in detail: the expropriation by the Mexican Government of American-owned lands and the property of American oil companies. Before the day of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States would probably have tried to force Mexico to return the property, possibly even to the extent of blockading her ports and sending troops to the Rio Grande. But the emphasis in the Good Neighbor Policy, an emphasis much acclaimed in Latin America, is upon the sovereignty of each state regardless of size. Now, sovereignty means that a state has absolute control over its own internal affairs. At the same time, international law requires that when a government expropriates foreign property it should make compensation. In the case of Mexico the State Department declared that this compensation should be "prompt, adequate, and effective." Mexico promised to indemnify the oil companies for their surface properties but not for their vested subsoil rights. Further, this compensation was to take place at some future date and, judging by past experience, with measures of dubious value. President Roosevelt said that a "good neighbor" was one "who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with world neighbors." In its protests against the

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expropriation, the State Department, without accepting the Mexican contention, acted in accordance with it. In substance the Mexican contention has been that a foreign corporation which claims to have suffered injury must first exhaust the possibilities of legal redress in Mexico before requesting diplomatic intervention from its own government. The oil companies, in fact, followed this procedure. But after hearing their case, the Supreme Court of Mexico decided that the expropriation of their property was in conformity with the Mexican Constitution.

The State Department, burdened by an evil heritage of bad relations with Mexico, pursued an honorable policy in attempting to bring about a fair compromise between the oil interests and the Mexican Government, even if neither of these parties showed much of the spirit of compromise. After repeated efforts to effect an agreement, the State Department suggested to the Mexican Government on April 3, 1940, that it submit the question to arbitration. The proposal was rejected. This rejection was embarrassing to Mexico for, like all Latin American states, she has always been a strong adherent of arbitration. As these lines are written, the solid front of the oil companies has been broken by the Sinclair interests, which have come to terms with the Mexican Government. What will happen next remains to be seen. We can exert pressure on Mexico by threatening to change our silver purchasing policy, now so profitable to her. This action would undoubtedly disrupt Mexican economy. But, in any case, we must never forget that our attitude towards Mexico is regarded by most Latin Americans as the touchstone of the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Good Neighbor Policy accords with the contention long maintained in Latin America that the government of one country cannot use military intervention to collect debts owed its citizens in another country. However, at the Lima Conference Mexico proposed a resolution by which the conferring states would recognize the "right" of their nationals to waive the diplomatic protection of their governments. This would have meant that there could be no redress for a foreign investor whose property had been expropriated. The United States has consistently held that diplomatic interposition cannot be bartered away by its citizens. By skillful diplomacy this question was referred to the next Inter-American Conference to be held in 1943.

Other less tangible difficulties confront the Good Neighbor Policy. First, there are political difficulties. President Roosevelt's

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pronouncement is only seven years old, too short a time in which to expect the long-standing antagonism of the Latin Americans towards the United States to be completely dispelled. In particular the strongest Latin American country, the Argentine Republic, has never been over-friendly towards the United States. Argentina's orientation has always been towards Europe rather than North America. She wants to pose before the world as the foremost exponent of Latin American interests, an attitude viewed with little sympathy by other countries in South America. Argentina is determined, if possible, to prevent the domination of the United States from spreading beyond the Caribbean area into the South American continent. Furthermore, Latin Americans in general simply do not understand our interpretation of democracy. To them, democratic government means merely republican government, in which the élite, not the masses, rule. Before the present war broke out in Europe, both the Germans and Italians were engaged in deliberate anti-democratic and anti-American propaganda in Latin America. A Hitler victory would unquestionably cause that propaganda to be intensified, with the accompaniment of "fifth columns."

There are economic difficulties, also. Mr. Hull has succeeded in making excellent trade agreements with some of our southern neighbors. But his trade policy is based upon the most-favored-nation principle, whereas many of the Latin American states have adopted autarchic devices which prevent its application. Furthermore, the products of Argentina and Uruguay, for instance, compete with those of the United States in the European market; those two countries cannot, therefore, adopt policies which will offend their best customers. They resent not only our tariff policies, but even more our sanitary regulations excluding their meats on the ground that their cattle are afflicted with the hoof and mouth disease — an accusation which they regard as untruthful.

Then, there are religious and spiritual difficulties. The United States is overwhelmingly Protestant. Latin America is even more overwhelmingly Catholic. The Catholic Church is afraid of what might happen if, in the countries to the south of us, education should be secularized as it is in the United States. In some countries, such as Peru and Argentina, the Church is not very cordially disposed towards the United States. The women of Latin America are shocked at the freedom prevailing in relations between the sexes in the United States, particularly among

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the young as depicted in our movies. They raise questions concerning the breakdown of family life here, and wonder at the place enjoyed by the divorcée in our society. In short, the Latin Americans do not regard us as *simpatico*. Our philosophy of life is that of the pragmatist. We ask of an idea, "Does it work?" Their philosophy is that of the traditionalist. They ask, "Does it conform to our ways of doing things?" If not, then "Why change those ways?" The Latin Americans look upon us somewhat as the Athenians looked upon the Macedonians — as an active, virile, efficient people without culture. In our civilization it is the businessman who is everywhere given first place; in theirs, it is rather the scholar — with the general always in the background. Until recently, Latin Americans sent their children to be educated in France, which they regard as *le pays le plus civilisé*.

Will these disruptive factors result in the breakdown of hemisphere solidarity when the menace of the present war is removed? It is difficult to say. But it might be pointed out that few nations differ more in language, race, religion, systems of law, and attitudes towards life, or have a longer record of hostility towards each other, than France and England; and that almost until the outbreak of the present war there was an influential element in Britain more friendly to Germany than to France. Yet today the French and British are bound together by one of the closest alliances in history. The fact of the matter is that relations between states are determined by national interests — economic, political and strategic. True, the economic interests of Argentina and Uruguay tie them in a greater degree to England than to the United States. But what they and all other Latin American nations want most is security and peace in order to develop their national lives — and security and peace are to be found only in hemisphere solidarity.

III. PAN AMERICANISM

It is a common mistake to assume, because the Pan American Conference called by Bolívar at Panama in 1826 was a failure, that the effort was not worth making. That gathering provided an ideal which has remained in the Latin American mind ever since. True, no serious attempt was made to realize that ideal until 1889, when Secretary of State James G. Blaine called the first real Pan American Conference in Washington. Blaine's primary objective was to increase trade between the United

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States and Latin America. Bolívar's ideal had been very different — to organize a federation of states which would maintain peace and hold periodic conferences for considering problems of all kinds concerning the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere, especially the Latin portion of it. At the first conference (held in 1889–1890) provision was made for a bureau to be established at Washington under the administration of the Secretary of State of the United States. This agency was to be a sort of publicity bureau for giving commercial information and advice. The Buenos Aires Conference of 1910 reorganized the bureau and changed its name to the Pan American Union. Until very recently, Latin Americans have regarded the Union as merely an appendage to our State Department.

At the Fifth Pan American Conference, held at Santiago, Chile, in 1923, open hostility was manifested towards the United States, partly because of the suspicions aroused in Latin America by our imperialist policy in the Caribbean, partly because of the arrogant way in which the American delegation at the Conference tried to smother any attempt to discuss political and contentious questions. In fact, the evidences of ill will towards the United States shown by the Latin American delegates at Santiago were so pronounced as to startle our State Department. The very strong delegation headed by Charles E. Hughes which we sent to the Sixth Conference (held at Havana in 1928) therefore adopted a somewhat more conciliatory attitude, though with little effect because the United States still sought to keep the proceedings on a non-political plane.

Almost simultaneously with President Roosevelt's enunciation of the Good Neighbor Policy, Adolf Hitler attained supreme power in Germany and began to rearm that country at a feverish pace. Two years later, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and the subsequent failure of sanctions showed the weakness of the League of Nations as an instrument for collective security. These facts made a deep impression on the Latin American countries, most of which belonged to the League. The armaments race into which Europe plunged in ever increasing frenzy also greatly alarmed peoples on this side of the Atlantic. When early in 1936 President Roosevelt suggested the convocation of an Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, all the other American Republics concurred unanimously. The Conference, which met at Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936, was opened by

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President Roosevelt. His reception was most cordial and the atmosphere in which the discussions were held gave evidence of happier relations between the United States and the Latin American countries.

At Buenos Aires, Mr. Hull proposed a treaty containing the following points, most of which were accepted by the Conference: (1) The coördination of the multilateral peace agreements which had been signed at previous conferences but which in no case had been ratified by all the American Republics. (2) Consultation in case of any threat to peace through a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee. However, on the insistence of Argentina, the Conference agreed that consultation should be *ad hoc*. (3) The establishment of a common neutrality policy in the event of an inter-American war. In an Additional Protocol of Non-Intervention it was agreed that the procedure provided by the pact for collective security should be invoked were any country, American or non-American, to intervene in the foreign or domestic affairs of another. *This practically made the Monroe Doctrine a multilateral affair.* Mr. Hull's peace structure was topped by a Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Coöperation, which was adopted by the Conference as it closed. Mr. Hull also presented two resolutions on international trade; but since the leading South American countries followed autarchic policies, his resolutions were amended by a proviso that the signatories should act "to the extent that the several national economies permit." This amendment, of course, reduced the resolution to meaningless words.

The Buenos Aires Conference disclosed that the United States still did not see eye to eye with the Latin American nations on all questions and that even the latter by no means always acted in harmony with one another. Nevertheless, they unanimously adopted a Declaration affirming the principle of the equality of states, proscribing territorial conquests, condemning intervention and the forcible collection of public debts, and accepting the obligation to settle international disputes pacifically. In so doing they set up peace machinery which was to prove very valuable when the time came to operate it. And certainly not least among the useful achievements of the Conference was the conviction it instilled into the Latin Americans that the United States was not rendering mere lip service to the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Eighth Conference of American States met at Lima on

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December 9, 1938, and devoted itself almost exclusively to an attempt to organize a stronger common American front against external aggression and against the menace of Fascism. Argentina, however, opposed any effective defensive agreement in the Western Hemisphere even though Secretary Hull made it clear that such a policy did not involve isolation from Europe. The United States delegation proposed a convention providing that the American Republics should act in concert to oppose any threat from a non-American state. Argentina was willing for the states to consult, insisting that each one should act independently. Nevertheless, the United States managed at Lima to secure the machinery for consultation which it had been unable to get at Buenos Aires. The Declaration of Lima, which finally resulted from these negotiations, though expressed in vague terms, was a distinct advance in the peace program of the American Republics. At Lima, as at Montevideo and Buenos Aires, Mr. Hull's unquestioned sincerity, broadmindedness and willingness to make concessions in the interest of harmony won universal recognition, and his resolution committing the American Republics to liberal trade practices was unanimously adopted — though not implemented.

Even if the gains made at Lima were largely in the imponderables, hemisphere solidarity had been reaffirmed and the principle of a "common concern" for the peace of this continent had been emphasized. Most important of all was the fact that the Latin American countries were now convinced that the United States based its relations with them upon fair play, reciprocal accommodation and mutual trust. Some American supporters of the League of Nations professed to see in these developments a tendency to isolate the nations of the Western Hemisphere from the rest of the world. But, in view of the fact that the French and British themselves were withdrawing more and more from activity in the Far East and thus leaving to the United States the burden of holding Japan in check, and inasmuch as the United States Government almost invariably took a very lively diplomatic interest in the recurring crises that arose in Europe, this criticism is a little difficult to understand. Some of our British friends, forgetting the Ottawa Agreements, also deplored what they considered an attempt to divert trade from its "natural" channels. But what really concerned most of these critics was the steady advance of Pan Americanism from ideal to reality — and Pan

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Americanism is the most hopeful reality on the world's political horizon today.

IV. THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA

The occasion for testing the strength of this newly achieved hemisphere solidarity was not long in arriving. On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. In accordance with the procedure for consultation set up at Buenos Aires and Lima, the Government of Panama invited the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics to meet at its capital. This they did on September 23, and at once unanimously affirmed their determination to present a united front for the maintenance of their rights and the preservation of peace in this hemisphere. At this conference the delegates devoted most of their thought and time to the problem of keeping the American Republics from becoming involved in the European conflict. Towards this end they adopted the now famous Declaration of Panama.

This Declaration states that "there can be no justification for the interests of the belligerents to prevail over the rights of neutrals . . . which by their . . . distance from the scene of events, should not be burdened with its fatal and painful consequences," and that therefore "the waters to a reasonable distance from their coasts (*i.e.*, the American Republics) shall remain free . . . from the undertaking of belligerent activities by nations engaged in a war in which the said governments are not involved." To give effect to this assertion the Declaration created a security zone large enough to contain all the normal maritime routes of communication and trade between the countries of America. Generally speaking, this zone (which is not to be construed as an extension of territorial waters) stretches to a distance of 300 miles from the coasts of all American countries save Canada and the possessions of European states. Provision is made in the Declaration to "undertake . . . to patrol either individually or collectively as may be agreed upon by common consent . . . the waters adjacent to their coasts" within the zone, and for consultation as to measures "which they may individually or collectively undertake" to secure the observance of the Declaration.

The Declaration of Panama was not in conformity with international law as understood at the time of its announcement. But international law is not static. In the past, belligerent rights have

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always dominated neutral rights in time of war. The depths of belligerent illegality reached in the present war prove that the rights of no neutral will receive consideration unless it has the power and will to enforce them. A single nation, even as powerful a one as Japan, would be ill-advised to make such a sweeping pronouncement. But the Declaration of Panama was made by twenty-one states (almost one-third of all those in the world) occupying contiguous territory far removed from the scene of conflict. It is by such measures, gradually accepted, that the scope and effectiveness of international law are advanced.

The Declaration of Panama is in the nature of a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine — a sort of front line of defense to protect it. When President Monroe delivered his momentous speech in 1823, almost every state outside of this hemisphere ignored it. Metternich called it a piece of impertinence, and as late as the era of Bismarck many European statesmen referred to it in similar terms. Moreover, during the first fifty years of its existence it was repeatedly violated. Yet today it commands almost universal respect. Is it not possible that the Declaration of Panama, which is aimed solely at the protection of the Western Hemisphere and is directed against no nation's legitimate interests, may likewise gain strength with the passage of time? Admittedly, the Monroe Doctrine won acceptance from foreign nations only as the power of the United States increased. The degree to which the Declaration of Panama is accepted will likewise depend upon the power of this country to enforce it. We may need a two-ocean navy to do it, but that would be a small price to pay for our "peace and safety."

In spite of all this, the Declaration of Panama was received with considerable skepticism in this country; many critics regarded it as an unrealizable and possibly even dangerous program. As for the belligerents, they all rejected it. The British Admiralty declared that it was for the belligerents to decide "whether or not to accept restrictions which would limit their enjoyment of certain well established rights." Apparently it is not for the neutrals to decide whether or not to accept restrictions which limit their rights. One frequently hears the statement that it would probably be impossible to patrol so vast an area as that provided in the Declaration. That is certainly true. And indeed, both sides in the present war have violated it, and instead of imposing penalties, the American Republics have

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only issued warnings. But it is doubtful whether the conferees at Panama originally intended to apply penalties during this war. It is more likely that their intention was merely to issue warnings in order to keep the record straight until the close of the war, at which time the entire problem could be considered calmly and deliberately in the light of whatever experience had been gained.

Some of the Declaration's critics have pointed out that an attempt to implement it by force might lead to war. This also is probably true. But there is no need to implement the Declaration by force in order to secure its observance by the belligerents. The American neutrals need only refuse entrance into their ports by naval ships of a nation violating the Declaration. Such exclusion would be entirely within their rights, and when applied impartially ought not to arouse resentment. During the First World War, Norway, Sweden, Holland and Spain forbade belligerent submarines to enter their territorial waters except in case of distress. None of the belligerents in this war except Canada possesses territory on the Pacific coast of this hemisphere. Britain and France have colonies in the Caribbean area, access to which is of course their right. To prevent any of the belligerents from refueling and revictualing their naval vessels in western hemisphere ports might seriously cripple them. It is, however, difficult to see what redress they would have. None of them would be likely to declare war upon the twenty-one American Republics. If necessary, the prohibition might be extended to merchant vessels. That such a policy will be undertaken is highly unlikely, but it might be valuable as a deterrent in another kind of war.

A more immediately urgent problem than the enforcement of the 300-mile neutrality zone was recently presented the American Republics by the German occupation of Denmark and The Netherlands. Both of those countries possess colonies in the Western Hemisphere, and the question naturally arose as to what would become of them. The Monroe Doctrine states that we will not interfere with the existing colonies of any European Power. A change of sovereignty over these possessions would, however, be quite another matter, for the Doctrine characterizes any attempts by European Powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The extension of Nazi totalitarianism would certainly come within the meaning of this declaration. Furthermore, a resolution was passed at the Panama Conference of September 1939

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calling for immediate consultation among the American Republics whenever the question of such a change in sovereignty should arise. In the case of Greenland, Canada would also presumably be consulted.

Thus far there has been no question of transferring the sovereignty of either the Danish or Dutch possessions. Denmark is still nominally an independent country, though under German "protection." Shortly after the German invasion of Holland, Allied forces occupied the Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba in the Caribbean in order to prevent possible destruction of the oil tanks and refining plants located there. This action was taken without the previous consent of our State Department, but we can assume that assurances have been given that these forces will withdraw at the end of the war no matter who should be victorious. If the Allies are victors, we can take it for granted that the islands will revert to The Netherlands. If Germany is victorious and retains control of Denmark and The Netherlands, will she be allowed to inherit their colonial possessions in this hemisphere? Not unless the Monroe Doctrine has become a "scrap of paper."

The present war has admirably illustrated one significant difference between Europe and America. The Europe of 1939 consisted of some twenty-five sovereign national states, divided by race, language and tradition, and often warring with each other. The fact that Hitler is now in the process of imposing Nazi domination on most of them must not obscure the further fact that this domination will not last forever; for no matter what happens, Europe will always remain split up into many quite diverse cultural units. The Western Hemisphere, in the large, is made up of only two great civilizations, the Iberian (Spanish and Portuguese) and the Anglo-Saxon. These two civilizations differ from each other in many ways, but they are now united in one most important resolve, namely, to make this hemisphere a haven of peace and to arrange for its adequate defense. In this they have given a splendid illustration of one kind of *Union Now*. Europe might profit by their example.

V. CANADA AND PAN AMERICANISM

Thus far we have not taken Canada into consideration. Yet this nation is one of the most important in the Western Hemisphere. What is its relation to the Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor Policy and Pan Americanism? The answers to the first

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two are easy to give. Canada has been the most secure nation in the world, for she could rely upon both the British fleet and the Monroe Doctrine to protect her. She believes wholeheartedly in the Monroe Doctrine. She believes equally wholeheartedly in the Good Neighbor Policy and has for years been a real exemplar of the good neighbor. But what about her relation to Pan Americanism? When the Pan American Building in Washington was erected in 1910, Canada's coat of arms was built into it alongside those of the other American nations. But the Dominion has never been invited by the Pan American Union to become a member and has never asked or shown any desire to join. Indeed, even if she wanted to join she could not, because membership in that body is at present restricted to "American Republics." However, the Union would find little difficulty in changing its membership rules if it became desirable to admit Canada. In the last analysis, of course, it is for Canada herself to decide whether she will gain more or lose more by joining the Pan American Union.

In actual practice as distinct from legal forms, Canada is an independent and sovereign state. She is at the same time a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the League of Nations. She demonstrated her loyalty to Britain and the Commonwealth by voluntarily declaring war on Germany. She nevertheless decides her own foreign policy, as was shown in 1922 when she refused to respond to Lloyd George's request for help in his imperialistic attack upon Turkey. After the League's failure to enforce drastic sanctions upon Italy, Canada notified Geneva that henceforth the Canadian Parliament would decide in each specific case whether the Dominion would participate in other such attempts. At present, only ten of the twenty-one American Republics still remain members of the League. The question therefore is: Will the *débâcle* of the League make Canada more likely to join the Pan American Union in the near future and thereby become a member of a third international group?

It is doubtful whether Great Britain would favor this. The first principle of British foreign policy today is to strengthen in every possible way the bonds that bind the members of the Commonwealth to the mother country and to one another. The second is to maintain peace and cordial relations with the United States. To what extent would Canada's joining the Pan American Union affect those principles? Great Britain might well look on it as a weakening of the British Commonwealth. Economically,

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Britain profits greatly by Canada's place in the Commonwealth because of the tariff preference she enjoys in the Canadian market. Also, Britain is about the only market for Canada's great annual wheat surplus. But there is much to be said on the other side. The major portion of the capital invested in Canada has come from the United States, and American control over Canadian industry is steadily growing.

Spiritually, allowance must be made for the tremendous attraction which the United States exercises over Canada. According to the last American census (1930), 1,278,000 of the inhabitants in this country were born in Canada. This represents a considerable proportion of all Canadian-born persons. Americans and Canadians are at bottom much more alike than Englishmen and Canadians. Canadians read American, not English, magazines, listen to American radio broadcasts, see American movies. Canadians and Americans cross their undefended frontier practically without hindrance. The first objective of Canada's foreign policy is to retain friendly relations with the United States. This was made clear in 1922 when Great Britain put an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 largely because of Canadian pressure. Both of the principal political parties in Canada believe that the Dominion should preserve its membership in the British Commonwealth; in recent years, however, the Liberals have shown a tendency to favor a stronger emphasis on Canada's North American connections. What influence the present war will have upon this division of opinion, only time can tell.

In the British Commonwealth of Nations, Great Britain is — because of her large population, wealth and military strength — the most influential member; but it does not compare in this respect to the position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Canada occupies a very influential place in the British Commonwealth of Nations. She would not have the same degree of importance as a participant in the Pan American Union. Moreover, such participation might endanger her first principle of foreign policy: she might by the force of circumstances be impelled to take a position on a contentious problem at variance with the United States. At present, Canada's relations with the members of the Pan American Union are on a happy basis. To the suggestion that she shift the focus of her loyalty from the Commonwealth to Pan America, may not Canada therefore with justice reply — *Cui bono?*

But the law of life is change, and never more so than in the

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world of today. At the end of the present war, Canada must decide what is to be her attitude toward Pan Americanism. The other nations in this hemisphere stand firmly for a decent respect for the rights of neutrals in order that the Western Hemisphere may remain a haven for peace in any future conflict. None of these nations wishes to see Canada withdraw from the British Commonwealth. Yet will they in the future look kindly upon the Dominion if it brings armed conflict to this hemisphere every time Great Britain goes to war? Unless Hitler wins this war, Canada may be called upon to make her choice.

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FAR EASTERN TRIANGLE

By K. K. Kawakami

EVER since the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after the Washington Conference of 1921–22, the Far Eastern policy of the United States has apparently been based upon the assumption that British and American interests in China are identical. For this reason Washington has taken it for granted that in the Orient London will pursue a policy parallel to that of the United States. But this assumption has in fact not always been justified by events during the last eighteen years, for Britain's Far East policy has often run counter to the wishes of the American Government. True, the present war in Europe has momentarily given added support to the American theory of parallel action now that Britain finds it imperative to retain the good will of the United States. Yet the irony of fate is such that the same war is bringing about England's reconciliation with Japan.

After the World War, British opinion was divided as to whether or not the Japanese Alliance should be terminated. The British people in general, and Downing Street in particular, were in favor of keeping it alive. Several leading statesmen — notably Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Lord Curzon and Lord Lee of Fareham — were also of this opinion. At an imperial conference held at London in 1921, India, Australia and New Zealand expressed themselves against the abrogation of the Alliance, though Canada, presumably under American influence, insisted upon its termination. Meanwhile Washington had made up its mind to break up the Alliance by any means. Secretary Hughes even intimated to the British Ambassador in Washington that if England refused to part company with Japan, Congress might register its displeasure by passing a resolution recognizing the Irish Republic.

The American Government took this firm stand against the Alliance in spite of assurances from both Japan and England that under no circumstances would it be invoked against the United States. As revised in 1911 the Alliance absolved England and Japan from any obligation to go to the other's aid if one of them were involved in a war with the United States. This provision was embodied in the following terms: "Should either High Con-

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tracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force." Unfortunately, the American Senate failed to ratify the arbitration treaty which Britain concluded in order to give effect to this article of the Alliance. Nevertheless, both Tokyo and London made it clear that they considered its provisions fully effective, since they held that the Bryan Peace Commission Treaty of 1914 was a general arbitration agreement. Yet this explanation did not satisfy Washington.

Why did Britain continue to desire the Alliance even after the German menace had been eliminated? The answer is that England was now faced with a totally new danger, that of Communist revolution along the Asiatic fringes of her empire in Afghanistan, India and China. In order to cope with this new peril Britain maintained friendly relations with Japan. She knew, of course, that Japan herself had become a rival, a dangerous rival, in China; but that was only added reason for regarding the Alliance as essential to British interests. This reasoning was not paradoxical. England believed that she could restrain Japan's ambitions in China by befriending her. Up to the very eve of the Washington Conference, Britain and the Dominions, except Canada and South Africa, hoped the Alliance could somehow be saved. With that hope in mind they proposed that an international conference convene at London to discuss the Far Eastern situation prior to the meeting at Washington. This plan was vetoed by the United States, which suspected that it was conceived in a desire to preserve the Alliance. In the end the American Government scuttled the Alliance at the Washington Conference and substituted the so-called Four Power Pacific Treaty.

The termination of the Alliance left Japan in no happy mood, for she had come almost superstitiously to rely upon British coöperation. In China especially, she had regarded British support as essential for maintaining her political and economic position. Quite naturally she felt as though the keystone had fallen out of her diplomatic arch when the Washington Conference tolled the knell of the Alliance.

But Japanese statesmen, though they knew that the American Government was responsible for the end of the Alliance, nonetheless adopted a policy of friendliness towards the United States

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and guided public sentiment so as to promote that policy. As they saw it, the World War had shaken the British Empire to its foundations, while the United States, on the other hand, had emerged as the greatest Power in the world. Japan had to face this fact in reorienting her diplomacy. They also knew that her growing influence in China might conflict with Britain's vast interests there, while she could foresee no such conflict with the United States, whose Chinese interests were small. It was no doubt these considerations which persuaded Tokyo to pursue a policy of friendliness towards Washington in preference to London.

The Japanese public was not fully informed as to the part played by Washington in terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but was allowed to gain the impression that England, having got all the good out of it, had then left Japan in the lurch. This widespread belief, coupled with a rising anti-British sentiment in China, rendered England's position increasingly difficult. Britain had consented to abrogate the Alliance in the hope that China, which had vigorously opposed it, would become more friendly. She had also hoped that, should her Chinese interests be seriously menaced by China or Japan, the United States, which had offered its coöperation in place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, would come to her rescue. Neither of these hopes was *fulfilled*.

By the beginning of 1925 it was evident that a *putsch* against British interests was about to take place in China. In the fall of 1926 the Chinese Nationalists — partly financed by Moscow and guided by Borodin, Galen (later known as General Bluecher) and other Bolshevik emissaries — surged through South China and established themselves in the Yangtze valley, long Britain's exclusive sphere of influence. They flaunted such slogans as "Down with the British" and "Away with British exploitation." Indeed, the success of the Nationalists' campaign was primarily due to their anti-British propaganda promising the masses that if British imperialism were put to rout all would be well with China. Downing Street sounded out Tokyo and Washington for help, but in vain. That Japan should be cool to the British request was understandable enough; but many Englishmen, remembering the American promise of coöperation at the Washington Conference, were disappointed with the aloofness of the United States. Under these circumstances Britain could only retreat before the Nationalist onslaughts.

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And so His Majesty's Government, on December 18, 1926, proposed to the Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty that certain surtaxes which the Nationalists had levied on foreign trade in violation of treaty obligations be recognized and regularized. To this friendly gesture the Nationalists responded in January 1927 by forcibly seizing the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiu-kiang. In March, Nationalist agitation against the British in Nanking led to the looting of several foreign consulates and many foreign firms, residences and missionary institutions, and the murder or serious injury of several prominent foreigners. The situation became so deplorable that on May 9, Sir Austen Chamberlain admitted in the House of Commons that "the Nationalist Government have neither observed the spirit of the agreement signed at Hankow, nor have they made any attempt to reciprocate the friendly attitude which we have displayed towards them." And yet "His Majesty's Government are," Sir Austen declared almost in the same breath, "unwilling, even under such provocation as they have received, to abandon their hope that this friendly policy will presently evoke an equally friendly response from a Chinese Government freed from foreign domination and thus enabled to devote itself to the single-minded service of the interests of the Chinese."

Hitherto English businessmen in China had assumed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance served to advance Japanese interests at their expense, and that once this pact was dissolved British influence and trade would again have smooth sailing. Now, however, they were sadly disillusioned, some of them frankly admitting their blunder in casting aside Japanese friendship. Boycotted by the Chinese, singled out for attack by "Red" agitators, and uncertain of the value of American friendship, these Britishers began to advocate a pro-Japanese reorientation in London's foreign policy.

In England, too, this sentiment found sympathizers, especially in Conservative circles. Although the Government itself had no intention of reversing the policy adopted at the Washington Conference, it nevertheless felt that Britain's termination of the Alliance with Japan had placed her in no bed of roses. This feeling was the more poignant since the American attitude towards the English in China seemed to be one of rivalry rather than of coöperation. When Downing Street made its proposal that the Powers should regularize the Nationalists' illegal levy of surtaxes

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upon foreign imports, Washington felt — at least it was so stated in American newspapers — that Britain had stolen a march on the United States by attempting to play the "big brother" to China, a rôle it had long considered an American monopoly. In any event, Secretary of State Kellogg, in a public statement on January 26, 1927, went much farther than the British in this Chinese tariff question. Mr. Kellogg emphasized American solicitude for China's "unity, independence, and prosperity," and declared that "the United States is now and has been ever since the negotiation of the Washington treaty prepared to enter into negotiations with any Government of China or delegates who can represent or speak for China not only for the putting into force of the surtaxes of the Washington treaty, but entirely releasing tariff control and restoring complete tariff autonomy to China." It looked as though the winning of Chinese good will had become a matter of rivalry between Washington and London. And indeed, on July 25, 1928, Secretary Kellogg surprised the world by making public the text of a brief treaty which had been hastily signed by Mr. T. V. Soong, the Nationalist Finance Minister, and Mr. John V. A. MacMurray, the American Minister at Peiping, and in which the United States recognized "the principle of complete national tariff autonomy" for China — a recognition which Britain was unwilling to grant.

Such was the history of the divergences between British and American policies *vis-à-vis* Japan and China during the decade following the World War. These differences were thrown into still clearer relief by the Manchurian "incident" of 1931. To frustrate Japan's designs on Manchuria, Secretary of State Stimson repeatedly urged the League of Nations, whose interest in the crisis seemed only half-hearted, to take measures strong enough to check Japanese aggression. He also made several direct approaches to Downing Street. His final proposal was that England and the United States jointly invoke the Nine Power Treaty, because — as Mr. Stimson says in his book "The Far Eastern Crisis" — economic sanctions against Japan "would have more chance of being adopted by Congress if it were recommended following the invocation of the Nine Power Treaty than if it had been recommended solely by the League of Nations." Several times Mr. Stimson called Sir John Simon on the trans-Atlantic telephone, and each time the British Foreign Secretary's reply was so lukewarm and uncertain that Mr. Stimson had to

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admit that "my plan was blocked" and that "the British non-joinder obviously killed the possibility of any such *démarche*." In the British view, Manchuria was merely an outlying territory of China where British interests were small and from which England could gracefully retreat with no vital sacrifice. British statesmen believed that the part of wisdom for Britain was to keep Japanese friendship in order to preserve their much larger interests in China proper during the years to follow.

Under its non-recognition doctrine the United States treated Manchukuo as if it were an outcast. The English, on the other hand, in 1934 sent there an economic mission led by Lord Barnby and representing the powerful Federation of British Industries. The mission was "unofficial" and "non-political;" but no one, reading its highly favorable report on Manchukuo, could help attaching to it a greater significance than met the eye. A year later an American economic mission made a tour of the Far East, but studiously avoided Manchukuo and in its report said not a word about the economic prospects of that area. It is hard to believe that American businessmen could have been so sentimental except under political influence.

On April 18, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office, through Mr. Eiji Amau, Chief of the Information Bureau and so-called "spokesman," issued a statement enunciating a principle which was regarded abroad as an imitation of the Monroe Doctrine. Its English version, as given out in Tokyo, was vague in meaning and very clumsy in phraseology. The translation published the same day by the British Foreign Office was much clearer. It said in part: ". . . supplying China with war aeroplanes, building of aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China, and other countries and to disturb peace and order of Eastern Asia. Japan will oppose such projects. The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from policies she has pursued in the past, but on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign Powers, under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time."

The Japanese were moved to make this declaration as a result of several alarming rumors. For one thing, it was reported that powerful American interests had been supplying China with

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military planes and pilots and had even obtained a concession to build an airfield at a point on the Fukien coast eighty miles from a Japanese naval harbor off Formosa. For another, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Financial Adviser to the British Government, had been evolving a plan to give China considerable financial aid. Then too, the League of Nations had been sending various experts to China to find out how best it could help the Nanking Government.

On April 30, Mr. Hull issued a formal statement, of which the tenor is indicated by the following sentence: "In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in a situation where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign States." The American Ambassador at Tokyo was instructed to reiterate these views to the Japanese Foreign Office.

The British Foreign Office, however, talked in another language. On May 18, 1934, Sir John Simon told the House of Commons that the Nine Power Treaty contained no provision whereby "this country undertook to respect and preserve the integrity of Chinese territory." "It is not true," he declared, "that we have ever signed, or . . . anyone has signed, a treaty with China in which we have pledged ourselves to use all our forces to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China including Manchuria." Furthermore, the British Foreign Office seems to have inclined to the belief that the activities of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross in China were inimical to England's friendly relations with Japan. An Associated Press dispatch, dated London, November 26, 1935, reported that the "British Foreign Office disapproves his [Sir Frederick's] whole mission and particularly disapproves the wordy exchanges . . . between him and the Japanese," and that while his activities were supported by the Treasury the "Foreign Office believes . . . that any attempt to restore China's finances is doomed until there is political agreement between China and Japan."

All this seems to justify the assumption that the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not change the basic principle of British policy towards Japan — that an aggressive Japan could best be restrained, not by fault-finding and nagging, but by friendliness and conciliation. Since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese

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hostilities in July 1937 this policy has been put to a severer test than ever before. The sinking of the British gunboat *Ladybird* in the Yangtze and the bombing of the motorcar in which the British Ambassador to China was travelling from Nanking to Shanghai, even though accidental, taxed British pride. The Japanese blockade of the British Concession at Tientsin caused Mr. Chamberlain to say in the House of Commons on August 4, 1939, that "it makes my blood boil to hear and read some things that have been happening there." And yet, in spite of all the exasperating things which have been happening in China, the indications are that England, following her traditional policy, will eventually come to terms with Japan.

At the Brussels Conference, called in November 1937 to condemn Japan's acts in China, Mr. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, was obviously content to play second fiddle to the American delegate, Mr. Norman H. Davis. The resolution adopted by the Conference was mainly the work of the American delegation. The Japanese interpreted these facts as another evidence of Britain's reluctance to make herself the butt of Japan's enmity, a reluctance that became more and more pronounced as the European situation deteriorated.

On July 15, 1939, the British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, opened conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita. The British authorities at Tientsin had rejected a Japanese demand that four Chinese terrorists, who at a point inside the British Concession had assassinated the pro-Japanese superintendent of the Tientsin Customs, be handed over to the local Chinese court for trial. The Japanese had replied on June 15 by blockading the Concession. In reality, England hoped that the settlement of the Tientsin affair would prove a starting point for the improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations along broader fronts.

By July 24 the conferees had agreed upon general principles applicable not only to the Tientsin imbroglio but to the Chinese situation as a whole. On that day Sir Robert therefore signed the following memorandum:

> His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognise the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note that, as long as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control and

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that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy. His Majesty's Government have no intention of countenancing any act or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by Japanese forces and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.

When the British memorandum was made public, Washington was agog. Outwardly the State Department maintained a decorous silence. Nevertheless, on July 26, two days after the Craigie-Arita understanding had been made public, it notified the Japanese Embassy of its decision to abrogate the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911. Was there any connection between this sudden American move and the Anglo-Japanese agreement at Tokyo? In Tokyo, at any rate, the American notification has been interpreted as a move to bolster the "wavering" British. The Japanese Foreign Office, in response to persistent public clamor, let Mr. Seijiro Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau, explain the American move over the nationwide broadcasting system. "On July 26, at 4 p.m. (July 27, 5 a.m. Tokyo time)," he said, "the State Department handed to the Japanese Embassy a very brief note for treaty termination with the verbal advice that the document spoke for itself, that no further explanation was necessary, and that it would be given to the press at once. Only at the Embassy's request was its publication withheld for a few hours to give the Tokyo Foreign Office just enough time to receive the note before it was flashed across the Pacific by the press." Why, asked Yoshizawa, was the abrogation done so suddenly? "Perhaps," he suggested, "the American move had something to do with the Anglo-Japanese conversations which had been in progress in Tokyo."

The Craigie memorandum of July 24 was duly communicated to Washington by the British Government. To the questions which the State Department doubtless asked, the British apparently replied with assurances that though no change was contemplated in their policy of Anglo-American coöperation, they regretted that the European situation did not permit them to pursue in China a course exactly parallel to that of the United States. This much at least was gathered from Mr. Chamberlain's address before the House of Commons on August 5, 1939, when he declared that "if the British Government says it does not regard this formula [the Craigie-Arita memorandum] as making any

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change in our policy, as indeed it does not, that is much more important than the alteration of words in a formula which has been arrived at after much difficulty and hours of discussion." In reply to a question as to why Britain could not follow the American example and denounce her commercial treaty with Japan, Mr. Chamberlain pointed to the "fundamental difference of the United States of America and its isolation from Europe and this country," and said that "we would much rather settle our differences with the Japanese by discussion and negotiation." The Prime Minister concluded with these words: "We shall endeavour to show patience and to exercise reasonable moderation, recognizing that behind all these outrageous things [done by the Japanese] there may be some genuine suspicion on the part of the Japanese in China about our treatment of them, but above all let us not forget that there may be even graver and nearer problems to be considered in the course of the next few months."

Besides the threat of war across the Channel, Downing Street had to consider the possibility, even probability, of Japan's joining the Berlin-Rome Axis, not only to combat the Comintern but to form a united military front against England and France. Even while Mr. Chamberlain was uttering the above-quoted words, Berlin and Rome were moving heaven and earth to obtain a quick and favorable decision from Japan. In Tokyo too a powerful group had been vigorously working to push Japan into the projected triple alliance. What would become of Hong Kong and of Britain's tremendous investments in China, were Japan to ally with Germany? Worse, what would happen in India if Japan were to sweep British influence from East Asia? Would not Australia, New Zealand and the British possessions in the South Pacific be opened to an attack by the Japanese Navy? Certainly, these questions received a most serious consideration at Whitehall during the critical days of August 1939.

Hitler's scuttling of the Anti-Comitern league by joining hands with Stalin made the situation even more ominous, for Berlin now urged Tokyo to come to terms with Moscow so that a great bloc extending from the Rhine to the Pacific might be created. This, coupled with the abrogation of the American commercial treaty with Japan, was a portent which England could not ignore. Indeed, history does not lack instances in which American pressure or antagonism drove Japan into Russia's arms. Secretary Knox's famous Manchurian railway scheme to "smoke Japan out," as

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he expressed it, led to the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1911. The hostility of the United States towards the Sino-Japanese agreement resulting from the so-called "Twenty-one Demands" was largely responsible for the virtual alliance between Tokyo and Moscow in 1916. The enactment in 1924 of the American Immigration Law with Japanese exclusion clauses was followed by Japan's recognition of Soviet Russia.

The Anglo-Japanese conversations at Tokyo were suspended soon after the United States notified Japan that it was terminating the treaty, largely because — so the Japanese believed — Downing Street was momentarily heartened. But the suspension was short-lived, for following the outbreak of the European War in September 1939, England has felt more keenly than ever the need for better relations with Japan. But before Britain can establish such relations, she must meet Japan halfway in the spirit of the Craigie-Arita memorandum of July 24, even if this runs counter to American wishes. In July Britain had already consented to hand over to the native police the four Chinese terrorists and had also agreed to certain measures of coöperation between the British Concession police and the Japanese authorities at Tientsin. What remains for further discussion is the Japanese demand that the silver worth about £8,000,000 held by a Nationalist bank in the Concession be turned over to the Japanese-sponsored New Chinese Government at Peiping, and that the *fapi*, or legal currency of the Chiang Kai-shek régime, be prohibited within the said Concession.

At this writing both the silver and *fapi* questions seem about to be settled. And when these matters are out of the way, the blockade of the British and French concessions will be lifted, even though the Japanese forces on the spot may prove recalcitrant.

On March 28, 1940, only two days before the inauguration of Wang Ching-wei's secessionist government at Nanking, Ambassador Craigie surprised the Japanese — and the Americans — by making a very significant speech plainly bidding for Japan's friendship. Said Sir Robert:

> Bearing in mind the declared intentions of the Japanese government and the measure of success already achieved, I have a definite feeling of confidence in the future of Anglo-Japanese relations. . . . Japan and Great Britain are two maritime powers on the fringe of great continents and they are vitally concerned with the covenants in those continents. . . . Methods may differ but both are ultimately striving for the same objective — a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous and subversive influences.

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It is surely not beyond the powers of constructive statesmanship to bring the aims of their national policies into full harmony.

Again there was a stir in Washington. What a difference, in tone and implication, between Sir Robert's address and Ambassador Grew's famous "straight-from-the-horse's-mouth" speech delivered in Tokyo the previous October! But London took pains to explain that the Craigie speech had no political significance. Lord Halifax in the House of Lords, and Mr. Butler in the House of Commons, stated that there was no question of any change in British policy in China, though they added that this attitude was not incompatible with a wish to see an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, neither Sir Robert nor his Government could have failed to foresee that the Japanese were bound to read political significance into such a speech. Three days after it had been delivered, Secretary Hull issued a statement denouncing, in language more vigorous than he had used in any of his previous statements on China, the inauguration of the Wang Ching-wei régime. Meanwhile, Downing Street was eloquently silent on the advent of the new Nanking Government. Here was a clear indication of the relative position of London and Washington *vis-à-vis* the Sino-Japanese situation.

Today, while the United States is buzzing with talk of an embargo against Japan, the British are thinking of extending their trade with her. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose stock is mostly owned by the British Government, has agreed to sell Japan a million barrels of crude oil — an agreement likely to be expanded. The British Foreign Office may be cautious in taking advantage of the American abrogation of the commercial treaty with Japan; but the Treasury and the Ministry of Economic Warfare are understood to be in favor of developing trade opportunities in and with Japan and China. It is considered quite possible that Britain will increase her purchases of Japanese foodstuffs and also reduce tariffs on Japanese textiles imported into India, thus giving Japan the necessary exchange to purchase cotton, oil, machinery and other goods from the British Empire.

Many Americans may regard Britain's concessions to Japan as shocking, as a betrayal of her promise to coöperate with the United States. They have been wont to believe that British and American interests in China were identical. It has seldom occurred to them that this community of interests is subject to severe restrictions. Great as is Britain's stake in China, it sinks to

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relative insignificance when compared with her infinitely greater stakes in other parts of the world, above all, in Europe. The position of the United States is quite different. Free from European entanglements and blessed with an advantageous geographical position, it can concentrate its attention upon the Far East.

Yet the United States has no stake in East Asia other than the Philippines and the Open Door in China. Neither of these interests is vital to the United States; but because it has no other interests in the Far East, it can, if it wishes, devote an undivided attention to them. Particularly in regard to China, it can take vigorous measures against Japan as a sort of hobby, confident that no matter what the Japanese do in retaliation, none of its vital interests will be hurt. On the other hand, England's interests in China are of such magnitude that she cannot apply pressure upon Japan without exposing them to grave danger.

Both the Japanese and the Wang Ching-wei Governments have repeatedly promised to respect the legitimate rights and interests of third Powers in China. Much significance attaches to the qualifying word "legitimate." Is extraterritoriality legitimate? Are foreign settlements and concessions legitimate? Even if the Wang Ching-wei régime considers them "illegitimate," it will take no precipitate action to abolish them, but will allow time for readjustment. Are not the Powers themselves, including the United States, committed to the termination of these *imperia in imperio* within a reasonable time? As for Britain, she evidently believes that her purely or essentially economic interests can best be served by friendliness towards Japan. Take for instance the British attitude towards the Yangtze River trade. There were 35 British ships totalling 68,000 tons engaged in that trade as compared to 8,400 tons of American and 35,000 tons of Japanese shipping. Yet England has never protested to Japan against the temporary closing of the Yangtze as a military measure so vigorously as has the United States. Washington received from Japan prompt apologies and a check for $2,214,007 for the sinking of the gunboat *Panay* and for the damage done to three Standard Oil ships by Japanese bombers along the Yangtze on December 12, 1937; London is still waiting for a settlement due for the sinking of the gunboat *Ladybird* on the same occasion.

On Japan's part there is now a perceptible tendency to appreciate the British attitude, particularly as she feels that her traditional policy of preserving American friendship has proved futile.

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For economic and other reasons Japan's natural preference is for American rather than for British good will. Since the beginning of the hostilities in China she has endeavored to respect, as far as practicable under the exigencies of military operations, American property and American rights, while she has shown no such solicitude for British interests. Now she feels herself forced to reorient her course. If her relations with England improve, the latter's vested rights in China will be treated with more respect. For one thing, vast British railway loans to China which have been in default for many years will be resuscitated if the railways, with the assistance of Japanese technicians and experts, emerge from chaos. England no doubt finds encouragement in this respect in what the Japanese have done for the British-financed Mukden-Shanhaikwan railway in Manchuria. For many years prior to the creation of Manchukuo under Japanese guidance, the income of this railway had been misappropriated by the local warlords, leaving nothing for interest or sinking fund. Promptly upon the appearance of Manchukuo in 1932, the new Government, acting upon Japanese advice, paid all back interest, and has since been punctually paying the sums necessary to service the British loan.

Japan, though discouraged by the United States' adamantine attitude towards her, still sees a ray of hope in the statement made by Secretary Hull on March 30 of this year. This statement, while it condemns the inauguration of the Wang Ching-wei régime, contains a significant sentence: "This Government again makes full reservation of this country's rights under international law and existing treaties and agreements." This idea is the *leitmotif* running through all of Mr. Hull's pronouncements on the Sino-Japanese situation. It is not a new idea; it simply follows America's traditional policy of the Open Door in China enunciated by John Hay forty years ago. That policy looks upon China's Open Door and territorial integrity as a means to an end — and that end is the preservation and promotion of American commercial interests. Secretary Hay himself raised no objection to spheres of influence already established as long as they did not prejudice the equal commercial opportunity of other nations. Japan believes that if American policy can be made to conform to this tradition there is still hope, given reasonable time, for a rapprochement with Washington.

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THE CANADIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM UNDER REVIEW

By J. W. Dafoe

FOR the past two and a half years a Royal Commission [1] has been conducting an inquiry into the working of the Canadian federal system. The Report of this body has now been made public by the Dominion Government.

The inquiry had a very wide range. Public hearings were held in the various Canadian capitals, at which the provincial governments were given an opportunity to present their views and offer their suggestions; and research of the most varied kind was carried out by a staff of experts representing the best scholarship of Canada. The resulting Report is in three volumes. With its annexes and appendices containing studies made for the Commission by economists, accountants, historians, political scientists, and constitutional authorities, it includes some twenty-eight titles and forms a vast compendium of information about present Canadian conditions and their background. One of the three volumes comprising the Report itself gives specific findings and recommendations, makes suggestions as to alternative solutions, and candidly discusses conditions for which no solution is offered. The Report is supported by a book of statistics, tables and documents, and by another which reviews Canadian history since the Dominion was created in 1867.

The inquiry was planned in peacetime and for peacetime purposes. The Dominion Government which appointed the Commission hoped that the facts and documents collected by the Commission and the recommendations made by it would lay the groundwork for a conference between the Dominion and the provinces at which the relations between these governments, which have been accompanied with ever-increasing friction in recent years, could be put on a more satisfactory basis. Though

[1] The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations as appointed August 14, 1937, was as follows: Hon. N. W. Rowell, Chief Justice of Ontario, Chairman; Hon. Thibaudeau Rinfret, Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada; R. A. MacKay, Professor of Government, Dalhousie University, Halifax; Henry F. Angus, Professor of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver; and John W. Dafoe, President of the *Winnipeg Free Press*. While the public hearings were still in progress, Mr. Justice Rinfret and Chief Justice Rowell were forced by ill-health to retire; and the work of the Commission was completed under the Chairmanship of Joseph Sirois, Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law of Laval University, Quebec. Alexander Skelton, Economist of the Bank of Canada, served as Secretary and Director of Research.

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the main findings of the Commission were reached before the outbreak of war, it was deemed unwise to try to adjust them to a wartime situation. Nevertheless, since the major recommendations were framed with the possibility of emergencies in mind, the Dominion and the provinces may possibly find in them some suggestions worthy of early consideration. Certainly, many of the difficulties dealt with in the Report will be aggravated by war conditions. But it is not possible at this writing to say whether the Canadian governments, Federal and provincial, will desire to deal with these large issues during the war.

The reasons for setting up the Commission were clearly stated in the Order in Council appointing it. The Commissioners were instructed to carry out inquiries along certain lines and thereafter "to express what in their opinion, subject to the retention of the distribution of legislative powers, essential to a proper carrying out of the federal system in harmony with national needs and the promotion of national unity, will best effect a balanced relationship between the financial powers and the obligations and functions of each governing body, and conduce to a more efficient, independent and economical discharge of governmental responsibilities in Canada." The Commission was also asked to look into present taxation methods to determine whether, as now allocated and imposed, they are "as equitable as can be devised;" to examine public expenditures and debts to find out whether the present division of the burden of government is equitable and efficient; to investigate Dominion grants and subsidies to the provinces; and above all "to examine the constitutional allocation of revenue sources and governmental burdens to the Dominion and provincial governments, the past results of such allocation and its suitability to present conditions and the conditions that are likely to prevail in the future."

These terms constituted an admission that the constitution of 1867 was, in Carlyle's phrase, refusing to "march," and that the frictions and divergencies of interest could no longer be dealt with by temporary expedients or by bilateral adjustments between the Dominion and an aggrieved province. A situation, long in the making, had been brought to a head by seven years of depression. These frictions and divergencies arose chiefly from the constitutional distribution of powers between the Dominion and the provinces, and from certain policies of the Dominion Government which so accentuated the natural inequalities of the

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provinces that some of them could be classified as "Haves" and others as "Have Nots."

These developments were very dimly foreseen, or not foreseen at all, by the Fathers of Confederation. In its first phase the Confederation had consisted of but four eastern provinces. It was then assumed that these provinces could — and would — share both the burdens and the advantages of the union. In time there came to be imbedded in the Dominion's attitude towards the provinces the doctrine that they had sufficient resources to meet their own needs, that they had equal sources of income, and that no province had a claim on the Dominion that could not also be put forward by all the other provinces. A stubborn adherence to this dogma of an illusory equality has formed a reef upon which the Canadian Confederation has frequently grounded during its seventy-three years of existence. Whatever validity this assumption may once have had was lost as the Dominion expanded. For the Dominion had hardly come into being before it was saddled with the enormous responsibility of extending Canada's boundaries to the Pacific by taking over Rupert's Land as a territory and admitting British Columbia, then a mere colony, into the Confederation as a province. The alternative was to see these British possessions sucked into the United States, then suffering from a particularly severe attack of Manifest Destiny.[2] This westward expansion compelled the Federal Government to adopt policies designed to integrate this vast transcontinental area into a country with common political and economic interests. That is why the Dominion built transcontinental railways involving great public expenditures, settled the prairies by boldly conceived immigration projects, and imposed protective tariffs in order to compel the widely separated parts of Canada to trade with each other.

By and large these grandiose plans were realized, but only at great cost. One of the consequences was the concentration in a few provinces — because of their strategic position — of manufacturing facilities, of corporate bodies directing the larger business enterprises, of wealth derived from Dominion-wide operations, and therefore of an undue proportion of the country's taxable income. Since the provincial governments have un-

[2] The relationship between the course of domestic policies in the United States following the Civil War and the enormous territorial expansion of Canada during the first decade of Confederation is not generally understood. See "American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations" by James M. Callahan, and "Hamilton Fish" by Allan Nevins.

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limited tax powers, except in the field of indirect taxation (though this too has in fact been invaded by skillful flank manœuvres), these economic developments have brought the underprivileged provinces within the taxing range of the more fortunate ones. The assumption that there exists an equality among them with respect to the advantages and burdens of Confederation has thus become manifestly more and more unjust.

Yet all the provinces have suffered from the lack of vision of those who made the Confederation. The allocation of powers to the provinces was made at a time when the obligations of the state to the individual in terms of social services were at a minimum; but the powers thus allocated, as interpreted later by the courts, gave to the provinces responsibility for the whole range of social and welfare services. When these responsibilities came to mean rapidly rising costs, it was apparent that there was no provision for insuring a balanced relationship between the constitutional powers of the provinces and their taxation resources. The social welfare expenses of provinces and municipalities more than doubled between 1913 and 1921, and doubled again between 1921 and 1930. With a parallel rise taking place in education costs, the provinces were already finding it difficult to raise the necessary revenues even before 1929. When the depression broke, conditions became chaotic in even the strongest provinces. The Dominion held the provincial governments responsible for unemployment relief. In turn, the provinces sought at the outset of the depression to hold the municipalities responsible. But the absurdity of this position was soon demonstrated. Up to the end of 1937, out of the approximately one billion dollars spent on relief from all sources, only one-sixth was contributed by the municipalities. The Dominion, in order to keep the provinces from going bankrupt, was obliged to rescue them by grants representing a proportion of the provincial costs, and by loans for general purposes where these were necessary. Nevertheless, the Federal Government never accepted direct responsibility for dealing with unemployment. Deficit financing by provinces on an unparalleled scale became the order of the day; revenues were deflected from the ordinary purposes of government to relief; and a frantic search for new sources of taxation was begun, largely in the spirit of taking the money wherever it could be found.

The strongest statements made to the Commission, apart from the representations of the provincial governments, came from

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business organizations protesting against double taxation, against inspections and inquests by two sets of officials, against the multiplication of expensive returns, and against taxation which injured business. The Commission discovered that these charges were only too true. It found that taxes were increasing the costs of production, and as such were destructive to marginal businesses. The evidence showed this harmful taxation to be the result not merely of a mistaken policy but of the existing allocation of the burdens of government and of the sources of revenue between the Dominion and the provinces.

Confederation was not two years old before the provinces began protesting against the system by which the tax yield was apportioned between them and the Dominion; and this controversy has been going on ever since, rising at times to a high pitch. What all the demands of the provinces boiled down to was this: that they receive grants from the ampler revenue sources of the Dominion. These claims were put forward on various grounds: that the percentage relationship between the subsidies given to the provinces in 1867 and the total revenue of the Dominion should be maintained; that the customs revenue should be shared between the Dominion and the provinces; that the Dominion should abandon to the provinces certain taxes, such as that on incomes. But in recent years the provincial demands have more and more been based simply on fiscal need. On this basis, however, variations would be introduced into the criteria which govern the size of the Dominion's grants to the different provinces and it would thus be necessary to erect special machinery to determine these variations, as in Australia. The Dominion has not been sympathetic to the suggested innovations, especially when the Liberal Party has been in power. Efforts have long been made to create an immutable principle out of Sir Wilfred Laurier's dictum that: "It is a sound principle of finance and a still sounder principle of government that those who have the duty of expending the revenue of the country should also be saddled with the responsibility of levying and providing it."

There was, in the terms of reference, the suggestion that the solution to the problem might be found by making each governing unit "more independent," either by a reallocation of powers to bring its functions within the compass of its financial resources, or by a reallocation of revenue sources to match its needs. The Commission thoroughly explored the possibilities of an adjust-

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ment along these lines, and rejected them as not practicable. It found that any reallocation of sources of revenue on a uniform basis would vastly increase the existing inequalities between the provinces: those with aggregations of surplus taxable income would have their revenues unduly increased, while the poorer ones would not receive revenues adequate to cover their social, educational and developmental responsibilities. The alternative suggestion — that functions be transferred from the provinces to the Dominion on a scale sufficient to stabilize income and outgo in the weakest provinces — would involve a degree of centralization destructive of the Canadian Federal system. Such a transfer would go far beyond anything that the provinces were willing to concede or the Dominion to accept.

Here was an obvious deadlock. The problem could be solved neither by centralization of functions nor by transfer of taxing powers. A solution had to be sought elsewhere.

It was apparent to the Commission that the provision of social services constituted the heart of the problem. Early in the inquiry it decided that these services must be provided with the least possible disturbance of the constitutional *status quo*. With the exception of unemployment relief (and auxiliary services), all governmental activities relating to social conditions — non-contributory old age pensions, poor relief (in the strict sense of the term), housing, mothers' allowances, workmen's compensation, public health and education — were held to fall rightly within the ambit of provincial power. But relief of the employable unemployed, the operation of a nation-wide employment agency, unemployment insurance and contributory old age pensions should, in the judgment of the Commission, go to the Dominion.

In recommending sole Federal responsibility for relief of unemployed employables, the Commission disagreed flatly with policies to which the Dominion Government has stubbornly adhered since the beginning of the depression. This recommendation was, however, in keeping with the earlier finding of the National Employment Commission (1937) upon which no action had been taken. "The experience of the past decade," the Commission declares, "is conclusive that unemployment aid should be a Dominion function." It holds that since the economic structure of the country is now fundamentally national as far as opportunities for employment are concerned, it cannot be compartmentalized for the purpose of meeting unemployment needs.

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Conditions which produce unemployment are, it is pointed out, in no way local; they lie in national and international trade cycles, and to some extent in climatic cycles. Therefore, burdens do not fall with equal incidence on the different provinces; and attempts by the provinces to cope with them through Dominion grants-in-aid are held to be "a mockery of responsibility in public finance." These considerations, it asserted, justify this transfer of responsibility. "It is fundamental to our recommendations," says the Report, "that the residual responsibility for social welfare functions should remain with the provinces and that Dominion functions should be deemed exceptions to the general rule of provincial responsibility."

The Commission further decided that every province should be able to provide the average Canadian standards of social services for which it was responsible. The Commission also agreed that there are provinces, "whose financial position is not the result of emergency conditions," which are "unable to find the money to enable them to meet the needs of their citizens." It was therefore confronted with the question: How are these provinces to be put in a financial position to supply those average services which are the right of Canadian citizens regardless of the province they live in? The answer was inescapable: the funds have to come from the only source available — the Federal treasury.

These findings shatter the financial conventions about the Federal system that have grown up during the seventy-three years of Confederation. The Commission nevertheless asserts that in reality they are not out of harmony with the original pattern of Canadian federalism. The principle that a province was entitled to enough Federal assistance to permit it to maintain its services was implicit in the plan of Confederation; it was purely accidental that in 1867 the fiscal need of each could be met by identical subsidies. Today fiscal requirements vary from province to province, and grants to meet them should vary too.

But this principle immediately begot other problems: How are the varying needs of the provinces to be determined, and where will the Federal Government find the money? The Commission therefore had to devise a fiscal plan, or, as it is stated in the terms of reference, to "effect a balanced relationship between the financial powers and the obligations and functions of each governing body." To do this the Commission naturally had to review the whole field of public finance to determine whether — by ex-

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tensive shifts in taxation, disbursements or responsibilities — ways could be found to carry on the necessary social services and at the same time lessen the strain on the country's political and economic structure, thereby encouraging a much needed increase in the national income. Adjustments designed to attain these ends were worked out by the Commission and recommended for adoption by the Dominion and the provinces. This is the cornerstone of the Report.

Theoretically, alternative plans are submitted; actually, the recommendations are embodied in Plan One. Plan Two is only a makeshift to serve for a time if, from choice or necessity, the Government should wish a minimum of change in Canadian public finance. Plan Two would leave things as they are, except that the Dominion would assume the costs of unemployment relief and would grant fiscal-need subsidies to three provinces.

Under Plan One, the Federal Government takes over the entire debt of each province (or 40 percent of the combined provincial and municipal debt),[3] it assumes full liability for the deadweight (*i.e.*, the non-interest bearing) debt and administers the balance, subject to the annual payment by the province of a sum equal to the annual interest received by it from these sources; it accepts complete responsibility for the relief and care of the unemployed employables, leaving poor relief, in the proper sense of that term, to the provinces (including the municipalities); it replaces the present subsidies to the provinces by National Adjustment Grants (irreducible but capable of enlargement following inquiry) to enable a provincial government to balance its budget, after maintaining its social service at an average standard, provided it is established that its rate of taxation conforms to an average Dominion level. Future borrowings by provinces are to be made on their own credit or through the Finance Commission on terms.

For their part, the provinces are called upon to withdraw from certain fields of taxation which the Commission defines as national in character. These include taxes on inheritances, incomes and corporations (with certain transfers to the provinces). Under the existing distribution of powers such taxes can be levied by both Dominion and province, and the result has been a great

[3] This provision was necessary to meet the case of Quebec, where the provincial debt had been kept at minimum levels by requiring the cities to render services that elsewhere were discharged by the provinces.

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burden of double taxation except in the field of inheritance taxes, not yet invaded by the Dominion.

The essence of Plan One is, then, that the provinces surrender their right of direct taxation in certain fields now shared with the Dominion, in return for which the Dominion is to take over responsibilities now borne by the provinces. The Dominion would thereby assume an additional initial liability of some forty million dollars a year. However, this represents, not an added burden to the country, but a transfer incidental to setting up a new fiscal system which, in the judgment of the Commission, will enormously strengthen the nation's economy by putting the policies which affect the national income under Federal control.

The Dominion, thus given the basic instruments of taxation, can fashion a modern fiscal system which will fall much less heavily on the country's economy and far more equitably as regards taxpayers, classes and areas. The taxes on business which were imposed owing to the depression and which have had a deadening effect on marginal enterprises, will be replaced by taxes on the profits of business, and this change will in itself be a major contribution to increased prosperity. The provinces can balance their budgets; and the Dominion, with these national resources of taxation at its command, can deal with emergencies and with the dangerous features of the business cycle. The Commission strongly emphasizes the urgency of this rearrangement of taxation powers. "The situation is so serious," it declares in its Report, "that conflicts of policy between Dominion and provinces or between province and province have become a luxury which Canada cannot afford. Fiscal policies which have profound effects on the magnitude and distribution of the national income must be in a single hand and responsibility for action or inaction must be assigned with unmistakable clarity." If this language was justified in time of peace, it is all the more cogent in time of war.

Of equal importance are the National Adjustment Grants which the Plan suggests be given each province in order to replace the existing subsidy system. The Commission has computed for each province what the adjustment grant should be, if it is to provide normal services with no more than normal Canadian taxation. A permanent body of experts — the Finance Commission — will reëxamine these grants every five years; though it could increase them, the original grant would remain an irreducible minimum.

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These grants will not be conditional. The Commission opposes the use of conditional grants except under very special conditions. The National Adjustment Grant is to enable a province to provide services of a defined standard; but it is left to public opinion in each province to see to it that the money is not misapplied. "The freedom of action of a province," says the Report, "is in no way impaired." However, failure to supply the services for which the money is given would prevent a province from applying to the Finance Commission for an increased grant.

When computing the amount of the National Adjustment Grant for a particular province, account is first taken of the improvement in its financial position brought about by the Dominion's taking over the debt service and the costs of relief. After this, other factors are considered, including the need for a balanced budget and for a revenue enabling the province to make expenditures on education, welfare services and development, sufficient to provide services up to an all-Dominion average without compelling it to impose heavier than average taxation.

The revenue transferred to the Dominion — in the aggregate, as well as on a per capita basis — will be very unequal as between provinces; but this does not mean inequality of treatment, since new fiscal-need subsidies have been calculated after deducting these taxes. It is inherent in the Plan that the Dominion should be able to impose equal taxes on wealth wherever it may be found and on powerful corporations wherever their head offices may be situated. Since these levies are uniform for all Canadian citizens, the charge that the tax burden varies from one part of the Dominion to another would not be justified. Nevertheless, the variations in the grants to the provinces on the per capita basis are in some cases startling; and, if we bear in mind the traditional convention that Dominion grants must always be made to the provinces on this basis, we can predict that the battle as to whether the Report is to be accepted or rejected will be waged around this point.

The difficulties of the municipalities, especially of the larger cities upon which the care of the unemployed has fallen with crushing force, are dealt with as part of the provincial problem. The Commission recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial governments over the municipalities; and it left it to the provincial governments to distribute the benefits arising from Plan One, calculated on the basis of the combined provincial-

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municipal financial position. The Report does, however, deal with such special municipal problems as have been created by the impact of industrialism upon the old-fashioned municipal set-up and by the need for establishing metropolitan areas. The Commission puts considerable stress on the duty of the provincial legislatures to enact extensive municipal reforms.

Though the Commission's recommendations concerning taxation and finance constitute the heart of the Report, they by no means exhaust the questions affecting Dominion-provincial relations upon which it made findings. Some of these additional recommendations depend upon the implementation of the financial proposals; others are independent of them. For instance the Commission holds that Dominion-provincial conferences, which in the past have been *ad hoc* meetings, should take place at regular intervals and become a part of the machinery of the Canadian Federal system with a permanent secretariat. It also makes specific suggestions as to a division of services in various activities — agricultural, health, fishery control, etc. — in order to reduce overlapping to a minimum, though it discovered that there has been much less waste from this cause than had been believed. It censures the provinces for using various protectionist devices which impede the freedom of trade, supposedly safeguarded by the British North America Act. It suggests that tribunals be voluntarily set up to advise provinces on these matters and to adjust disputes without resorting to constitutional remedies such as employment of the power of disallowance. It found that concurrent legislation by Dominion and provinces and the delegation of powers (absolute or conditional) from one government to another — something which, from court decisions, appears at present to be beyond the constitutional powers of either the Dominion or the provinces — were essential if there is to be a division, desirable for commercial reasons, of the regulatory functions over grading and marketing. Conflicting jurisdiction in such questions as insurance, company law and the regulation of labor could also be adjusted in this way. The natural and convenient separation of function in all these matters is clearly indicated in the Report.

The Commission adhered steadily to the position that it was limited by its instructions to dealing with financial readjustments and to the functional rearrangements they would necessitate. Certain important and much-discussed problems brought before

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it by presentations from powerful representative bodies were not considered because they were beyond its scope of reference. On the vexed question of minority educational rights, it expressed the opinion that — subject to the provisions in the British North America Act safeguarding the rights of minorities — the provinces should continue to control education as something of vital importance to their social and cultural life. The Commission held that each province should continue to have the exclusive power to modify its existing system of education should it desire to meet requests by minorities for additional rights. Any departure from this rule, it stated, would excite opposition and provoke resentments detrimental to national unity.

Among other questions which were held by the Commission to be beyond the scope of the reference were these: the enlargement of Federal powers to protect alleged fundamental rights and liberties from infringement by provincial legislation; the claim that the French-speaking population in New Brunswick should have representation in the legislature proportional to its numerical strength; the contention that under a wide interpretation of Section 133 of the British North America Act (which, it was argued, simply confirmed natural rights) the French have bilingual rights throughout Canada, regardless of any division of jurisdiction — which, if granted, would give them language rights in schools, provincial assemblies and provincial courts.

In studying the relationships between the Dominion and the provinces, the Commission gave prolonged consideration to the problem of competing transportation systems. A railway network created by the expenditure of Dominion money in nearly astronomical figures is now faced with serious competition from motor highways falling almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provinces. This competition not only divides tonnage but is destructive of the rate structure essential to railway solvency. In the judgment of the Commission, the greatest danger of ruinous overlapping between the two levels of government lies precisely in this field of transportation. It therefore makes various suggestions for coördinating transportation policies and providing joint planning which will retain the economy, efficiency and high developmental value of highway transportation but will allow the railways to continue performing those particular services for which they alone are adequately equipped.

Pressure was exerted on the Commission to make declarations

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on constitutional questions that had nothing to do with the actual business in hand. Though it resisted this pressure, many of its recommendations can only be implemented by changes in the constitution. The Commission said nothing about the controversial question as to how the constitution is to be amended in the future. It proceeded on the theory that the constitution's present provisions authorize any changes which may be found necessary to insure national unity and prosperity. The view that Canada is in fact, and not simply in name, a Confederation of sovereign states of which the executive agent is a federal government functioning under delegated and withdrawable powers, was presented to the Commission in its starkest form by the government of New Brunswick. There is not only an explicit repudiation of this claim in the Report, but in all its comments and declarations the Commission implicitly recognizes that Canada is a federal union in the Hamiltonian sense of that term.[4] This, the Commission makes clear, was the kind of federal union the Fathers of Confederation believed they were creating, and it intimates that the changes it proposes merely restore the original constitutional pattern where it has been overlaid by later accretions of convention and interpretation.

If the Commission's recommendations are put into effect, the principle taxing powers will be returned to the hands of the Federal Government; the Dominion's grants to the provinces will again be based on fiscal need; the provinces will once more be assured of revenues adequate for their essential needs without unbalancing the budget; and the main burden of the country's finances will again rest upon the Dominion. "The Commission's financial proposals are," says the Report, "in terms of the economic life of 1939 very similar to what the provisions of the British North America Act were in terms of the economic life of 1867." It concludes with this assertion of confidence: "The Commission does not consider that its proposals are either centralizing or decentralizing in their combined effect, but believes that they will conduce to the sane balance between these two tendencies which is the essence of a genuine federal system and therefore the basis upon which national unity can most securely rest."

[4] "A federal government is properly one in which the federal authority is independent of any of its component parts within the sphere of the Federal action." *The Federalist*, No. 36.

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REFUGEE SETTLEMENT IN THE TROPICS

By A. Grenfell Price

UNSCIENTIFIC racial theories and cruel persecutions are rendering hundreds of thousands of Europeans homeless. Does the advance of genuine scientific knowledge offer these unhappy creatures homes in tropical regions which in the past have proved forbidding to whites?

In recent years white emigration to the tropics did not appear of outstanding importance from the long-time viewpoint. It is true that the tropics contain some ten to twelve millions of white settlers, together with large numbers of sojourners, representing the great white Powers which administer and control the people, industry and commerce of many tropical lands. But Kuczynski and other modern demographers have shown that the increase of nearly all white peoples is declining, or is likely to decline. In normal circumstances, therefore, white emigration to the tropics seemed certain to decrease.

Now, however, the picture is changing, owing to the nationalist evolution of pseudo-biological theories which lead to the persecution and expatriation of numerous ethnic minority groups. To take only one of the afflicted peoples, it is estimated that in 1938 there were 499,682 Jews in Germany, 191,408 in Austria, 356,830 in Czechoslovakia and 3,028,837 in Poland.

This persecution has led various governments and relief organizations to consider the dispatch of white refugees to tropical regions such as British Guiana and the northwest part of Western Australia. We may note in passing how frequently such relief schemes are designed to send the unfortunate refugees to the periphery of settlement. This is because the governments of many countries — even those which still offer ample living space — fear the difficulties arising from refugee settlement, the creation of minorities and of minority problems, and the long arms of the persecuting Powers. Sometimes, too, labor fears the competition of refugee immigrants. Racial antipathy also frequently exists. All this increases the importance of sparsely populated tropical countries as potential zones of white refugee settlement.

Another and allied development is the growth of nationalism in the spheres of both politics and economics. Italy's conquest

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of Ethiopia and the demands of the Nazis for the restoration of their former colonies in order that they may secure tropical products and economic self-sufficiency, are obvious examples. If the chief white Powers continue to demand *Lebensraum*, and to increase their economic isolation (with a consequent lowering of their living standards), each will inevitably attempt to secure its own section of the tropics, thereby augmenting the importance of that part of the world.

II. DEFINITIONS

Let us begin by defining the terms "white," "settlement" and "tropics" from the viewpoint of refugee and other white colonization. All the European refugees will be white in the popular sense, but there may be many ethnic (popularly "racial") differences and many variations in climatic experience, which will profoundly affect the emigrants' suitability for tropical life. Of these differences and their causes we have little or no scientific knowledge, but history indicates that, on the whole, South European peoples, such as the Portuguese, Spanish and Italians, fare better in the tropics than emigrants from Northern or Central Europe. We have no scientific information as to the reasons, but they probably lie in the climatic experience of peoples who live in the warm climates of Southern Europe, and in the fact that ethnic groups such as those just mentioned possess an historic mixture of Moorish or other "colored" bloods. The Jews appear to do fairly well in the moderate tropics, such as Curaçao in the Dutch West Indies; and this matter should be investigated more closely, for the Jews are the chief people likely to figure in refugee emigration.

"Settlement" may be defined as permanent colonization in which the whites follow all necessary occupations, including manual labor, and in so doing maintain their standards of health, energy, civilization and culture, from generation to generation, without mental or physical loss. Here we must emphasize the great difference between sojourners and settlers. The administrating officials, missionaries, soldiers, traders and planters of the great white Powers such as Britain, France, The Netherlands, Italy and the United States, are in most cases only sojourners, who retire with their families to their own countries on the termination of their service. The refugees, on the contrary, must in general be settlers, who will engage in manual labor and who

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will leave behind them descendants to live permanently in the tropics.

What do we mean by "tropics?" Of the many definitions let us select the one which embraces areas with an annual temperature of 70 degrees or more. This is not the same as saying that the tropics are that part of the globe lying between the parallels of 23½ degrees North and South latitude, even though this area coincides in part with the 70 degree isotherm. Altitude, winds and ocean currents create tropical conditions in some localities north and south of these parallels, and, conversely, produce cooler conditions in some places nearer the Equator. Southern Florida lies mathematically outside the tropics; but its projection into warm seas, its low altitude, and its high proportion of hours of sunshine give it a moderate tropical climate. Within the limits of the 70-degree isotherm there are several different types of climate, and these variations exercise all-important controls over white settlement. In broad outline we can distinguish between the equatorial tropics, the tropical deserts, the monsoonal tropics, the trade wind coasts and islands, and the mountains and high plateaux.

III. DISABILITIES IN THE TROPICS

Unfortunately, the leading scientists of many countries disagree over the question as to how far whites can settle in any or all of these types of tropical zones. One school of thought, typified by Dr. Ellsworth Huntington, considers that almost insurmountable difficulties confront whites as permanent settlers in most tropical regions. The climate is too deleterious. Huntington believes that like all living organisms white people have a biological optimum, and that the tropics lie beyond it. Other scientists, such as General Gorgas of Panama Canal fame and Sir Raphael Cilento of Queensland who base their views on the history of those regions, believe that as the whites gradually conquer tropical disease, they will settle the tropics. Sir Andrew Balfour, a great authority, held that the whites would never conquer the hot low tropics, even if they freed them from disease; but towards the end of his life he became more hopeful about settlement possibilities in the milder tropical zones. The need of differentiating carefully between various types of tropics is now becoming apparent to almost all scientists engaged in tropical work.

Clearly, white settlers in the tropics undergo certain disabili-

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ties. History, statistics and the laboratory work of various scientists prove that high temperatures are physiologically deleterious to energy; and it is suspected that these factors also have mental and nervous effects. The influences of other factors, such as moisture, winds and altitude, are not yet evaluated. Scientific knowledge is teaching the white man methods of counteracting tropical diseases and the disadvantages of isolation, and is providing him with suitable housing, clothing and diets. In a later section reference is made to the necessity of both men and women taking strenuous exercise or engaging in manual work. Yet in spite of these advances in knowledge, it remains a fact that white people of the tropics live under disabilities.

Modern scientists are seeking a clear view of the problems involved by utilizing three methods of research — history, statistics and the laboratory. Unfortunately, history is not an accurate guide, for a few years of progress in medical science can completely change white prospects. The statistical method, too, is far from adequate. It is difficult to secure and compare satisfactory figures on climate, heredity and so on, even in well-developed tropical countries. The laboratory method is also uncertain, for, although individuals can be tested in laboratories under artificial conditions of heat, moisture and air movement, we cannot produce the exact conditions they face when undergoing acclimatization on the spot. Still, by combining all three methods we can form an opinion as to whether white settlers are making sufficient progress in the tropics to warrant sending refugees to join them or whether we should develop other areas for settlement.

IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Let us first turn to history. From 1500 onwards, European nations made a great attempt to conquer the tropics. This of course was before the advent of scientific knowledge. The Portuguese, Spaniards, English, Dutch, French and other peoples poured into tropical Asia, Africa, America and Australia, and either conquered or destroyed the indigenous colored peoples. Before long, however, tropical races and tropical diseases began to take their toll. In lands such as India, Java and East Africa the whites held sway as administrators or traders, and still do; but each generation returns to its homeland, and families which remain are usually absorbed by the colored peoples, like a rivulet entering an ocean. In sparsely inhabited countries, such as the

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West Indies, the whites destroyed the natives; but instead of themselves forming large working communities, they brought in negro slaves, and these increased so rapidly that, in general, they absorbed the small groups of white workers who had originally replaced the indigenous races. In India, the Portuguese tried to maintain their hold by the interesting experiment of deliberately breeding a half-caste people. This experiment failed, and the surviving ethnic group is being absorbed.

Nevertheless, these pre-scientific waves of white immigration into the tropics left interesting survivals in various places, particularly in America. The West Indies and the American tropics contain many small groups of pure white people descended from Europeans, both northern and southern. Several of these groups have been examined by the writer. They completely refute the popular conception that white settlers cannot survive in the tropics for more than three generations. In 1933 the writer visited islands in the Dutch West Indies and traced pure white families of Scottish and Dutch descent back to about 1680.

But in general the white settlements in these regions failed. In the case of the British West Indies the obvious reasons why these settlements faded out were: the hot climate, isolation, disease, inadequate diet, excessive use of alcohol, poor housing, unsuitable clothing, ill-treatment, wars, political and economic mismanagement (both in the islands and mother countries), and the introduction of colored workers, who undercut the whites economically and absorbed them by intermarriage and miscegenation. But while the factors which caused the failures are apparent, it is impossible to give each factor its proper valuation. Many authorities lay emphasis on climate and disease. The writer believes, however, that the presence of colored workers of low social and economic standards was the most vital factor.

Some four centuries after the beginning of the invasion of the tropics described above, there came what may almost be termed a second and "scientific" invasion. The change, which was gradual, was due to improvements in such things as medicine, sanitation, transport, clothing and diet. Early in this revolution Gorgas and others transformed the Panama Canal Zone, lying in the low tropics and a "pest hole of the world," into a district fairly suitable for whites provided they keep within close and strongly protected limits. A little later, white settlements in the tropical margins, especially in Florida and northeastern

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Queensland, became healthy and prosperous. In Florida the white population increased from 678,000 to 1,035,000 between 1920 and 1930, and now includes thousands of genuine settlers engaged in manual work. By 1933 the whites of northeastern Queensland comprised a working population, largely sugar growers, of 184,831. In view of such progress, scientific optimists like Gorgas and Cilento proclaimed that the white man could hope to conquer the whole of the tropics.

Subsequent events proved that these views were incautious. The medical scientist has done much to overcome the ravages of hookworm and pellagra. He has almost conquered yellow fever by controlling the house mosquito, Aëdes aegypti. But he has made relatively little progress against the malarial mosquito — the wider-ranging insect of the swamps — and, apart from all climatic considerations, malaria can defeat the whites in the low tropics singlehanded. Sir Andrew Balfour estimated that malaria killed 2,000,000 people annually. Many other difficulties are still unsurmounted. One finds, on visiting Panama, southern Florida and tropical Queensland, that local medical scientists, educationists and others consider that the experiments in their regions are still too young to form the basis for definite conclusions, and that the permanent success of those experiments is still in doubt.

V. DENSITY OF POPULATION

Leaving these general and historical questions, we can turn to a consideration of those regions of the tropics in which white refugee emigrants may hope to meet with some success. Let us commence by eliminating certain regions where the prospects are hopeless. First, the writer believes that if refugees are to form white working settlements it is most unwise to send them to areas of dense colored population. White manual workers would have as little chance of success in the temperate but crowded areas of China or Japan as they would in Java, the Ganges basin and other densely inhabited tropical regions. Americans and South Africans know only too well how dense colored populations, particularly when organized under the plantation system, can undercut white workers, create "poor white" problems, and even in some cases absorb the whites racially. With very few exceptions (such as Florida, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica and parts of Brazil and Colombia) tropical America presents a picture in which the Indians and Negroes are seen to be gradually absorbing

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the white immigrants. It seems probable that eventually all the American tropics will be inhabited only by mixed races.

Tropical Queensland shows a striking reversal of the process. From 1863 until about 1910 the Queensland sugar growers worked their plantations with Kanakas from the South Sea islands. The Polynesian death rate reached the appalling annual figure of 70.9 per 1,000, and, as the natives gave their diseases to the whites, the expectation of life for white males at birth declined to 41.3 years, a figure 12 percent lower than the average for Australia. With the introduction of Federation and the White Australia Policy, the Kanakas were repatriated. The death rate for tropical Queensland is now the lowest in the Commonwealth.

VI. THE HUMID AND THE DESERT TROPICS

Of the various tropical areas which we have classified we can at once rule out the hot, humid, equatorial tropics and the deserts as entirely unsuitable for white settlement. As stated above, Sir Andrew Balfour considered the equatorial tropics hopeless, regardless of all questions of disease; and visits to regions such as Java, Panama and the north coast of South America make one feel that the monotonous, humid heat of these regions places them in general outside the range of white tolerance. True, here and there white colonists have survived, or have even done well under very favorable conditions. Earl P. Hanson, for example, draws attention to the healthy cattle ranchers of Marajó Island at the mouth of the Amazon. In places like Panama, whites of the second generation engage in manual labor; but they are protected in especially sanitated areas at great expense.

It is hardly necessary to state that permanent white settlement in the tropical deserts is virtually impossible. Whites may live in well-watered oases, or may engage temporarily in the mining industry in the desert itself. Sparse pastoral settlement may penetrate into arid zones, as in North Australia. But the number of whites so occupied is too small to be important.

VII. THE MONSOONAL TROPICS

The wet-dry tropics of monsoonal summer rainfall include some of the most deceptive portions of the earth. Terrific summer rains are followed by a long winter drought. Close agricultural settlement is generally too costly because of the need for drainage

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in summer and irrigation in winter; while the soils are often poor due, among other things, to leaching by the summer floods.

These conditions account for the almost empty state of the 1,000,000 square miles of tropical Australia.[1] There have been many attempts to introduce white and Chinese labor in this region. Nor are prospects for settling refugees in the Kimberley districts of northwest Western Australia much more favorable.

Queensland experts recently submitted an account of conditions in tropical Australia to authorities in the dry regions of Nigeria, India and the Dutch East Indies. The only hopeful reply came from the Nigerian experts who expressed the opinion that Negro families could settle in tropical Australia, using Zebu cattle or water buffalo and growing poor seasonal and subsistence crops such as millet. But they felt it unlikely that the annual income of these families would exceed $15 a year.

In a different part of the world — the hinterland of British Guiana — a commission of investigation reported last year that a refugee settlement might be established on some tropical grasslands at a rather low elevation. The writer has not visited this region and cannot give a first-hand opinion on possible risks connected with such matters as disease and miscegenation. The report of the commission, however, does not seem to give sufficient weight to the highly important limiting factor of isolation. The commission points out that only a large-scale settlement would warrant the expense of establishing adequate communications; yet it proceeds to advocate the foundation of a small experimental colony. The history of the American tropics contains numberless attempts and failures to establish small isolated settlements. The comparatively recent collapse of Murray's attempt in Bolivia, and of the Tomenotti Concession in Peru, carry a distinct warning on this point.

VIII. TRADE WIND AND MARGINAL TROPICS

In the trade wind and marginal tropics, developments in scientific medicine, sanitation, transport, diet, housing and clothing offer white settlers reasonable hopes of success. Unfortunately, the most suitable of these regions — southern Florida, the West Indies, Hawaii, northeastern Queensland and the like — are in most cases already settled, usually by colored peoples.

[1] The northern Queensland plateaux and coastlands are an exception; they are watered throughout the year by both monsoonal and trade-wind rains, and the soil is particularly fertile.

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The Queensland tropics might prove quite satisfactory for refugee settlers, but like southern Florida it is a comparatively small area and is already closely occupied. The Queenslanders enjoy splendid health and satisfactory fertility. Yet the fact remains that the population is comparatively new to the tropics. Doctors are not altogether satisfied that the climate is suitable for women, and educators have informed the writer that they are not sure that the mental development of children above the age of sixteen years is as satisfactory as that of children in cooler climates.

The outstanding contribution made to tropical knowledge by the north Queensland people is that white settlers can engage in hard manual work — indeed, thrive best with it. Working in a climate ameliorated by the trade winds, the Queensland whites are successfully conducting their sugar industry with their own manual labor, something which American authorities told the writer would prove beyond white powers. Many of them are of North European descent. In the northern and hotter sugar districts, however, the tendency is for these to be replaced by Italian emigrants. This may be due to economic factors; but one suspects it is only further proof that colonists from South European countries are more suited to hot climates than those from Northern Europe.

The writer discovered some important evidence on the question of manual labor while studying settlement in Panama. For many years European whites have engaged in very heavy labor in the workshops there, and are now being joined by strong and healthy sons who have been born and raised in the Canal Zone. Even in that climate white prisoners of North European descent remain healthy if they are worked in the open air. At the Gatun Dam, Central Europeans proved more efficient than Negro labor, provided they were kept within the area fortified against disease. The same story is now coming from many tropical regions. The writer feels that male whites have enjoyed better health than their womenfolk in the tropics largely because they have taken more strenuous exercise. Recently the health of the women has improved, due undoubtedly to their increased participation in outdoor games. The trouble is that white men and women rarely will do the work necessary to keep them in trim if they have colored servants. Here again we warn against sending refugees to regions of dense colored population.

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IX. THE HIGH PLATEAUX

The last division — the high plateaux — offers, in the opinion of the writer, by far the best prospects for refugee settlement. In parts of Central America or in a region like Portuguese Angola the annual average temperatures are comparatively low, the rainfall is good, the soils are satisfactory and the native peoples are not numerous. The main difficulties concern communications, economics and politics rather than the environment. In Angola, however, large-scale settlements could develop satisfactory communications and profitable industries if they received government support. A white settlement on these plateaux would have particularly promising prospects, owing to the markets offered in the nearby Rhodesian mining districts. True, scientists are still uncertain as to the ultimate effects of the monotonous climates of tropical plateaux, or of very high altitudes such as those in parts of the South American tropics. But information from regions like Costa Rica and the plateaux of Rhodesia and East Africa is in general encouraging.

The studies on Costa Rica by C. L. Jones, L. Waibel and the writer have drawn attention to the possibilities of establishing white refugee settlers in a plateau region almost free from American Indian peoples and settled for about four centuries by whites of Spanish descent. The latter are rapidly increasing, and now number about 400,000. Waibel shows that comparatively large areas remain unoccupied. The climate is satisfactory, the rainfall and soils are excellent, and communications could be established with the Pacific. From another point of view, the situation in Costa Rica is equally satisfactory. Almost every tropical country needs diversification in its industries. Costa Rica, with its heavy rainfall and steep plateau slopes, has ample water power with which to undertake manufacturing.

X. ECONOMIC FACTORS

The history of many tropical regions reveals the disadvantages and dangers of permitting the development of one-crop economies. Too often a great white nation, after acquiring the management of a tropical country, replaces its normal economy by expanding one or two products, such as sugar, bananas or coffee; and then after a time reduces it to a calamitous state by declining (or being unable) to pay a reasonable price for the very products

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which its policy has engendered. For instance, many of the troubles of the British West Indies spring largely from the fact that the British built up a one-crop sugar industry, and then proceeded to foster the home production of sugar beet. Frequently, of course, the capital supplied by the exploiters has been valuable — indeed essential — to the tropical countries concerned. Nevertheless, the tale of what has happened is in parts thoroughly disgraceful.

All these countries today need more than almost anything else the establishment of industries to make them less dependent upon the markets, the booms, the crises, the political somersaults and the wars of the great white nations. Refugees, speaking generally, might participate usefully in this development.

However, as already mentioned, there are other factors which bring the qualifications of refugees and other whites for tropical colonization into doubt. There are great differences, both of a psychological and physiological character, in the racial and individual qualifications of the persons concerned. We have already seen that Southern European peoples are probably better fitted than Northern Europeans, brunette women may in general do better than blondes, and so forth. Unfortunately, although many general observations have been published, comparatively little laboratory work has been carried out on the spot regarding acclimatized and unacclimatized whites. The establishment of a research laboratory in a center such as Panama might produce results of world importance and, by disclosing the causes of mental or physical unsuitability, save millions of lives and dollars. The varying economic factors must also be examined and classified. We must study the qualifications of white refugees and other potential emigrants to the tropics in the light of existing industries and markets, paying due attention to those which might be developed. It is nearly always assumed that the immigrants must engage in primary production. In point of fact, many tropical regions offer prospects for manufacture, and many of the refugees are city folk suited only for industrial production. Since many tropical areas possess water power not far from potential markets, these possibilities merit examination.

XI. CONCLUSION

After a lengthy study of the problems sketched in the preceding pages, the writer believes that there are fair, if somewhat uncer-

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tain, prospects for white refugee settlement on the tropical plateaux, in the trade-wind islands and coasts, and in the marginal tropics. In such regions refugees would have prospects at least as promising as in Alaska. Large parts of these areas must be excluded from consideration, however, either for political reasons or because they are already occupied by colored populations who would undercut the whites economically and ultimately absorb them. It also must be clearly stated that some scientists still fear that the climate, even in the moderate tropics, is psychologically and physiologically enervating for white persons.

We now possess much helpful knowledge about tropical climates, diseases, sanitation, soils, the need of adequate communications, the value of manual labor, the necessity of correct diets, the great danger of alcoholic excess, the proper types of housing and clothing, and certain political and economic pitfalls which must be avoided. But we need a long-time test of settlement under the new conditions which will be developed as a result of this knowledge, and must conduct an immense amount of further scientific investigation, before we can claim to be adequately equipped to speak definitely about each of the factors which control white settlement in the tropics.

Behind the other matters which have been discussed here looms the problem of expense. When we remember what it cost in time and money to send to Europe an American army numbering some two millions, even when the job was undertaken by one of the world's most powerful and wealthy of countries, we can realize the difficulty of the task that may confront us in trying to transplant even a small part of those who must seek new homes. Their number may reach eight millions. Emigration to regions such as Costa Rica may supply an answer to a fraction of the problem. But the real solution must be at the source: the utter eradication of the completely unscientific racial doctrines, the intolerance and inhumanity which have created the problem. The world's resources, material and spiritual, would be far better used at the present time if they were concentrated on removing the cancer itself rather than in attempting the almost impossible task of ameliorating its constantly spreading results.

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IRONSIDE

By Harold Nicolson

THE first time I saw Sir Edmund Ironside was in 1936. I had been asked to luncheon by some friends and on entering their drawing room I had the impression that it was smaller than I remembered. I then realized that what had changed its proportions was the presence of an enormous and most restless man. He was pacing up and down between the windows discussing with his host some point of military administration. I observed his great square shoulders and his great square jaw; he reminded me of Field Marshal Allenby, although his movements and the manner in which he spoke were infinitely more brisk. From the tone of authority in his voice it was evident that he was a very senior officer. Yet there was something about him which was different from the typical general. I supposed, at first, that it was his restlessness which made the difference. There was none of the slow grace of Haig, none of the ponderous and monumental rigidity of Kitchener, none of the lazy, lanky swing of Henry Wilson. There was something in the way he moved, at once nervous and decisive, which recalled the quick gestures of Marshal Foch. Yet what really made the difference was the manner in which he spoke. Most senior officers speak unwillingly, weighing their words, studiously avoiding anything which might appear to be unconventional or indiscreet. This man, it was obvious, was bursting with ideas and anxious to express them. I have observed that most British generals confine their conversation to the familiar and the expected; one realized that this man might at any moment say something very unexpected indeed.

"Who is he?" I asked my hostess in a low voice.

"Ironside," she answered.

Even in a whisper the name resounded through the room.

II

In the county of Aberdeenshire, in the highlands of Scotland, there lies a village of the name of Ironside. Around that village have clustered for centuries families of that name — sturdy country folk, leading resolute and frugal lives, and bearing their stern name proudly from generation to generation. It is from this stock that Edmund Ironside is descended.

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His father entered the army and rose to the rank of Surgeon Major of the Royal Horse Artillery. He married a Miss Richards of a well-known Somersetshire family. Their only son was born on May 6, 1880. The father died when Edmund was little more than a child and upon the widowed mother fell the responsibility of educating a son and daughter on a slender pension.

It would be tempting to define Edmund Ironside's heredity as a blending of the dour determination of his Scottish ancestry with the gentler, more sensitive and more imaginative fibers of the soft southwest. It would form a more usual pattern were one to represent the father of Edmund Ironside as possessing all the solid qualities of character and his mother as providing that element of grace, of imagination and of sensitiveness which goes to the making of outstanding personalities. There may in truth be some basis for such a picture. Yet seldom has the gentle southwest produced a character of such formidable strength as that of Edmund Ironside's mother. From St. Andrews she went to Rochester and brought up her two children under the shadow of the Cathedral. When Edmund reached school age she moved to Tonbridge in order to give him the benefit of a first-class school. He did not profit overmuch by the teaching of Tonbridge; he played rugby football with determination and even with dexterity; yet he had to be crammed before he could enter Woolwich. From the moment he entered Woolwich his mother's anxieties regarding him were at an end.

This indomitable lady never relaxed the hold which she possessed over her son, even as he never moderated the deep devotion with which he regarded her. They understood each other perfectly. They shared a liking for the caustic comment and the astringent phrase. He would write to her regularly when he was absent overseas. When he returned to England she took a cottage near his home. Every winter, even when she was over ninety years of age, she would travel out to Alassio or some other Italian resort. In March of 1939 he learnt that her health was failing. He was Governor of Gibraltar and crisis was in the air. He boarded a torpedo boat and dashed across to Italy. She rose from her bed and they lunched together gaily. He returned to the great fortress which was in his charge, and she a few days later died triumphantly at the age of ninety-six.

It was from the Richards strain that Edmund Ironside derived the independence, the originality, of his temperament.

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He shared with his mother an unfaltering curiosity regarding the strange habits of human beings, a constant intellectual energy, a tolerant but slightly acid contempt for the conventionalities, the twists and turns, of weaker spirits. From one point of view this long lanky young man, with his stern acceptance of duty, his profound sense of discipline, was the type of subaltern which the ordinary regimental officer dearly loves. Yet there were moments when young Ironside would say things which most subalterns were not expected to say, and there were other moments when the fierce straight eyes of the young man would sparkle with a disconcerting gleam. Was it obstinacy? Was it amusement? Could it possibly be criticism? His regimental superiors decided that young Ironside was efficient, a fine leader of men, but "odd." It took twenty-five years to convince them that what they had mistaken for oddity was in fact exceptional intelligence.

Opportunity came to him early in his career. He left Woolwich at the age of nineteen and served in the South African War. He was mentioned in despatches and reached the rank of a staff captain. Thereafter he might well have returned to ordinary regimental routine. It was at this stage that his innate originality asserted itself; he decided to remain in Africa and was seconded to the Secret Service. The British were anxious to obtain information regarding German activities in East and South-West Africa. They required first-hand details as to German methods of colonial administration, their handling of the Herero rising, their military and strategic plans. Captain Ironside volunteered to get this information. For a period of two years he disappeared from regimental life and assumed the disguise of a young Boer who had refused to accept British rule and was anxious to help the German colonial administration. He grew a beard, he climbed onto an ox wagon, and off he went.

He had always had a gift for foreign languages, a gift seldom found in conjunction with the highest form of intelligence. When he was a boy his mother would scrape her savings together and take her two children to Belgium and Holland, encouraging them to learn French, Flemish and Dutch. During the war he had mastered Afrikaans and Taal. The Germans never suspected that this young Boer volunteer was a British staff officer.

On two occasions he was nearly discovered. Once he forgot that he was supposed to be an ignorant Boer farmer and answered a German non-commissioned officer in pure German.

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He covered up his slip with a flood of Taal. The second occasion was even more disconcerting. He has a passion for dogs and even when in the trenches during the Great War his bull terrier would always accompany him. There was naturally a dog with him on his trek through German South-West Africa. One afternoon he was discussing routes and transport with a German staff officer and his dog was lying upon the verandah beside him. Suddenly he noticed that neatly engraved upon the dog's collar were the words "Ironside. United Service Club." He went on talking and as he talked he stroked the dog's neck, carefully coaxing the hairs to cover the denunciatory label. The Germans never discovered his identity. He was accorded the German Military Medal by General von Deimling as a reward for the services which he had rendered to the German forces. Fifteen years later, during the Great War, he was in command of a brigade opposite that which von Deimling commanded. They never met.

It seemed at the time as if this great private adventure had had no sequel. Yet when nearly forty years later Sir Edmund Ironside accompanied General Gamelin on an inspection of Aldershot they were presented to a young officer who had just succeeded to the title of the second Lord Tweedsmuir. "Did you ever know, Sir," the young officer said to him, "that my father John Buchan took you as his model for the character of Richard Hannay?"

III

He returned to regular service. He was promoted Brigade Major at the age of twenty-nine. The years between the South African and the first German Wars were spent in routine duties, varied by visits abroad and the intense study of foreign languages. He became a first-class interpreter in German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch and Afrikaans and a second-class interpreter in French. He later acquired a good knowledge of Russian, Turkish and Persian. He can now claim to speak fourteen languages. Yet these linguistic triumphs did not interfere either with his intelligence or with his modesty. Unlike so many soldiers who can speak foreign languages, he did not forget that the business of a soldier is to study the art of war.

In August 1914 Ironside, with the rank of Staff Captain, was actually the first British officer in uniform to land in France. He remained there throughout the war. He shared in the retreat from Mons; in 1915 he was accorded the D.S.O. for "outstanding

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bravery;" he became a Major in November 1914, a Lieutenant Colonel in 1916. He commanded the 99th brigade in France from March till October 1918, when he was appointed Brigadier General upon the General Staff. In November 1918, he was chosen to command the Allied forces at Archangel.

The origins of this expedition are not generally known. After the collapse of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Germans under Von der Goltz threatened to seize the Russian ports of Murmansk and Pechenga. The Soviet Government intimated that they were themselves unable to oppose this seizure and asked that an Allied force come to their aid. The Allies agreed, and in May 1918 a mixed force of Americans, French, British and Poles landed at Murmansk under the command of General Poole. Three months later the Tsar was murdered and the expedition began to assume an anti-Bolshevik rather than an anti-German character. It was decided to raise local anti-Red levies, and General Ironside was chosen for this task.

From then onward he became a specialist in forlorn hopes. The condition of his forces was not encouraging. He found himself occupying an area as large as Great Britain and having to cope with a force which was of so mixed a character that discipline became difficult. The climate was almost unendurable and the health of the troops, owing largely to a shortage of fresh vegetables, began to suffer. In spite of these obstacles General Ironside managed to consolidate his position and to recruit some 25,000 of the local population. It seemed at one moment as if the Archangel force would be able to join up with Kolchak and to suppress Bolshevism in Russia. These hopes were disappointed.

The Russian levies became disaffected; the mixed force, after the armistice, began to lack cohesion; and predominant opinion in Great Britain and France was much opposed to prolonging the war merely for the purpose of intervening against the Bolsheviks. By the summer of 1919 the Allied Governments had decided to withdraw from Archangel and orders were issued to that effect. Evacuation, however, was a most difficult operation. The Bolsheviks had learnt that the force was about to retire and they attacked it without stint. It required all Ironside's skill and resolution to avert a major disaster. By constant rear guard action, admirably planned and executed, he was able to embark his force without serious losses. He himself left Archangel on September 27, 1919. On his return to London he was made a Knight Com-

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mander of the Bath and was at once despatched upon another forlorn hope, this time to Asia.

It will be remembered that under the Armistice of Mudros the Allied Armies had occupied Constantinople and drawn a cordon around the Straits. The Greek forces meanwhile had been entrusted by the Allied Supreme Council with the task of occupying Smyrna and controlling the nationalist Turkish armies which had assembled round the banner of Mustapha Kemal. It was feared that the Turkish nationalists might advance upon the Straits and an Allied force was therefore sent to occupy the Ismid Peninsula. It was this force which Ironside was appointed to command. It was not a congenial or even a glorious task. There was little fighting, since the Allied Governments were determined not to be drawn into any large-scale operations. All that Ironside could do was to maintain his line and his communications, to cope with Turkish bands and to perfect himself in the ungainly Turkish language. He was glad when in the late summer of 1920 he was recalled for other duties.

After a short diplomatic experience in the final adjustment of the boundary between Hungary and Rumania, and after a very short visit to India, he was asked to take over a divisional command in 'Iraq and thereafter went to command the North Persian Force which was still seeking to prevent the Russians from advancing from Gilan and Mazanderan into the center of Persia. Here again he was confronted with a dispiriting situation. He was far from any organized base; his force was a mixed one of British and British-Indian troops, with a section of Persians who had been trained in the old Cossack Brigade. The country in which he had to operate was unhealthy and infested by robber bands under the leadership of Kutchik Khan. Moreover, the adventures and trials of Norperforce did not command a very sympathetic ear in Whitehall, which came increasingly to look upon this isolated sanitary cordon as most insanitary and only doubtfully a cordon. General Ironside maintained discipline, established order and was universally respected by European and Persian alike. He was relieved when he was recalled to Mesopotamia.

His short command in northern Persia was, however, productive of one definite (and to some minds most regrettable) result. At his final inspection of the Persian Cossacks he observed a huge trooper, with sullen eyes, a thin little voice, a bullet head and a chin and mouth indicative of the most determined ferocity.

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"You," he said, "look the sort of man who ought to command the others. What is your name?" "Reza," answered the trooper.

It was thus due to General Ironside that Reza Khan came to command the Cossack Brigade. With its help he in due course turned out the Persian Government, made himself the Defender of the State, dismissed the Qajar dynasty and seated himself upon the Peacock Throne, founding the dynasty of Pahlevi. It remains an open question whether Ironside's judgment of character proved a benefit or a disaster for the people of Iran.

IV

After these three forlorn hopes Ironside resumed, for a short time, his command in 'Iraq. He would visit the outlying units by air, but at that date the aerodromes were few and far between. On one occasion his plane was caught in a dust storm and had to make a forced landing in a marsh. Both the pilot and the wireless operator were knocked out and General Ironside broke both thighs. He had sufficient strength however, in spite of the leeches which at once fastened on his wounds, to recover the wireless apparatus and to tap out a message calling for help. It was on recovering from this ordeal that he was given an appointment after his own heart. He returned home and became Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley.

The enormous bulk of General Ironside (he is six foot four, with shoulders of reinforced concrete), his capacity as an officer in the field, his strict sense of discipline, his amazing courage, may have given to many the impression that he is above all a fighting rather than a thinking soldier. He is both. In Cairo, once, T. E. Lawrence remarked to Eric Kennington: "A friend of mine is coming to see you. You will find that he is a very big man, but he also has a great intellect." "And why shouldn't he have a great intellect?" asked Kennington. "Well," said little Lawrence, who was vain and sensitive on such matters, "have you ever known a big man who had a great intellect?"

It was at the Staff College that the true nature of Ironside's intelligence became apparent. He refused in the first place to allow discussion of the art of war to circle round and round the experience gained between 1914–1918. He knew well that strategy and even tactics are an art rather than a science and that as such they develop constantly from year to year. He taught his officers that imagination is of all qualities the most necessary for those

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who seek to hold high command. He taught them that too much preoccupation with detail tended to make the military mind rigid, whereas fluidity of intelligence was what was needed. He advised them to go to the root of every principle, since principles are unvariable whereas circumstances change. He insisted upon their knowing the technique of soldiering in every particular, but he never let them forget that the aim of technique is to render certain operations matters of instinctive habit, and thus to free the intelligence from all minor preoccupations. It was during his years at the Staff College that the correct Ironside legend arose. He ceased to be regarded as an "odd" outspoken soldier with a curious taste for foreign languages and travel. He was already known to be a fighting officer of unexampled vigor and resource; but in his lectures and discussions at Camberley he showed them that he was something more than all this — that he was that rare combination, the imaginative and the practical man.

On relinquishing his appointment as Commandant of the Staff College, Ironside held a succession of important posts. He commanded the Second Division at Aldershot; he went out to India in command of the Meerut district; he became for a short time Lieutenant of the Tower of London; he returned to India as Quartermaster General; he was appointed G.O.C. Eastern Command in England; and in November 1938 he was sent out as Governor and Commander in Chief to Gibraltar.

His work in India, although of more or less a routine nature, was executed with his usual personal drive. Instead of remaining up at Simla he insisted upon investigating every case personally, and in the peak of the hot weather he would travel endlessly across the burning plains, inspecting units, adjusting grievances, seeing the thing at first hand for himself.

His appointment to Gibraltar caused some surprise. By that date the name of Ironside was known in circles usually ignorant (except in time of war) of military personalities. The post of Governor of Gibraltar has always been regarded as one which is accorded to a meritorious officer who has reached the stage of retirement. His duties, in normal times, are not onerous; he lives in a fine old house and can walk in peace under the wide colonnades, or pace the terrace garden looking out upon the men-of-war signalling to each other in the harbor below. In the great dining room are embossed the names of his distinguished predecessors; and former comrades, on their way to India or back, will leave their

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steamers for a few hours and inform the Governor of what is passing in the great world beyond. An honorable, a comfortable, but not in normal times an exacting appointment. Public opinion was therefore surprised when Ironside went to Gibraltar.

It was fortunate that he did. The optimism which, in the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, had inspired the garrison of Gibraltar, the firm faith which they placed in the rapid victory and ultimate good intentions of General Franco, had blinded many eyes to the fact that Gibraltar was a strategic position of very great importance to the British Empire. It is not, and never can be, a place where we can afford to run any risks. Ironside is not an optimist, nor does he indulge in day dreams. He flung his huge energy into the task of rendering Gibraltar capable of defense in modern warfare. Only a man of his energy, only a man whom the politicians at home could not disregard, could have accomplished what Ironside accomplished. Perhaps we shall one day realize the great debt that we owe him for this tremendous feat.

As the war clouds gathered, he was needed for wider purposes. He was appointed Inspector General of our Overseas Forces. He paid rapid visits to Egypt and Palestine. He was recalled, when the war came, to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Then, as the Germans reached Calais on May 26, he was made Commander in Chief of the home forces defending England.

He works there, in his room at the War Office, day and night. He has never cared for comfort and there are corners of his sedate room which recall a bivouac. He has never bothered much to unpack and he keeps a great many things besides a baton in his knapsack. His bed is by his desk and he sleeps there every night. Although he rejoices in the company of his fellow men, he is also a lover of solitude. He will play patience for an hour at a time, thinking out some problem. His domestic life is one of great felicity. He writes excellent letters and his diary, if ever published, will be a literary event.

Yet always there pulsates within Ironside the twin engines of his nature. A grasp of detail and a grasp of principle: efficiency and imagination. He is not vain; but he is immensely proud. His self-confidence is tremendous. It is not the self-confidence of a self-satisfied man; it is the self-confidence of a man who possesses a cool but vivid mind, a man of resolution and wide experience, who has seen many things go wrong and who has triumphed over many impossibilities.

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FRANCE AND ISLAM

By Charles-André Julien

THE capture of Algiers in 1830 marked a significant departure in the expansionist policy of France, for North Africa was quite unlike older French colonial possessions in the Caribbean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The French soon discovered that North Africa — or the *Maghreb*, as the Arabs called it — did not produce tropical goods and that the native population could neither be destroyed to make way for European colonists nor enslaved to work for them. They also found that Islam provided the natives with a religious and a cultural ideal which they would stubbornly defend. France had not been fitted by experience to understand and govern an Islamic and essentially Oriental people. In the years that followed the fall of Algiers she therefore had to fumble her way. Gradually she acquired in Algeria the reservoir of experience which she was to utilize after 1881 in Tunisia and after 1912 in Morocco. But even today France possesses neither a colonial administration nor a body of doctrine sufficiently well developed to enable her to coördinate her Moslem policy effectively.

II

Contrary to general belief, North Africa is not inhabited by Arabs but by Berbers who in the course of time have become Arabized. Actually, it took the Arab invaders no less than five centuries to Mohammedanize the Berbers and to impose on the more sedentary tribes among them a thin veneer of Arabic culture. Throughout their history the Berbers have shown a remarkable power to resist cultural absorption by invading peoples. They have appeared to submit to the superior military strength of the Phœnicians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Turks and the French. Yet through all these vicissitudes they have preserved their civilization almost intact. They maintain their intense particularism and their hatred for all outsiders. However, their resistance to outside control, which once took the form of social revolt, now finds its outlet through nationalist agitation.

For several centuries the centers of resistance to foreign influences — Moslem or Christian, Turkish or French — have been

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the religious fraternities and the local saints (*marabouts*) which sprang up in North Africa in defiance of the Prophet's injunctions against sects and holy men. The French administration, consequently, has sought to neutralize, or even utilize, their influence by granting them subsidies and pensions. The result of this policy has been to lessen the prestige of the fraternities and the *marabouts*, for the Berber looks askance at collusion between his religious leaders and the foreigner. But today, instead of seeking redress in a religious schism as he once did, he is turning to nationalism and Pan Arabism.

Before the French conquest there was no such thing as nationalism in North Africa, except perhaps in Morocco. The only permanent political and social organization of the Berbers was the tribe. From time to time various tribes coalesced to form larger groups; but these were in no sense nations, being rather unstable federations held together by the prestige of a particular leader. Even after the French conquest North Africa remained divided into three parts by political and customs barriers. Algeria is today under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior; while Tunisia and Morocco, being protectorates where native sovereigns still hold nominal sway, are governed from the Foreign Ministry at the Quai d'Orsay. The two administrations, jealous of their authority, have applied different methods and criteria of government, and this has accentuated the peculiar characteristics of each region. In time Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco thus acquired separate individualities. In a sense, then, the French, by amalgamating formerly independent regions into clearly differentiated and unified countries, gave birth to a nationalism which was superimposed on tribal loyalties without eliminating them. Influences from the Moslem East also gave impetus to the growth of nationalist sentiment. The spirit of the Islamic Renaissance permeated the more educated classes in the *Maghreb*, and brought as its concomitant the doctrine that all people speaking the Arab tongue should be united in one nation.

III

The movement for Arab unity which got under way in the nineteenth century was primarily the work of two men, Jemal ed Din el-Afghani and the Sheik Mohammed Abdo. El-Afghani made two demands: that the Arab countries should become in-

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dependent in order to insure their progress under liberal institutions, and that they be grouped in a vast empire under a single Caliph in order to resist European imperialism. His Egyptian disciple, Sheik Abdo, sought to reconcile the Moslem faith with science so that Islam might adopt Western ways, particularly Western weapons, without renouncing its religious traditions. The teachings of these two men led to the founding of the "League of the Arab Fatherland" at Paris at the turn of the century and were elaborated by the Arab Congresses which met from 1913 onwards. They took for their foundations the three concepts of language, race and history.

The traditional Arab language has been rejuvenated and adapted to modern necessities by various learned academies (principally that at Cairo) with the aid of the young intellectuals. The new language, supple enough to express modern philosophical, social and political problems, is tending to become, under the influence of the Egyptian press, a *lingua franca* for the Moslem world and may eventually eliminate the local dialects. It thus represents a political instrument, a language of empire. Its triumph would constitute a step towards the ideal of unity.

The idea that the Moslem world forms an ethnic unit is, of course, scientific heresy. The racial diversities in the *mélange* of tribes and peoples who have been converted to Islam are so great that there cannot possibly be any ethnic unity among them. Nevertheless, the myth of such unity has been widely inculcated among non-Arab peoples. The converted Berbers, for instance, have sought to gain prestige by inventing complicated genealogies showing their direct lineage from the Arab conquerors. Today this racial illusion tends to unite the Moslems of Africa with those of Asia in a common opposition to European penetration. Every Moslem belongs to a great fatherland — Islam. He is taught from infancy that the decadence of the Arab countries began with their loss of freedom and that the return of the glorious days of the Ommiads and Abbassids awaits but the winning of Arab independence. The teaching of history in this dual form — nationalist and Pan Arab — thus confirms the Moslem's pride in the past and his confidence in the future.

Hopes for Arab unity received a severe setback after the World War. Feisal's kingdom failed to materialize; the Zionists were installed in Palestine; the French and British were given mandates over Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Trans Jordan and

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Palestine; and Ibn Saud expanded the Wahhabi power in Arabia proper. Yet in spite of these checks Pan Arabism has continued to gain mass support. During the last two decades the Arab world, from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, has become growingly conscious of the unity of its faith and culture, and of the need for solidarity *vis-à-vis* Europe. At the same time each Arab country has sought with increasing ardor to attain its own national liberation. Pan Arabism and nationalism, apparently incompatible, thus have developed simultaneously as a twofold expression of the East's resistance to the West.

IV

The spirit of the Arab revival was brought to North Africa by books and newspapers, by returning pilgrims and by students who attended Egyptian and Syrian universities. The Moslem world claimed the *Maghreb* for part of its own, and the Islamic congresses, beginning with that of Jerusalem in 1931, were attended by North African delegates. Among those who pushed the Pan Arab movement in North Africa the most active was a Lebanese feudal lord, the Emir Shekib Arslan. This remarkable personality has had a long and varied political career. He was a deputy representing Beirut in the Turkish Parliament at Constantinople, and served on Turkish missions to Germany during the World War. For many years he was actively engaged in the struggle to preserve Moslem predominance in the Balkans and Tripolitania. But it is as propagandist that his activities have been most marked. For his mastery of the Arab tongue he has been called the "Prince of Eloquence" and in 1938 was elected to the presidency of the Arab Academy in Damascus. His wide culture, his indefatigable political activity and his dominating personality have made him a natural leader.

After the World War the Syro-Palestinian Committee was set up at Cairo and the Emir became its permanent representative at Geneva, where his task was to bring Arab influence to bear on the League of Nations. This mission afforded an excellent base of operations for an ambitious and astute man like Shekib Arslan, and he soon transformed his office into a clearing-house for information and propaganda concerning the entire Moslem world. Indeed, the activities of his organization were so far-reaching that his house in Geneva became the nerve center of Islam. He entered into relations not only with Mohammedan leaders but

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with European statesmen, notably Mussolini, whose incense-bearer he became. He issued instructions and programs to the heads of local Arab parties, and he settled disputes between various Moslem groups and leaders. He also sponsored publications, among them *La Nation Arabe*, distributed widely from Java to Morocco. In September 1939 he went to Berlin and put his influence at the service of Germany.

The North African nationalists drank deep at this never-failing well of Pan Arabism. Shekib Arslan had long understood the political importance of North Africa and in Geneva he surrounded himself with Tunisian and Moroccan collaborators. He became the spiritual guide for the young intellectuals and the leaders of the religious awakening in the *Maghreb*. Nor did he confine himself to encouraging the local nationalisms; more than anyone else he sought to popularize the idea that Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were but parts of the great Moslem community.

The Jerusalem Conference had voted the "Arab Pact" which proclaimed the "complete and indivisible unity" of the Arab countries, the duty of each to strive for "a common goal," and the necessity of combatting colonialism with every available force — and this call to action had served as an inspiration to the leaders of the nationalist parties in North Africa. Yet such a program, if put into effect, would naturally have brought the nationalist movement into collision with the French Government. A compromise formula was therefore worked out, probably under the prompting of Shekib Arslan. At any rate it was after exchanging views with the Emir that the North African leaders issued declarations — simultaneously at Tunis and at Fez, and couched in like terms — to the effect that North Africa must march towards independence with the aid of France, and that by giving this aid France would win the undying friendship of the liberated peoples of North Africa by binding them to her with ties of gratitude and common interests. This was a very astute declaration, for it sought to reconcile the nationalists' aspirations with a theoretical loyalty to France. They asked the French Government, as an act of generosity, to grant an autonomy which they knew perfectly well it could not possibly concede.

Meanwhile, out of the regional loyalties developed a larger nationalism encompassing North Africa as a whole. A student congress in 1935 called for instruction in the schools that would "give birth to the consciousness of our unity in North Africa, a

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unity founded on a unified intellectual outlook, a single religion and common sentiments. And let no one say that we are creating a fictitious unity. No, a thousand times no! We are only reviving an ancient unity which history is here to witness and to guarantee." The nationalist parties adopted joint programs and created working alliances. A Tunisian militant wrote in 1937 that "Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, united by the bonds of a common colonial domination, are tending towards the formation of a solidly cemented bloc"; while the head of the Algerian nationalist movement declared: "For the struggle against the imperialist front we are building our own common front of Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans."

This ideal — which we may call "Pan Maghrebism" — is a nationalist stage on the road to Pan Arabism. It has failed so far, not only because it has been officially repressed, but because regional loyalties have persisted. No matter how burning their desire for unity, the nationalist groups in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are obliged, because they live under different administrative régimes, to organize regionally and to formulate their own regional demands.

V

Algeria differs markedly from her two neighbors in several respects. The French Government, instead of exercising indirect rule through native monarchs and Residents, as in Tunisia and Morocco, has divided Algeria into departments, arrondissements and communes which, like those in the mother country, send deputies and senators to the parliament in Paris. There is a relatively high proportion of European colonists: 987,252 out of a population of 7,234,684 (1936 figures). The educated natives have long confined themselves to protesting against the *lois d'exception* and to demanding that their status be made equal to that of Frenchmen. Algerian intellectuals, instead of preaching separatism as have the educated classes in Tunisia and Morocco, have demanded that they be given French citizenship — retaining, however, their personal status as Moslems, with all the rights (for instance as to marriage and inheritance) which that status presupposed. Thus there has developed a movement, unique in North Africa, towards assimilation. This movement might have become much more extensive if the authorities had not done their best to obstruct it by discouraging the naturaliza-

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tion of Moslems. Among those who supported the policy of assimilation were most of the natives who held elective office. But their campaign, carried on in the assemblies and among the masses, clashed with the activities of the Ulemas and the North African Star, an organization of which more shortly.

The Ulemas are the authorities on Moslem law who have made it their business to rescue Islam from the *marabouts* and religious charlatans on one hand and from Europeanization on the other. Their association, formed in 1931, became a potent influence in Algeria under the leadership of Sheik Ben Badis of Constantine, the most forceful personality among North African Moslems and one of the most learned men of Islam. On the one hand he has succeeded in disorganizing the party of the *marabouts;* and on the other he has refused to work with any of the French parties who would like to ally with him. Instead, he has confined himself to activities which fall within the Ulemas' reform program. He distrusts assimilation, for he believes that if the native becomes a French citizen he will lose his Moslem faith.

Assimilation has also been opposed by the North African Star, a nationalist and revolutionary group founded in 1929 and directed by an eloquent tribune, Messali Haj, a former associate of Shekib Arslan. Among other things, Messali demanded that Algeria be independent. In its early years the activities of the North African Star were carried on almost exclusively among Algerians working in the factories of Paris. Dissolved in 1929 and reduced to clandestine activity, it reappeared in 1933, only to be condemned again the following year. Messali, who in the meantime had taken refuge in Geneva, returned to Paris in 1936 when the Blum government was formed. After a short stay in France he went to Algeria, where he founded local cells which he grouped in departmental federations. His success continued to grow until cut short in November 1937 by his sentence to two years' imprisonment and the loss of civil and political rights for "excitation to acts of disorder against the sovereignty of the state." Yet he retained his prestige among the masses, who regarded him as the victim of an arbitrary government.

The fact of the matter is that France cannot arrest the progress of political and religious nationalism except by audaciously embarking on the program of assimilation demanded by the intellectuals and office-holders. M. Léon Blum understood this

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perfectly and therefore, in conjunction with M. Viollette, Minister of State without Portfolio, placed a bill before the Chamber on December 30, 1936, in which the electoral rights of French citizens were to be granted to some 22,000 natives chosen from certain specified categories.[1] These voters were to retain their personal status under Moslem law, as their co-religionists had done in Jugoslavia, French India and Senegal.

The Moslem masses in Algeria received the Blum-Viollette project with enthusiasm. For the first time in history they showed a desire to be integrated in the great French Fatherland, and it is to the credit of M. Blum that he grasped the opportunity presented by this fact. But the French colonists in Algeria opposed this proposal with such violence that Blum's successors did not dare let his bill be discussed in the Chambers. The disappointment which ensued naturally profited the nationalist party of Messali, who had always proclaimed the futility of relying on French promises. The Government sought to compensate its political timidity with more active economic measures; but the Algerians, like other peoples, are moved more by their loyalties than by their interests, and their egalitarian aspirations do not seem to have been diminished by the rising standard of living now noticeable among the rural and urban proletariat.

VI

The problem is quite different in Tunisia and Morocco, which are nominally governed by a Bey and a Sultan, respectively, under French "protection." The inventors of this system of government thought that it would assure the protecting Power all the advantages of annexation without saddling it with any of the obligations. In Tunisia, however, the higher French officials have gradually substituted their own authority for that of the Tunisian ministers, while the *controleurs civils* have absorbed the power of the *caïds* and the French *gendarmerie* has replaced the native *spahis*.

As a result, many Tunisians educated in the French juridical tradition have come to question very seriously the legality of the Protectorate. They assert that the treaties of Bardo and La Marsa imposed on France certain duties *vis-à-vis* her protégé,

[1] Holders of university diplomas, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, certain dignitaries holding the Légion d'Honneur and the Médaille Militaire, and farmers and merchants chosen to represent their economic groups.

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and they have asked that she prepare Tunisia for its political majority by extending the practice of self-government and by expanding the educational system. Instead of the existing régime of disguised annexation they propose a sort of benevolent tutelage which, by successive stages, would lead to an independence in which Tunisia would be tied to France by nothing more than a loose federalism. This position is juridically strong, but it clashes with France's will to rule. The ideal of emancipation which has inspired the mass of the Tunisian people has usually been summarily dismissed by French statesmen as merely a subversive idea. But though the Residents have alternated authority with benevolence, now giving ear to the appeals of the Tunisians, now acting with rigor when those appeals became too insistent, they have not succeeded in stopping the upsurge of nationalism.

Immediately after the World War a campaign began in Tunisia for a constitution, or a *destour*. The leaders of this movement sent a petition to President Wilson in April 1919 and published an anonymous pamphlet entitled "Martyred Tunisia," of which the actual author was an intellectual, Sheik Thaalbi, who had imbibed the doctrines of Moslem reform in the East and who wanted Tunisia to return to the "liberal régime" prevailing before the installation of "French tyranny" in 1881. The year 1920 saw the foundation of the Destour Party with a program calling for the "emancipation of the Tunisian people from the bonds of slavery" and for a constitution under which the reins of government would be given back to the Bey and his dynasty. There followed anti-French press campaigns, street demonstrations, delegations to Paris and attempts at economic boycott. The Government replied not only with repression, but by the creation (in 1922) of representative assemblies which satisfied, at least in part, the moderate elements.

In 1930 the Destour split in two: the New Destour, a liberal constitutionalist party led by young intellectuals with modernist tendencies; and the Old Destour, immovably attached to tradition. The program of the New Destour called for closer participation by the Tunisian people in their own government. Its political techniques were borrowed partly from France, and even more from Fascist Italy: parades in uniform, Arab scouts organized and trained to act as *cadres*, local cells under the direct orders of the central committee, "spontaneous" demonstrations carefully organized beforehand, etc. Under the guidance of its ardent leader,

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a lawyer named Habib Bourghiba, the propaganda of the New Destour won almost unanimous support from Tunisian public opinion. The weakness of the New Destour lay in the tacit assumption, inherent in its program and tactics, that reforms could be won by wringing concessions from the protecting Power. In other words, it inferentially recognized the legality of the treaties binding Tunisia to France. This, many felt, was a false position for a supposedly nationalist movement.

The Old Destour was under no such handicap. Primarily aristocratic and *grand bourgeois* in its outlook, it had refused to admit the principle of the Protectorate or to collaborate in any way with the Resident. Though the Old Destour, like the association of the Ulemas in Algeria, favored Pan Arabism and a return to the pure principles of Islam, it disdained to formulate its demands in a precise program. It thereby avoided subordinating its tactics to the ups and downs of French party politics. Consequently, it was the New Destour that bore the weight of the severely repressive measures carried out by the government between 1933 and 1936.

However, the advent of the Popular Front Government in France in 1936 opened prison gates, recalled exiles from internment in the Sahara and permitted them to express their views freely. In the Foreign Office, an intelligent young Under-Secretary, M. Pierre Viénot, one-time collaborator of Lyautey in Morocco, was put in charge of Tunisia and Morocco. Measures were taken to reëstablish the freedom of the press and of assembly, and the social legislation of France, adapted to local conditions, was extended to Tunisia. But this was not enough, for more fundamental reforms were required in the structure of the government itself. M. Viénot therefore went to Tunisia early in 1937 to investigate on the spot. He convinced himself that the country needed a thorough political, administrative and economic reorganization. He nevertheless disillusioned the Destourians by declaring that the Protectorate was "definitive in character" and that he was fully determined "to insure respect, by all legal means, for the limits which the law imposes on hostile agitation and lying propaganda."

After the fall of the Blum ministry agitation grew rapidly. Disorders began throughout North Africa as if by a single command — perhaps that of Shekib Arslan. The more advanced elements in the New Destour proclaimed the vanity of the Pop-

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ular Front's promises and called for more energetic action to obtain reforms. Their influence grew as a result of the conflict which broke out between the Old and the New Destour following the return of Sheik Thaalbi from a fifteen-year exile.

During his absence the Sheik had become intimately associated with the Moslem Renaissance in the Near East. He now proposed that there be a fusion between the Old and the New Destour. But since Thaalbi's sympathies were opposed to the democratic and strictly national program of the latter, it was obvious that fusion under him would mean a victory for the traditionalist policy of the Old Destour. The New Destour therefore opposed Thaalbi, sometimes going as far as to engage in bloody riots to prevent him from speaking in public. Nevertheless the Sheik, with the encouragement of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, continued his active personal campaign on behalf of Moslem unity. In time the New Destour began to fear that its opportunist program would no longer attract followers in competition with Thaalbi's primarily religious appeal. Habib Bourghiba therefore in November 1937 had his party jettison its policy of tolerance towards the government. He also called a general strike to protest against the repressive measures taken in Algeria and Morocco. Moslem solidarity thus became a cardinal point in the New Destour program. At the same time it rapidly lost sympathy among French Leftist and trade union circles. In order to outdo the Old Destour, Bourghiba recommended that the Protectorate be opposed "by all means, including insurrection," and he sought to arouse a spirit of martyrdom among his followers by getting them to refuse to pay taxes or do military service, and by fomenting mass demonstrations.

On April 9, 1938, a mob organized by leaders of the New Destour, who had become convinced of French impotence following the German seizure of Austria, attacked the police. The throat of a gendarme was cut, the police then fired, and there were a score of dead. But order was quickly restored and punishment was immediate. Within a few hours Habib Bourghiba and the other leaders of the New Destour were imprisoned and three days later the party was dissolved. Though the Government later released a number of suspects, it abrogated practically all of Blum's social legislation.

As a matter of fact, the Nazi menace and Italy's demands did more to bring peace in Tunisia than the imposition of prison

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sentences. The Munich crisis of September 1938 found Tunisia quite calm and the population more clearly conscious than before of the usefulness of the ties which bound them to France. This evolution in public opinion was speeded up by the Italian repudiation (December 1938) of the Laval-Mussolini Agreement of January 7, 1935, and by the Fascist press campaign for the annexation of Tunisia. The Tunisian people have never had a high opinion of Fascism, and their proximity to Libya has given them opportunities to understand the real nature of Il Duce's Moslem policy. Libya's incorporation into the Italian national territory and its division into four provinces, the despatch of 20,000 Italian colonists to settle on Arab lands there in 1938, and the announcement that many more were to follow, provoked a feeling of hostility throughout Islam which even Shekib Arslan, in spite of his "high opinion" of Mussolini,[2] had to take into account.

The Tunisian nation has left no doubt as to where its sympathies and interests lie. In a choice between French and Italian colonialism, not even a Destourian extremist would hesitate. The native reaction after the November 30 demonstration in the Fascist Chamber — when deputies had cried "Tunisì, Gibuti, Corsica!" — was immediate and profound. The popular enthusiasm engendered by Premier Daladier's visit in Tunisia about a month later was in every sense spontaneous and sincere. It would be a mistake, however, to consider Tunisia's universal rejection of the Italian claims as approval of French policy. The New Destour has maintained its demands, while those more prudent circles accustomed to work with the French have made it clear that their coöperation must not be taken for granted and that after the war they expect a thorough transformation of the Protectorate.

VII

In Morocco the nationalist movement evolved much as it did in Tunisia. Many of the sons of the Moroccan bourgeoisie were sent to study in Paris, where they absorbed the democratic and anti-capitalist ideology of the French Left parties. Upon their return they organized the movement for Moroccan independence, basing their demands on the ideas and slogans they had picked up in France. Though this élite was numerically very small, it was active; and in the end it imposed its leadership even on those who

[2] *Nation Arabe*, September–December, 1938, p. 1197.

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held to the old beliefs. The most decisive event in arousing Moroccan nationalism was the revolt of Abd-el-Krim in 1925. His advance nearly to the gates of Fez showed the nationalists that only lack of modern arms prevented Morocco from achieving independence.

With the end of the Riff War open agitation ceased in Morocco, though among the educated youth the desire to play a political rôle burned as fiercely as ever. The latent conflict broke into the open again with the publication of the now famous "Berber Dahir" on May 16, 1930. Under the provisions of this inopportune and ill-advised decree, legal disputes which hitherto had come before Koranic courts in certain Berber tribes were transferred to tribunals in which the customary tribal law was enforced. The young Moroccan intellectuals, organized in a group called the Moroccan Action and inspired by Shekib Arslan, carried on a vigorous campaign of protest against this measure. They bitterly opposed it (even after its terms had been attenuated) because, they declared, it deprived the faithful of Allah's justice. They thus posed as the champions of Islam before the older generation, whom their Western culture had alienated; and their action was praised by the Conference of Jerusalem.

This was very important, because these young intellectuals, in formulating their nationalist program, had to take account of the strong Moslem traditions and conservative tendencies of their elders as well as of the democratic and revolutionary doctrines of their Parisian patrons. To an Occidental mind these two sets of aims were clearly contradictory. But the young men in the Moroccan Action did not find them irreconcilable, as was clearly shown in the "Plan for Moroccan Reforms" which they published in November 1934 at Paris under the sponsorship of a group of Frenchmen prominent in politics, journalism, the law and academic life. It is significant that the "Plan" was also published at Cairo. This manifesto, which was a catalogue of demands and complaints rather than an articulated scheme of reforms, became the official program of the movement.

The Action counted many friends among the Leftists who were victorious in the French elections in the spring of 1936, and it naturally assumed therefore that its demands would be granted forthwith. But after a few months it began to realize that the Blum Ministry was not going to accept them. The Action thereupon launched forth on a violent agitation, which on March 18,

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1937, led to its dissolution by the Sultan. The nationalists then decided that force alone would prevail, and proceeded to prepare the country, even the outlying rural districts, to redeem itself in a frenzy of sacrifice. In August 1937 carefully prepared outbreaks began occurring. Blood was shed, and in October the authorities were led to make mass arrests. General Noguès, the Résident, adopted a very wise policy: he quieted the suspicions of the younger Moroccans by granting a part of their demands and by liberating most of those who had been imprisoned. The majority of the nationalists by this time had learned that the Protectorate could not be overthrown by force; the Munich crisis therefore passed with no untoward repercussions in Morocco.

VIII

Taking North Africa as a whole, we are now in a position to make certain broad generalizations about French policy. In the beginning the authorities failed to grasp the real nature and importance of the various influences filtering in from the Near East. They were inclined to scoff at the efforts of the Destour, the Ulemas, the North African Star and the Moroccan Action as in no way representative of the mass of the natives. Then suddenly events revealed that the spirit of nationalism was making progress even among the tribes in the country districts. Easy-going confidence suddenly gave way to boundless anxiety. All the demands put forward by the nationalists, even those of a purely cultural nature, seemed to take on an anti-French color. This was particularly the case in Algeria, where the subsequent repression was sometimes indiscriminate. In Tunisia, a state of siege was declared after the disturbances in April 1938; and with this arbitrary power in their hands the authorities did not always seek to make the punishment fit the crime. Only in Morocco was repression followed by such skilful opportunism that native opinion was appeased, even though not won over entirely.

IX

The French Government, unable to adapt itself to rapidly changing conditions in North Africa, was equally unprepared to cope with difficulties that arose in its mandated territories in the Levant — Syria and the Lebanon. In Syria it encountered a cultured bourgeoisie accustomed to holding high offices under the Turkish régime; while in the Lebanon, where the majority of the

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inhabitants belonged to one of numerous Christian sects, education had already reduced the proportion of illiterates to 16 percent. The French colonial officials, whose training had been largely confined to governing the colonies in Africa, lacked the experience necessary to administer areas in which the process of political and social evolution had reached an advanced stage.

Furthermore, neither the French Government at Paris nor its officials on the spot had a clear idea of what was involved in ruling an area under mandate. Some held that France was duty-bound to prepare these Levantine states for complete independence as rapidly as possible; others — for political, military or financial reasons — favored prolonging the provisional régime indefinitely. The dangers inherent in France's uncertain and contradictory policy in Syria were revealed in July 1925 when a revolt broke out in the Jebel Druse and spread to Damascus, Mount Hermon and the South Lebanon. Following the suppression of this insurrection the Government failed to pursue a clear-cut policy. Negotiations with the Syrian nationalists would be undertaken, then broken off; reforms would be instituted, only to have their effect arbitrarily annulled. By the end of the twenties the French Government had demonstrated its inability to solve the problems arising from (1) the age-old conflict between Syria and the Lebanon, and (2) the contradictory claims of the Christian minority in Syria and of the Moslem minority in the Lebanon.

In June 1931 the French representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission declared that "the present process of evolution points to the termination of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon at a not very distant date." Fortified with this promise, and encouraged by the emancipation of 'Iraq in 1932, the Syrian nationalists stubbornly refused every compromise offered them. On January 10, 1936, they decided to pass from words to action. The market places were closed (January 18–February 14), there was a boycott of foreign companies, and disorders took place at Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor in which sixty were killed and hundreds wounded. The Government thereupon promised, on March 1, to grant Syria rights equal to those accorded by Britain to 'Iraq.

In June 1936 M. Blum inherited these promises from M. Flandin, together with the conduct of pourparlers which had been going on in Paris since March. M. Viénot, who was resolved

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to bring negotiations to a quick and successful conclusion, on September 3 signed a protocol with the head of the Syrian delegation, Hashem Bey el-Attassi. This was followed by the signature of a treaty with the Lebanon on November 13 and one with Syria on December 22. The Lebanon was separated from Syria and each was given its own government. The independence of Syria was recognized, to take effect in three years. In return it accepted a 25-year alliance with France, and gave certain military, economic and cultural guarantees.

Peace seemed restored. There was loyal collaboration at Damascus between the High Commissioner and the nationalists, as was shown when the latter accepted alterations in the treaty and resigned themselves, albeit reluctantly, to the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey. But the Government's delay in presenting the treaty to Parliament and the encouragement which was given to the separatist demands of the minorities, in particular by certain French officers, convinced Syrian opinion that France wished to kill, or at least mutilate, the treaty. The extremist elements, led by Dr. Shahbendar, chief of the "nationalist bloc," spread the idea that a *jihad* — a holy war — was necessary to compel France to honor her promises.

It was in this feverish atmosphere that the Syrian Prime Minister, Jemil Mardam Bey, left Damascus in August 1938 for Paris to negotiate with Foreign Minister Bonnet. The two men came to a complete understanding. In a joint declaration signed on November 14 they expressed the hope "that the Syrian Parliament will give its approval" to the treaty of December 22, 1936, "not later than January 20, 1939, and that the French Parliament, to which the report of the relevant committees will be presented before December 10, will authorize the ratification of that document before January 31, 1939. Under these conditions the transfer of functions from the mandatory Power to the Syrian administrator will occur during next February." Furthermore, the date set for Syria's admission to the League of Nations was put ahead from December 31 to September 30, 1939.

These reciprocal promises were quite explicit. Yet Jemil Mardam Bey had not yet returned to Damascus when M. Bonnet, under the pressure of intrigues in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, declared (December 14) that for the moment he would not bring the treaty before the Chamber for ratification. This violation of a solemn promise less than a month after it had been given

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naturally had serious consequences in Syria. Jemil Mardam Bey left office on February 18, and was followed by two cabinets, one nationalist and the other neutral, which lasted only a few weeks. The situation became so grave that the High Commissioner took over the police power and in March occupied Damascus with troops. The situation was further aggravated on July 2 when the Government decided to extend a certain amount of autonomy to the minorities. As a result, Hashem Bey el-Attassi resigned from his office as President of the Republic.

To put an end to the crisis, the High Commissioner was obliged to suspend the constitution, dismiss the Chamber and entrust power to a directorate subject to his own supervision. He also declared that the country should harbor "no illusions as to the permanence of French rule in Syria," and that he himself was in favor of prolonging the mandatory régime and direct French rule in defiance of the promises which the French Government had been making ever since March 1, 1936. The energetic purge of the administration and the penalties which were inflicted on the nationalists following this announcement showed in a very practical way the new direction which French policy in Syria was to take.

X

In Syria, then, as in North Africa, there has been a reaction during the last two years against the liberal measures of the Blum government and a return to an authoritarian régime. The outbreak of the war presented the nationalist parties with a favorable opportunity for revolt. Instead of seizing it, they spontaneously adhered to the Allied cause. Everywhere — Damascus, Tunis, Algiers and Fez — native opinion was unanimous against Hitler's racist régime, and this despite the German propaganda actively disseminated from Berlin by Shekib Arslan.

But if the nationalist leaders, especially in Syria, have shelved their demands for the moment, they have made it clear that they intend to push them with renewed vigor at the end of the war. Jemil Mardam Bey, when proclaiming that "Syria will always remain the ally of France and will maintain a faithful attachment to her," nevertheless expressed the hope that the French Government would return to its traditional policy of assisting the Arab countries to fulfill their national aspirations. Dr. Shahbendar was even more explicit. "During the last war," he said, "the Arabs took up arms and fought for the Allied countries.

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Now, twenty years later, the Arabs again stand shoulder to shoulder with their old comrades, because their destiny is irrevocably tied to that of the democracies. From victory they expect liberty and independence."

France would betray her own genius were she to fail courageously to revise her Moslem policy when the war is over. In the Levant she must make good her plighted word by granting independence to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics. In the North African Protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco, she must effect thorough-going constitutional changes: the whole concept of a protectorate must be reëxamined and its juridical bases defined coherently and definitively. In Algeria the gates of French citizenship must be opened widely to the Moslems. This is simple justice. It is also to the interest of France, for it will erect an insurmountable barrier to the wave of Pan Arabism that is sweeping North Africa from the East. In all these countries the land must be given to the *fellahin*, and an outlet for the ambitions of the educated youth must be found in the government services. The nationalists' cultural demands, even if imported from the Near East, must not be regarded in the same light as the political programs of individual parties. And lastly, the Government must improve its services for obtaining information and for unifying Moslem policy. The creation of the *Haut-comité Méditerranéen*, attached to the Prime Minister's office, and of the ministry for coördinating the different administrations in North Africa are the first steps in this direction. But there must be others.

During the debate on the 1940 budget in December 1939, M. Sarraut, Minister of the Interior, M. Herriot, President of the Chamber, and M. Mandel, Minister of Colonies, promised that France would not forget the services rendered by her colonial populations during the present war. Throughout her overseas possessions France has carried out a great civilizing mission. Now in her hour of peril she is being repaid by their almost unanimous loyalty. If the peace of tomorrow is to be what all Frenchmen hope it is, a peace of justice, it can be no less just to natives than to Europeans.

XI

The Arab problem is bound to play an increasingly larger part in Mediterranean affairs. Not only France and Britain, but Italy and Spain are vitally concerned with the course of events in the

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Arab world. Take the case of Spain. When General Beigbeder was High Commissioner in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, he enrolled large numbers of natives as mercenaries to fight for Franco in Spain. He also encouraged nationalist disaffection in the French Zone. Now that he is Franco's Minister of Foreign Affairs, he may very likely try to expand that policy in coöperation with the other totalitarian Powers.

In the case of Italy, it is clear that Mussolini's Moslem policy has been merely a phase of his foreign policy. Italy's only Moslem subjects are four million backward souls in Ethiopia and 700,000 leaderless Libyans, about whose welfare the Fascist state is little concerned. Mussolini's aim, like that of Franco, is negative — namely, to cause trouble in the possessions of France and Britain by inflammatory broadcasts in Arabic from the Bari radio station, by disseminating seditious pamphlets, and by encouraging agitators like Shekib Arslan. In 1937 Il Duce went so far as to proclaim himself "Protector of Islam" at a spectacular ceremony in Tripoli.

Fascist propaganda might have been more successful if Rome had not decreed a series of drastic laws aimed at preserving the "racial" purity and superiority of the Italian colonists in Libya and Ethiopia. A "special Italian citizenship" has been created in Libya, giving natives certain rights valid exclusively in Africa and entitling them to hold certain minor civil and military posts. In other words, a sort of second-class citizenship has been invented for the more faithful and better educated Moslems.

The same contempt for the rights of the natives is manifest in the Fascist conception of colonization as an instrument for gaining control of the Mediterranean and for strengthening Italian autarchy. In order to make place for the soldier-colonists installed along the coasts of Libya, the Fascist Government has expropriated the best lands of the natives. These facts are well-known to the Moslem world; and should Italy actively enter the war on the side of Germany, she may find that her Moslem policy has earned her the bitter enmity of Islam.

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THE ORIGINS OF THIS WAR: A GERMAN VIEW

By Alfred von Wegerer

BY now there is some degree of agreement among historians as to the sequence of events leading up to the World War of 1914–18. This agreement has been made possible by the vast compilations of diplomatic documents published by the various Powers since the close of that war. Concerning the origins of the present war, however, the belligerent governments have not yet been able to publish such extensive documentary collections. They have, however, issued books of various "colors," in which they seek to present their respective cases by making public the texts of documents taken from their archives.[1] This article attempts to weigh and interpret these documents, with particular attention to the German case.

I. GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS BEFORE 1933

On November 5, 1916, in the midst of the First World War, Poland was made an autonomous state by Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the collapse of the German Empire in November 1918, Poland became independent and at Versailles received new boundaries which included a considerable amount of formerly German territory. By cutting off East Prussia from the rest of the Reich and by setting up the Free City of Danzig as an independent political organism, a source of conflict was created which, together with the minorities question, eventually made German-Polish relations intolerable and helped cause this war.

The Versailles Treaty also sought to assure just treatment for the German minorities in Poland; but the Poles did not live up to these obligations. Complaints by the German Government, which began in November 1921 and were continually repeated, led to no improvement in the conditions under which the German communities lived. Arbitrary arrests were frequent; Germans were assassinated and the culprits often left unpunished; and German-owned lands were expropriated. As a result of all

[1] In this article the relevant documents will be indicated parenthetically in the text by the following symbols: G, for the Second German White Book; B, for the British Blue Book; and F, for the French Yellow Book. The figures refer to the document numbers. The symbol H refers to the "Final Report of Sir Nevile Henderson" of September 20, 1939 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939) Cmd. 6115.

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this there was a large German emigration. But the Weimar Republic, deprived of military force by the Versailles Treaty, was unable to defend German rights against Polish arrogance.

II. GERMANY'S SEARCH FOR AN UNDERSTANDING WITH POLAND: 1933-39

At the beginning of May 1933, the new National Socialist Government made its first attempt to come to an understanding with Poland. But from the very outset it left no doubt that the permanent preservation of peace between the two nations was unthinkable as long as the Versailles boundaries were retained. Also, it refused to recognize that Poland had a special right to Danzig. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, negotiations between the two countries led, on January 26, 1934, to a declaration that in the future they would under no circumstances use force for the settlement of any future disputes (G 37). However, in spite of this agreement, German-Polish relations remained more or less the same as before. On November 5, 1937, Germany and Poland concluded a new agreement for the mutual protection of minorities. But the expected improvement in the condition of the German communities in Poland still failed to take place, and unemployment, especially among the youth, steadily increased. The Germans felt this to be especially hard, since in the Reich Hitler had managed within a few years to put an end to unemployment.

The situation in Danzig demands special consideration. Under the Versailles Treaty, Danzig and its immediate vicinity had been separated from Germany and made into a "Free City" and its external political relations placed under a League of Nations Commissioner. Poland was given certain special economic and transport privileges, while on the Westerplatte, an island at the mouth of the Vistula, she had the right to maintain a fixed number of troops for the protection of a munitions depot. An economic agreement between Danzig and Poland, signed in August 1933, if loyally carried out, might have brought about a lessening of the friction. But the Polish Government, besides building up the purely Polish port of Gdynia, held fast to its expansionist policy toward Danzig, and tried by unjustified tariff policies to deflect commerce from the Free City. Polish propaganda even demanded the annexation of Danzig.

In spite of Poland's intransigent attitude, Germany continued

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to seek an understanding concerning Danzig and the Corridor. Towards this end the German Foreign Office made certain concrete proposals at the end of 1938. In these, Poland was asked to agree to the return of Danzig and to the establishment of an extraterritorial highway and railway connection across the Corridor to East Prussia. In return, Germany was to give Poland a similar connection with Danzig, and, when the agreement came into effect, definitely to recognize Poland's boundaries.

In the course of these negotiations a meeting took place at Berchtesgaden (January 5, 1939) between the Führer and Foreign Minister Beck of Poland. In friendly terms Hitler explained how German-Polish relations, and in particular the Danzig and Corridor questions, should in his view be regulated. Concerning Danzig, he had in mind a formula "according to which Danzig should become a part of the German body politic but in economic matters should remain with Poland" (G 200). The Polish Foreign Minister promised to think the matter over.

However, Poland's dilatory tactics continued. But before pursuing the German-Polish question, we must turn to relations between Germany and Britain after Munich.

III. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS FROM MUNICH TO PRAGUE

Upon his return from the Munich Conference, Mr. Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, no doubt fully intended to carry out a policy of peace. But the Conservative Opposition was of a different mind, and Chamberlain was therefore unable to put the Anglo-German rapprochement on a firm basis. Munich was a bud which failed to blossom. The tension created by Italy's claims in the Mediterranean compelled Chamberlain to speed up the pace and volume of the British rearmament program. Furthermore, as early as October 1938, Hitler found himself obliged, as a result of statements by British politicians about the fate of German citizens inside the Reich, to protest against London's attitude of "governess-like guardianship." The Reich, he said, did not bother itself about similar matters in the British Empire — referring to events in Palestine (G 219).

On January 30, 1939, Hitler emphasized in a speech to the Reichstag that National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy were strong enough to win any conflict frivolously caused by irresponsible persons. Germany, he said, had no territorial demands to make on England and France, except the return of her

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colonies. There was not a single German, especially no National Socialist, "who had any thought of making difficulties for the British Empire" (G 241). In February and March he delivered other speeches of a similar import.

To sum up, the causes for the growing tension between the Axis Powers on one hand and Britain and France on the other were: the rivalry between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, which indirectly made Anglo-German relations worse; the exaggerated notions about Germany's expansionist aims in Southeastern Europe; and the difference in *Weltanschauung* represented by the British and the National Socialist Governments.

IV. PRAGUE

The tension was sharply intensified when, in the middle of March, Czechoslovakia fell to pieces after the declaration of independence by the Slovak legislature. Hitler therefore put an end to the untenable situation in Bohemia and Moravia by joining them to the Reich under a Protectorate. The Czechoslovak President, Dr. Hacha, "in order to assure quiet, order and peace," trustfully laid the fate of the Czech people in the hands of the Führer. The Czechs were promised "an autonomous development of their national life in accordance with their character" (G 260). The text of the agreement of March 15, establishing the new relationship between Berlin and Prague, was at once forwarded with explanations to England and France (F 69). Britain thereupon suspended negotiations for a trade pact and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, was called to London to report. The English and French Governments also entered formal protests against Germany's action in Czechoslovakia as being illegal and contrary to the Munich Agreement (F 70, 76; B 10). The Germans rejected these protests with the observation that they lacked "all political, legal and moral foundation" (G 262). In this connection it might be pointed out that, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that according to his knowledge the Communiqué of Munich "contained no such declaration" that Hitler had promised, with reference to the Czechoslovak State, to negotiate with the British Government (G 259, 264).

The significance of the German occupation of Prague lies not so much in any pretended disregard of the Munich Agreement or in an abandonment of political principles on Hitler's part as in

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the fact that Chamberlain took it as an occasion for making a fundamental change in his policy — by actively interfering in the German-Polish affair through the granting of a British guarantee to Poland. Chamberlain revealed his thoughts in a comprehensive speech at Birmingham on March 17. In this he made a detailed defense of his Munich policy, which he said had saved peace in Europe. He remarked very aptly that even if England, instead of signing the Munich Agreement, had gone to war and after frightful losses had been victorious in the end, "never could we have reconstructed Czecho-Slovakia as she was framed by the Treaty of Versailles" (B 9). (If one applies these phrases to the Polish question, one perceives the futility of the present war.) He went on to say, however, that the annexation of Czechoslovakia belonged in a different category and that it raised several questions: "Is this the end of an old adventure or is it the beginning of a new" one, was it not in fact only another step in Germany's attempt "to dominate the world by force?"

Now the proceedings in Prague constituted neither an old nor a new adventure, but merely a further revision of the Versailles and St. Germain Treaties — a revision which, despite Hitler's previously expressed opinion to the contrary, had now proved to be necessary. To try to construe from this a breach of promise on Hitler's part would justify making the same reproach of Chamberlain, made in the "German White Book," for his declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Chamberlain's words about Germany's attempt to dominate the world by force gave expression to an old fear of Conservative circles in England that "a consolidated territory in the East under German hegemony would, after consolidation, throw itself with its whole strength against England" (G 275). Here was the same English fright at spectres that had found expression in Arthur Nicolson's report to Sir Edward Grey in March 1909, during the first Balkan crisis.[2] This notion, absurd as it is, was deeply rooted in the Foreign Office at London and in it lay the precise cause of the wars of 1914 and 1939.

V. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLAND IN MARCH 1939

After Prague, English diplomacy began feverishly to meet Germany's imagined plans for world domination by extending

[2] Alfred von Wegerer, "Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, 1914." (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939) v. I, p. 49.

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the British system of alliances — the old method of encirclement. London wanted a Four Power Pact between England, France, Poland and Russia (G 206, 274, 275).[3] Hitler, on the contrary, sought to come to terms with Poland by negotiation. On March 21, Ribbentrop tried to convince Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, that Germany and Poland should conclude an agreement on the basis of Germany's well-known terms: the return of Danzig to the Reich, an extraterritorial railway and highway connecting the Reich and East Prussia, and a German guarantee that the Corridor should remain Polish. In order to make clear to Lipski the urgency of the affair, Ribbentrop proposed that the Ambassador make a trip to Warsaw; otherwise, he said, Hitler would get the impression "that Poland simply was not willing" (G 203).

But the Polish Government had little intention of negotiating on this basis, as was indicated on March 24 when it called up reservists (G 204). In order to understand Poland's intransigent attitude, one must keep in mind that England was then seeking to create a Four Power Pact in which Poland was to join. Instead of following up the German proposals, Lipski, at another interview with Ribbentrop on March 26, delivered a memorandum from his Government in which it refused to consider the proposal by which extraterritoriality was to be granted to German transportation lines across the Corridor, though it offered them certain traffic facilities (G 214). As for Danzig, the Polish memorandum proposed a joint Polish-German guarantee. After taking note of this communication, Ribbentrop declared that since the position taken by the Polish Government "could offer no basis for a German-Polish solution," the Führer could not regard its proposals as satisfactory. "Only a clear reunion of Danzig, an extraterritorial connection with East Prussia, and a 25-year non-aggression pact with boundary guarantees" could, he declared, lead to a definite and clear understanding (G 208).

On the same day, in the formerly German town of Bromberg in the Corridor, outbreaks occurred which were organized by the Polish West Association and in which cries of "Down with Hitler," "We want Danzig," "We want Koenigsberg" were

[3] See also the report of Lukasiewicz to Beck of March 24, 1939 (*The New York Times*, March 30, 1940), from which it appears that Poland had little inclination to adhere to this pact, because she did not have sufficient confidence that English assistance would be forthcoming in a crisis. This document was among those reportedly found by the German authorities in the Polish archives after the capture of Warsaw.

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heard. Ribbentrop therefore on the following day declared to the Polish Ambassador that these new insults had made a catastrophic impression in Germany. Further, he added that he could not understand why the Polish Government had rejected Germany's generous proposal and that a Polish *coup de force* against Danzig would be a *casus belli*. Lipski replied that he was willing to do everything in his power to overcome the difficulties (G 209).

On March 29 Beck told Moltke, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, that a unilateral attempt by Germany to change the Statute of the Free City, or an independent action by the Danzig Senate, would be regarded by Poland as a *casus belli* (G 211). Beck sought to justify Poland's mobilization measures by pointing out that, after what had happened to Czechoslovakia and Memel, the Poles had come to regard Germany's Danzig demands as an alarm signal. Moltke reminded Beck of the proposals made by the Führer in January at Berchtesgaden, and pointed out that the present ones merely aimed at putting German-Polish relations on a sound basis (G 211). With this interview German-Polish negotiations came to a temporary halt.

On March 31, Chamberlain came forward openly as Poland's protector. He declared in the House of Commons that his Government had no confirmation for the rumors that Germany was planning an attack on Poland, but that in the event of any action which threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government considered it necessary to resist with its national forces, the British Government would feel bound "to lend the Polish Government all the support in their power" (B 17). The French Government undertook the same commitment. This, of course, meant the definite end of Munich, for England had become Poland's partisan. As was to be expected, Britain's action only increased Poland's intransigence.

On April 6, a communiqué issued by the British and Polish Governments announced that they had decided to replace their existing unilateral assurances with a reciprocal agreement. Pending the conclusion of this agreement, Poland promised to render assistance to England under the same conditions as those contained in the assurance already given by London to Warsaw (B 18). On the same day, Lipski informed Secretary of State von Weizsaecker that Poland wished to preserve the 1934 agreement with Germany. The Anglo-Polish accord, he said, was a bilateral, purely defensive arrangement; there was no question of Poland's

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joining a bloc (G 212). Weizsaecker expressed his astonishment that Poland had not taken up Hitler's generous offer, and pointed out that the Anglo-Polish accord, the terms of which to be sure were not yet known, was incompatible with the German-Polish Agreement of 1934. To this Lipski replied that the Franco-Polish Alliance, dating from 1921, had not been regarded as incompatible with that Agreement (G 213).

VI. APRIL 28, 1939

Britain's guarantee to Poland, and the failure of German-Polish negotiations over Danzig and the Corridor led the German Government to draw up two memoranda. These were handed to the Polish and British Governments on April 28 at the same time that their contents were being made public by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag. The memorandum to Poland, after reviewing the efforts of the National Socialist Government to come to terms with its eastern neighbor, stated that the Polish Government, having rejected the opportunity to settle the Danzig question and having undertaken obligations towards another state (England) incompatible with the German-Polish Agreement of 1934, had thereby deliberately and unilaterally voided that document. Nevertheless, it continued, the German Government was ready to enter a new agreement provided it were based on a clear obligation binding on both parties (G 213, 214, 294, 295; B 21, 22).

In its memorandum to the British Government, the Reich declared that Britain had shown, by her recent policy and by the attitude of her press, that she regarded preparation for a war on Germany as the principal problem of her foreign policy; and that by pursuing this "encirclement policy" the British Government had removed the basis for the Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, which was therefore no longer in force (B 22).

As for Hitler's speech, insofar as it dealt with England it expressed deep resignation. During his whole political career, he said, he had always expounded the idea of Anglo-German friendship, an idea founded on the belief that the continued existence of the British Empire was in the interest of mankind. He had never made any mystery of the fact that he regarded England as an invaluable element in the world's cultural and economic life, and that the colonizing work of the Anglo-Saxon people aroused his "sincere admiration." However, his respect for this

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achievement could not obscure his duty to protect the interests and aspirations of his own people. Nor did he fail to recall that Germany herself had once been a great empire. In concluding, he expressed his regret that the English people were of the opinion that, no matter in what conflict the Reich might be involved, "Great Britain would always have to take her stand against Germany." He deeply deplored this because, after all, his only demand on England was the return of the former German colonies—and this, he declared, could never become a cause for Germany's going to war with England (G 295; B 21).

VII. GERMANY, ENGLAND AND POLAND: TO AUGUST 25

In a speech delivered on May 5, Beck rejected Hitler's proposals of April 28. At about the same time anti-German demonstrations took place in Thorn, Katowitz, Lodz and Posen (G 349–417). On May 12 the German community in Poland presented a respectful petition to President Moscicki reviewing the old complaints concerning church and school questions as well as the dismissal of German factory workers — again with no result. A few days later the German Consul in Lodz reported that German workers had been driven out of certain factories by a Polish mob, that all German places of business and private dwellings had been systematically demolished, and that the police had done nothing to prevent it. Reports from the German Ambassador in Warsaw also revealed that the "German Houses" in Bromberg, Lodz and Tarnowitz had been expropriated and that in seventeen cases the German clergy had been mistreated or their church property destroyed.

These outbreaks were the result not only of racial hatred but of Polish propaganda. It was, for instance, widely believed in Poland that crowds of famished German soldiers were daily deserting across the border, that the German war *matériel* was of doubtful value, and that German foreign policy had suffered one defeat after another. Even among the Polish intelligentsia the relative strength of Germany *vis-à-vis* Poland was completely misjudged. Nor did the failure of the Anglo-Polish loan negotiations dampen the bellicose ardor of Polish opinion.

In July, a slight lessening of the tension in Danzig seemed possible, but by the beginning of August the situation had become extremely critical. In particular, conflicts arose between Warsaw and the Danzig Senate over the question of customs

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administration (B 42). The Polish Government had notified the Danzig Senate, in a communication which took the form of an ultimatum, that the Danzig authorities must not interfere with Polish customs officials in the execution of their duties (B 43, 46; F 181, 193). When the Reich Government learned of this, it informed Warsaw that a repetition of such peremptory demands on the Danzig Senate, coupled with the threat to use force, would only aggravate German-Polish relations (G 445). Poland sharply rejected this intervention as without legal justification, and informed the Reich that she would regard any interference by it in Danzig "as an aggressive action" (G 446). This statement, made on August 10 by the Polish Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, created a very serious situation (G 447; B 47).[4]

On the evening of August 15, a hectic conversation took place in Berlin between Weizsaecker and Sir Nevile Henderson, in which they were unable to reconcile their widely divergent points of view in regard to the Polish situation. In a later conversation Henderson declared that if Germany used force, England would do likewise. Weizsaecker tried to impress upon him the German view that Poland's attitude was such that the British Government was freed from any obligation "to follow blindly every eccentric step on the part of a lunatic" (B 48). He went on to say that Beck, in his last parliamentary speech, after having "sat himself like a Pasha on the divan," had announced that if Germany accepted the Polish thesis he was ready within these limitations graciously to receive proposals (G 450). Weizsaecker expressed his confidence that Russia would join in sharing the Polish spoils. In reply, Henderson again reiterated that British intervention was inevitable if Poland were attacked (B 48). This conversation showed that England was no longer master of the situation.

The action which the British Government undertook in Warsaw to postpone or prevent the conflict between Germany and Poland consisted in having Lord Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, instruct its Ambassador to Poland, Sir Howard Kennard, to beg the Poles to avoid giving Hitler a pretext, to moderate their press campaign against Germany, "to intensify their efforts to prevent attacks on their German minority,"

[4] In 1909 the Serbs had sent the Vienna Government a similar note, which Sir Edward Grey characterized as "shameless" and which caused England to withdraw her support from Serbia, thereby putting an end to a crisis which had brought Europe to the brink of war. *Cf.* Wegerer, *op. cit.* v. I, p. 48.

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and in the future to deal with Danzig questions through the mediation of the High Commissioner. Halifax further stated in these instructions that the Polish Government, "provided essentials can be secured," would do well to declare its readiness "to examine the possibility of negotiation over Danzig if there is a prospect of success." The British Ambassador was instructed to consult with his French colleague before talking to Beck (B 50).

In view of the state which affairs had reached by this time, such a cautious *démarche* on the part of Britain could not cause Poland to change its policy toward Germany. The Poles must have been aware that the Allies' negotiations with Russia would fail and that Poland, as their only reliable ally in Eastern Europe, could therefore command a high price. At this stage tension might have been relaxed only if England had come to a general political understanding with Germany. But this would have meant Britain's dropping Poland so that Germany could have revised the Versailles Treaty by direct negotiations with Warsaw.

On August 15, Weizsaecker also talked about Poland with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre. The State Secretary said he could not understand why France should regard her aid to Poland as "automatic and a matter of course." Coulondre sought to explain that French policy was identical with the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. If Poland were to be overrun by Germany, he said, one could foresee that France's turn would come next. France, therefore, could not agree to put pressure on Warsaw (G 449; F 194).

VIII. THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN CHAMBERLAIN AND HITLER

After the announcement of the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia, the English Cabinet decided on August 22 to pass the Emergency Powers [Defense] Bill. On the same day Chamberlain sent a letter to Hitler in which he spoke of the approach of war and suggested postponing the discussion of the German-Polish problem until a better atmosphere could be created. He also declared himself ready to examine with Germany the larger international problems of the future and to stop the press polemics. But he stressed Britain's determination to fulfill her obligations to Poland. He did this, he said, in order that the tragic misunderstanding of 1914 would not occur again (G 453, 454; B 56). This letter was discussed the following day at a con-

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ference between Hitler and Henderson at Berchtesgaden. The British Ambassador observed that in England it was recognized that Anglo-German coöperation was necessary for the well-being of Europe. Hitler replied that this ought to have been recognized sooner. Henderson declared that England must stand by her guarantee to the Poles and that she was only opposing the principle of force. Hitler's rejoinder was merely to remind Sir Nevile of Versailles (G 455).

In his answer to Chamberlain, Hitler, after once more stating his views without adding any essentially new points, concluded by remarking that throughout his life he had always fought for Anglo-German friendship, but that British diplomacy had convinced him of the futility of such a policy. Should the future bring any change in this respect, nobody, he said, would be happier than he (G 456; B 60).

On August 25, Hitler saw Henderson again and told him: that the Polish provocations had become intolerable; that Germany was determined to put an end to the "Macedonian conditions" on her eastern frontier; and that the problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. After this had been done, he said, he was determined once more to approach England with a comprehensive offer. He accepted the British Empire and "pledged himself personally for its continued existence" if his colonial demands, which could be negotiated by peaceful methods, were fulfilled. He did not ask that England give up her obligations toward France, any more than he intended to give up his toward Italy. He also emphasized Germany's determination never again to enter into conflict with Russia. And he declared that he was ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments which would correspond to the new political situation (G 457; B 68).

On this same day the assurances which had already been exchanged between England and Poland in March were signed in a mutual assistance treaty (B 19; G 459).

IX. THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN HITLER AND DALADIER

On August 25, Hitler begged the French Ambassador to tell Daladier that he would very much regret a war between Germany and France. He felt no hostility toward France, he said. He had renounced Alsace-Lorraine and had recognized the Franco-German border; but, he said, he would "reply by force to any

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further provocations." Coulondre assured him that Poland would be given reasonable advice, but that in case the Germans attacked that country, France would be found on Poland's side (F 242). On August 26, Daladier sent Hitler a personally-signed telegram, in which he emphasized that France would live up to her obligation to Poland; at the same time he promised to make every effort to bring about a peaceful solution (F 253; G 460).

In his answer of August 27, Hitler recalled how he had succeeded in getting rid of the most intolerable provisions of the Versailles Treaty without shedding blood. He then sought to clarify Germany's position in the Corridor question by comparing Danzig with Marseilles, and concluded with the observation that a war of destruction between Germany and France would be very painful to him. But, he said, he saw no peaceful means by which he could persuade Poland to pursue a course acceptable to Germany (F 267; G 461).

X. THE CLIMAX OF THE CRISIS

Hitler's reply to Chamberlain's letter and his statements to Henderson were answered in a memorandum which the latter handed the Führer late on August 28 (B 74; F 277; G 463; H 39). The British Government declared in this memorandum that it could enter into discussions for an Anglo-German understanding only after the differences between Germany and Poland had been settled. It once again stressed England's obligations to Poland and asserted that any German-Polish agreement must be guaranteed by the other Powers. The British Government stated that it had already received "a definite assurance" from Poland that she would negotiate upon the basis of such a guarantee, provided that "Poland's essential interests" were safeguarded. But this was not true, for in reality there was only an "intimation by the Polish Government" that it was ready to hold conversations (G page xv; B 73, 74).

In his interview with Henderson on the twenty-eighth, Hitler declared himself ready to negotiate with any Polish Government that really had the country under control and was reasonable. But he could not, he said, repeat his generous offer of March, for now he desired the return of Danzig and the Corridor, together with the rectification of the frontier in Silesia. The British envoy maintained that Hitler must choose between Britain's offered friendship and his own excessive demands on Poland. When

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Henderson remarked anew that it was not merely a question of Danzig and the Corridor but of Britain's determination to meet force with force, Hitler excitedly insisted that in the Rhineland, Austria and Sudetenland he had succeeded in finding a peaceful solution without using force and intimated that the Polish problem could likewise be settled pacifically if only Poland were not given encouragement by outside Powers. With this observation Hitler struck to the very core of the problem. In response to Henderson's question as to whether he was willing to negotiate directly with the Poles, Hitler declared that he could reply only after a careful examination of the British note, and that he would at once talk with Göring about it (B 75).

On August 29, Chamberlain delivered an important speech in the House of Commons, in which he said that Berlin had been given clearly to understand that England would fulfill her obligations to Poland (B 77). At about 7 p.m. on the same day, the Führer handed to Henderson his answer to the British memorandum. In this he called attention once again to Poland's negative attitude toward the March proposals, as well as to the maltreatment and persecution of the Germans living in Poland. The German Government therefore demanded the return of Danzig and the Corridor, and the safeguarding of the existence of the German national groups in the territories remaining to Poland. It declared that the British proposal that Germany's differences with Poland be settled by negotiation unfortunately could not be accepted unconditionally. It had attempted to negotiate, but had received no encouragement from Warsaw. Nevertheless, impressed by the prospect of a treaty of friendship with England, Germany would accept the proposal that direct conversations be initiated with Poland, on the understanding that the Soviet Union, with which Germany had signed a non-aggression pact on August 23, should participate in any rearrangement of Polish territory. The German Government disclaimed any intention of touching Poland's vital interests and was ready "to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August 1939." Corresponding proposals would be immediately worked out for an acceptable solution, and, if possible, placed at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator (G 463, 464; B 78).

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In his interview with Hitler, Henderson had got the impression that the Führer's desire for good relations with England "was undoubtedly a sincere conviction" (H 44). When Henderson remarked that the demand for the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary by August 30 sounded like an "ultimatum," he was told that this stipulation had been made only in order to emphasize the urgency of the matter. The plenipotentiary would "naturally" be received in a friendly manner, and the discussion would be conducted on a footing of complete equality (B 79, 80; F 291, 293). When Henderson tried to indicate the difficulty of getting a Polish negotiator to Berlin by the thirtieth, Hitler declared that "one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half hours" (B 82). During the night of the thirtieth Halifax informed Henderson that the German note would be carefully considered, but that it would be unreasonable to expect England to produce a Polish representative in Berlin on that very day (B 81). The British Ambassador conveyed this message to Ribbentrop about 4 a.m. In a despatch to Halifax, Sir Nevile nevertheless recommended "that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Hitler" (B 82).

In Warsaw, however, the German proposal was held to be impossible. The Poles declared they would sooner fight and perish than submit to such humiliation. The British Ambassador in Warsaw remarked very correctly that Poland would not agree to the present proposals, which went beyond the March terms, because she could now rely on the support of Great Britain and France (B 84).

At about 5:30 p.m. it was reported from Warsaw by telephone that general mobilization had been ordered. This made Poland's attitude quite clear (G 465). Halifax informed Henderson about 7 p.m. that, though he assumed the German Government was insisting on the despatch of a Polish representative to Berlin with full powers, he could not advise the Polish Government to comply with this procedure. He therefore recommended inviting the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to accept the German proposals for transmission to Warsaw (B 88).

On August 30 about midnight, Henderson was in a position to give Ribbentrop the full text of the British reply, in which a futile attempt was once more made to spin out the business heedless of the acute tension then prevailing (G 466, Appendix 1; B 89). In the discussion which followed the delivery of this note,

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Henderson once more recommended that Germany open negotiations with Poland in the normal diplomatic way. In reply Ribbentrop confined himself to complaining that the only result produced so far by British mediation had been that Poland had ordered general mobilization. Since a Polish negotiator had not arrived in Berlin, he said, the German proposals were no longer relevant. However, in order to show Henderson what Germany had intended to propose to the Polish representative, Ribbentrop read him, in the German language and somewhat more rapidly than Henderson would have wished, the comprehensive German proposals. Henderson's request that he be given a copy of the document was refused, because it was "now too late," no Polish emissary having arrived at Berlin by midnight. A final suggestion by the British Ambassador that Ribbentrop should give the proposals to the Polish Ambassador was likewise rejected. These proposals, consisting of 16 points, included: the return of Danzig to the Reich, a plebiscite in the Corridor, the establishment of provisional transit facilities to East Prussia across the Corridor, an exchange of populations in case after the plebiscite the Corridor should return to the Reich, the arrangement of special rights for Danzig and Gdynia, and the regulation of the rights of minorities. Acceptance of these proposals was to be immediately followed by demobilization (G 466, Appendix 2; B 92, 98; F 336).

Henderson at once informed Lipski concerning the principal German points and explained that so far as he had correctly grasped them "they were not on the whole too unreasonable." Lipski promised to transmit the proposals to his Government (H 55, 56). Coulondre, with whom Henderson had communicated during the night before seeing Ribbentrop, was also of the opinion that the Polish Government should consent to send a plenipotentiary. He thought, however, that a place near the frontier ought to be chosen for the negotiations.

Poland's attitude toward Germany's demands and Britain's mediation suggestions is indicated only indirectly in the British and French documents. During the night of August 30, Lord Halifax directed the British Ambassador in Warsaw to transmit the above-mentioned British note to the Polish Government. Halifax characterized as unreasonable the most essential point of the German demands — *i.e.*, that a Polish representative should arrive in Berlin that same day. He also informed the Polish Gov-

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ernment that the Germans were now working out proposals on the basis of which a decision must be taken (B 90). This information, however, conflicted with Ribbentrop's position, made known later, that these proposals had been withdrawn since no Polish representative had appeared within the stipulated time (G 466; B 92). Beck promised a comprehensive reply to this British communication by noon of the next day.

But at that hour a further message from Lord Halifax reached Warsaw directing Kennard to propose, along with his French colleague, that the Polish Government accept the principle of direct negotiations. In a subsequent telegram Halifax requested that the Polish Government inform the German Government through its Ambassador in Berlin that the latter was ready to transmit any proposals to the Polish Government for examination and to make suggestions regarding early discussions (B 95). On the afternoon of August 31, Beck handed Kennard a note containing the views of the Polish Government. This communication, however, limited itself to outlining a *modus procedendi* for an immediate exchange of views with the German Government, and therefore came too late (B 97). The British Ambassador urgently advised Beck to direct Lipski immediately to put himself in touch with Ribbentrop or Weizsaecker (B 96). Late in the evening of August 31, Henderson was directed by Halifax to inform the German Government that the Polish Government was taking steps through its Ambassador in Berlin "to establish contact" with the German Government (B 99).

Halifax telegraphed to Warsaw that he did not see why the Polish Government should feel any hesitancy about authorizing its Ambassador to accept a document from the German Government, and that he earnestly hoped that it would modify its instructions to him. A refusal to receive proposals "would be gravely misunderstood by outside opinion," he asserted (B 100). Lipski meanwhile called on the German Foreign Minister about 6:30 p.m., but this visit did not diminish the tension because, not being empowered to negotiate, he could only declare that Poland was giving the British suggestions favorable consideration (G 468).

XI. WAR WITH POLAND

In the last days of August countless small fights, principally around customs houses, occurred along the German-Polish border.

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Because of these incidents and because of Poland's unreadiness to negotiate, the German Army invaded Poland early in the morning of September 1. On that same day, Hitler delivered a detailed speech to the Reichstag in which, after tracing the origins of the conflict, he specified Germany's aims and declared that he would not wage war on women and children (G 471).

XII. THE ENTRANCE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE INTO THE WAR

On September 1, Henderson handed Ribbentrop a note stating that the British Government would fulfill its obligation to assist Poland if Germany did not immediately withdraw her troops from Polish territory. In reply, Ribbentrop pointed out that regular and irregular bands of Polish troops had raided German territory, that Poland had been acting provocatively toward Germany for months, and that he had waited in vain for a Polish negotiator even for a whole day beyond the limit originally set (B 110, 111; G 472). An hour later the French Ambassador handed a similar note to the German Foreign Minister (F 345; G 473). Meanwhile the German Army continued its invasion of Poland.

After two days, at 9 a.m. on September 3, Henderson presented a British ultimatum, declaring that no reply had yet been received to Britain's demand that Germany should immediately withdraw her troops from Polish territory. Unless a satisfactory assurance to the above effect were given by the German Government not later than 11 a.m. — that is, within two hours — a state of war would exist between the two countries as from that moment (B 118; G 477).

Since no reply was forthcoming within the time set, at about 11:15 a.m. the German Chargé d'Affaires in London was handed a note of which the last paragraph contained Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany (B 118; G 478). Fifteen minutes later Ribbentrop handed Henderson a note declaring that the German Government and people refused "to receive, accept or indeed fulfill ultimatum-like demands from the British Government." It further stated that without the interference of Britain, Germany and Poland would certainly have found a reasonable solution in which the rights of both parties would have been respected. It also gave the reasons why the British Government must bear the responsibility for the calamity which had now overtaken so many peoples (G 479). At 12:30 p.m. the French

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Ambassador had a short interview with Ribbentrop in which, after discussing Mussolini's mediation proposal,[5] Coulondre handed over a note stating that France would, as from 5 p.m. on that day, fulfill her treaty obligations to Poland (G 481; F 367).

XIII. CONCLUSION

The incidents that led to the outbreak of the war arose from the unfortunate form given to Poland's frontiers at Versailles. It was only natural that after Germany had again grown strong, she should seek to remedy the intolerable conditions along her eastern border. The right course would have been for the Western Powers themselves to have sponsored a just settlement of German-Polish problems. Instead of that, however, they fortified Poland in her opposition to change, and made it impossible for Germany to secure her aims by negotiation.

The antagonism between England and Germany was only a secondary cause of the war. The primary causes were the exaggerated notions that prevailed in various countries concerning Germany's policy of economic expansion towards the Southeast and the tension between France and Italy over Mediterranean questions. This latter factor must not be neglected, merely because the relevant documents have not as yet been published. Up to Munich, Chamberlain was on the right path, and had found in Henderson an excellent second. But after Munich, the British Prime Minister fell under evil influences which again brought England, and France with her, into conflict with Germany. In the late winter of 1939, just as Franco-Italian tension was relaxing, came the German occupation of Prague. This event gave English policy a new orientation that made a European war inevitable.

One cannot escape the conclusion that Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia and the settlement of the Danzig and Corridor questions in the way intended by Hitler, need not have caused Britain and France to involve Europe anew in a general war. Just as the Austro-Serbian hostilities might have been localized in 1914, so in 1939 it should have been possible for Germany and Poland to settle their difficulties by themselves. Only as a result of the interference of the Allies did a relatively unimportant conflict in Eastern Europe develop again into a great war.

[5] This mediation proposal failed because England insisted that Germany must withdraw her troops from Poland before the conference suggested by Mussolini could take place.

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THE BATTLE OF THE METALS

By Percy W. Bidwell

THE statisticians had defeated Germany months before she invaded Poland. With batteries of adding machines they had proved that she was suffering from serious deficiencies in critical foodstuffs and in practically all of the raw materials necessary for the conduct of modern warfare. Their calculations showed that with respect to fats, oils, wool, cotton, hides, petroleum, iron, copper and other metals, the Reich was bound to be at a great disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the French and British as long as the latter could keep open the lines of sea communication. The conclusion seemed obvious — "Germany Can't Win." The more cautious of the commentators introduced qualifications as to the length of the war and the tightness of the British and French blockade. They also made a third qualification as to the character of the struggle — whether it was to be a war of attrition or a war of movement. But since the invasion of Norway in April, there is no longer any doubt on this score. It *is* a war of movement — a war in which fuel, lubricants and metals are being consumed on a scale never before seen.

Germany's rapid and smashing successes, first in Poland, then in Norway, and finally in the Low Countries, have forced us to reconsider our earlier conclusions, and to ask whether undue weight was not assigned to the raw material factor in deciding the outcome of the struggle. In this article I shall attempt a partial reappraisal in only a limited field, that of metals, especially the non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys. I shall attempt to show where Germany's metal problem is most acute, and then review the various solutions which have been tried — stock piling, recovery of wastes, substitutions, and the shifting of imports so as to find holes in the Allied blockade. Under the last heading, I shall consider the policy of the United States, in particular with respect to "moral embargoes."

The reader must be warned at once not to expect me to demonstrate in mathematical terms Germany's chances of victory or defeat in this "battle of the metals." Even with accurate and complete statistics concerning the imports, exports and production of ores and metals, such a demonstration would be difficult. Actually, it is impossible, for in Germany, and to a less extent in

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Italy and Japan, there has occurred a statistical blackout which prevents quantitative conclusions about the trade in metals. Neither Germany nor Italy has issued any foreign trade statistics since August 1939. As early as July 1937 Japan discontinued publishing detailed import data on metals.

II

Since the days when knighthood was in flower, steel has been the indispensable metal of warfare, both for defense and offense. Each new development in military technique only emphasizes the necessity for steel in great quantities and, what is equally important, of special qualities. Armor plate and projectiles require steels with great power of resisting shock; airplane and tank engines require light steels of great tensile strength. The manufacture of munitions requires special tool steels, capable of effective operation at high speeds. These various qualities, the metallurgists have discovered, may be developed by alloying steel with one or several of a group of rare metals. Their names — molybdenum, tungsten, chromium, vanadium — are meaningless to the layman, but ring in the ears of experts with a familiar clangor. Everyone knows that nickel plating prevents rust, but few are aware of the importance of nickel steels in the manufacture of gun carriages and other heavy equipment. Manganese has a double use both as a ferro-alloy and as a deoxidizing agent in the manufacture of steel. For the latter purpose it cannot be replaced by any other metal.

Non-ferrous metals — aluminum, antimony, copper, lead, magnesium, tin and zinc — constitute a second group whose importance in warfare has been greatly emphasized by recent technological developments. Electrical apparatus, the radio and sound detection devices, as well as the radiators of airplanes, tractors and tanks demand large amounts of copper. The all-metal airplane is the outstanding new device in this war. In an average plane of 8,300 pounds net weight, metals are used as follows: aluminum, 5,120 pounds; iron and steel, 1,680 pounds; copper, 360 pounds; other metals (nickel, chromium, molybdenum, magnesium, tin) from 60 to 70 pounds each; and, in addition, small quantities of lead and zinc. Applying these figures to Germany's estimated production of 24,000 planes annually we get the following metal requirements for her airplane industry alone:

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Metals	*Metric Tons*
Aluminum	55,800
Iron	18,300
Copper	3,900
Nickel, chromium, molybdenum, tin, magnesium and other metals	4,400

III

Germany's poverty in metal-bearing ores is well known. By and large her domestic ores have supplied only one-fourth to one-third of her requirements for iron and steel, and one-seventh of her copper.[1] Of bauxite, antimony, tin and the critical ferro-alloys (molybdenum, tungsten, chrome, nickel), domestic production was either negligible or non-existent. Only in the production of lead, zinc and magnesium did Germany approach self-sufficiency. The high state of efficient productivity attained by the German metal industries has been due to the use of ores and metals in various stages of concentration, brought from all over the world to German smelters, refineries and steel plants.

But satisfactory as such trade may have proved in peacetime, it harbored grave dangers for a war economy. Both the geographical distribution of the ores and the nature of the political control over them were unfavorable to Germany. Most of the great metal-producing areas were overseas, and many of the best deposits were within the British or French Empires. As soon as war broke out, the copper ores of Chile and Rhodesia, the nickel of Canada and New Caledonia, the manganese of Brazil and India, the tin of China and Bolivia became for all practical purposes unavailable to Germany. Those metals which are available in Europe — with the exception of iron, bauxite, magnesite, manganese, zinc and lead — are either inferior in quality or available to Germany only in insufficient quantities.

Germany, of course, did not go into the war unaware of her weakness in metals. For years her economists and metallurgists have given much study to plans for strengthening this vulnerable sector in her war economy. The most direct way for Germany to obtain metals was to invade neighboring nations which produce them, or which had accumulated stocks. However, viewed from this angle, the annexation of Austria and the occupation of

[1] These estimates, which are based on statistics for the period 1936–1937, probably underestimate the importance of domestic supplies. Imports in these years were abnormally large, owing to the policy of accumulating reserves.

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Czechoslovakia did not yield large results, for like Germany they were themselves industrial states and hence large consumers of metals.[2] The acquisition of these two countries added some 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 tons to Germany's annual supply of iron ore, and small contributions of mercury, antimony and copper. Austria's abundant supply of magnesite was an important gain for the Reich's production of magnesium.

The Polish adventure contributed zinc, making Germany practically self-sufficient in this metal. Denmark has no metals. Norway has been an exporter of many of the metals which Germany must have if she is to win this war: aluminum, copper, nickel and various of those rare metals, such as chrome and molybdenum, which are so important in adding hardness and temper to steel. But the Norwegian metallurgical industry was based principally on hydroelectric power resources which it used to refine foreign ores: bauxite, copper, nickel and other ferro-alloys. By acquiring the Norwegian molybdenum mines, Germany got a strategical resource which may prove of substantial aid in carrying on the war. The annual output of the mines, 1,000,000 pounds (metal content), will afford several months' supply of an alloy desperately needed for high-speed steels and for those requiring great tensile strength.

The occupation of The Netherlands and Belgium resulted in the addition of badly needed supplies of tin. Tin ores from the Dutch East Indies were smelted at Arnhem, only ten miles from the German frontier. Fearing that the product might fall into German hands, either through trade or by force, the British from the opening of the war imposed a strict limitation on the imports of tin ore or metal into The Netherlands. Nevertheless, in spite of these precautions, the Germans may have succeeded in seizing 2,000 or 3,000 tons of tin supplies when they invaded Holland. (German consumption runs perhaps to 13,000 tons annually.) Germany's greatest gain in metals came from the occupation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. This tiny state in 1937 produced 7,700,000 tons of iron ore, an amount equal to more than one-third of Germany's annual imports in recent years. This Luxembourg ore, combined with imports that can be expected from Sweden, will go far to satisfy Germany's needs.

Europe as a whole is poor in metals, particularly in the rarer

[2] Czechoslovakia's iron ore production was not sufficient to supply its own iron and steel industries.

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ferro-alloys. Thus a limit is put to the solution of the problem by force of arms, unless and until Germany can wrest the control of the seas from the British Navy.

IV

On the home front, Germany's metal deficiencies may be solved, more or less completely (1) by a fuller exploitation of scanty and neglected ore reserves; (2) by the accumulation of stock piles; (3) by restrictions on the consumption of metals for all non-military purposes; (4) by the exploitation of the reserves in the hands of consumers in the form of metal objects and scrap; (5) by the development of new alloys and new technical processes, making possible the substitution of metals which are abundant in Germany, or available from neighboring countries, for those which are scarce.

The policy of making the most of Germany's scanty ore deposits has found its most spectacular application in the exploitation of low-grade iron ores in the Brunswick region. By working low-grade ores at great expense, domestic production was raised from 8.4 million tons in 1936 to 13.6 million tons in 1938. (Germany's present import needs are estimated at over 20 million tons a year.) As for copper, though the Reich's domestic production was increased somewhat during the same years, it was still dependent upon foreign supplies for 85 percent of its total consumption. Gains were also made in lead and zinc mining. There are no other deposits of metal-bearing ores of importance in Germany, and consequently this policy can aid but little in solving her metals problem.

Stock piling — the accumulation in peacetime of reserves to be used when war cuts off supplies from abroad — is a policy more feasible for metals than for other raw materials. Metals can be stored without deterioration and with relatively little expense for warehousing. It is common knowledge that stock piling has been carried on vigorously in Germany since 1933. Since stock piles constitute an important military secret, no exact estimates are possible. But some idea of the extent to which metals were accumulated, either in public ownership or in the hands of traders, is given by the trend of imports as shown in the following table. When interpreting the figures, allowance must, however, be made for the great armament program of the years 1933–1938 which increased metal consumption considerably.

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GERMANY'S RETAINED IMPORTS OF CERTAIN METALS AND ORES

(expressed as percentages of 1929 imports [a])

	1933	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*
Aluminum, crude and refined..	(b)	55	410	108	62	316
Bauxite.....	62	84	131	254	339	306
Chrome ore.....	114	184	231	297	319	426
Copper ingots.....	74	104	94	76	100	167
Copper ore and matte.....	54	75	92	111	128	151
Manganese ore.....	33	57	101	59	142	109
Nickel.....	82	170	248	140	137	163
Nickel ore.....	250	272	210	128	145	248
Tin, crude.....	91	88	88	68	82	95

[a] Imports in 1929 were as follows (in metric tons): aluminum, crude and refined — 3,704; bauxite — 386,856; chrome ore — 41,393; copper ingots — 162,794; copper ore and matte — 429,673; manganese ore — 388,867; nickel — 2,391; nickel ore — 13,818; tin, crude — 12,458.

[b] Exports exceeded imports by 2,571 metric tons in 1933.

Stock piling is a costly policy which may put severe strain on a nation's economy. For example, if Germany were to store up one year's consumption of tin and copper, she would have to spend about $50,000,000. If traders and producers can be persuaded to hold large stocks, the cost to the national treasury can be reduced; but in any case, stock piling imposes an added burden on the country's economy and the added cost of holding inventories constitutes a form of taxation.

Through the use of "priority orders" the German Government has diverted metals from civilian (non-essential) production to the munitions industries. Since March 1934 all consumption of metals and all trade in ores and semi-finished products has been strictly controlled. The tin which was used in collapsible tubes for tooth paste and in tin cans for preserving fruits, meats, etc., is now used in solder for airplane radiators. Aluminum and copper, nickel and chromium which formerly went into household utensils and builders' hardware, are now destined for airplane bodies and engines and other military equipment. The empty shelves of retail dealers are evidence of the extent to which the transfer has already proceeded. In peacetime a considerable volume of metals was stored by Germans in their coin purses and trousers pockets. But a few months ago this small change of copper, aluminum and bronze, was replaced by coins of zinc. As early as January 1940, a general prohibition was applied against the use of aluminum for civilian purposes; instead, substitutes of zinc, steel and synthetic resins were suggested. The restriction of both civilian consump-

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tion and the export of metal products has freed important quantities for munitions. The use of iron and steel in building and in highway construction has been curtailed. So great is the economy possible in this direction that the *total* German consumption of iron ore, for example, may show no increase during the war; it may even decline. During the First World War the German output of steel dropped by 30 percent.

In peacetime, metals are not really "consumed," as are gasoline, lubricants and textile materials. Only part of the new metal production each year serves to replace what was used up the year before; the remainder is added to a great circulating metallic fund which can be drawn upon heavily in wartime. Naturally, there are wide variations in the extent to which various metals may be recovered and re-used; some, which are now critical for Germany, cannot be recovered at all. Most of the manganese used in steel manufacture disappears in the process. Recovery of other alloys — tungsten, molybdenum, nickel and chromium — is not commercially feasible. But at the other end of the scale are iron and steel which are regularly reclaimed. In the United States about 65 percent of our annual production of iron and steel eventually finds its way back to the blast furnaces in the form of scrap. Scrap lead, copper and aluminum used each year is approximately equal to the primary production.

Under war conditions, however, the recirculation of all metals is obstructed. The thousands of tons of steel and copper in sunken warships can be recovered, if ever, only after years of peace. The steel used in gun emplacements, pill boxes and tank traps will not soon be available for civilian uses. The metal in bombs and shells will for the most part never be recovered. But behind the lines, the collection of scrap metals proceeds busily. In Germany, between 1914 and 1918, kitchens were swept clear of their shining pewter and brass. Churches were stripped of their copper roofing; iron railings and fences, bronze statuary and church bells were hauled off to be melted down for munitions. Now again, under the war economy which has existed in Germany since 1933, the recovery of scrap metals has been developed into a fine art. In the collection of household wastes, all discarded objects of metal, collapsible tubes and tin foil are sedulously retrieved. Recently a campaign was instituted to persuade Germans to make a voluntary contribution of all articles of copper, bronze, brass, tin, lead and nickel which are not "vitally needed."

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The resources of the stock piles and the junk piles are supplemented by the skill of German metallurgists, modern alchemists who, if they cannot actually transmute metals, have found ingenious ways of substituting one for another. Each metal has peculiar qualities which fit it preëminently for certain uses. Tin is malleable; nickel and chrome resist corrosion; copper is distinguished for high thermal and electrical conductivity, magnesium and aluminum for their low specific gravity, the ferro-alloys for the qualities of hardness, temper and tensile strength which they add to steel. But the lines of division between the metals are not hard and fast; substitution is possible and in peacetime continually takes place in response to price variations. In wartime Germany, the metal famine produced by the blockade has given great impetus to the substitution of zinc, aluminum and magnesium — metals which are abundant in Germany or accessible from non-blockaded areas — for those which are no longer obtainable. In the latter category is tin (mined in Bolivia, China and the Dutch East Indies). Until recently tin was regarded as indispensable for soldering the joints of airplane and automobile radiators and for non-friction bearings. It is reported that in new solders, zinc has been substituted for tin and that plastics (synthetic resins) are used for bearings even where great pressures are encountered. The tin can, the ubiquitous symbol of modern life, accounts in peacetime for a very large proportion of tin consumption — in the United States for about 45 percent. Wherever possible, Germany is substituting cardboard or paper containers. Experimentally, aluminum is being plated on steel as a substitute for tinplate where a non-corrosive metal container is required.

Probably the most important changes which have taken place are the substitution of aluminum for copper, and of alloys of aluminum and magnesium for nickel steel and chrome steel. Germany's rapid gain in aluminum production from 19,000 tons in 1932 (the 1929 figure was 33,000) to 168,000 in 1938, gave her world leadership. Bauxite, it is true, must be imported, but this can be obtained from Italy, Greece, Hungary and Jugoslavia. In the electrical industry the substitution of aluminum for copper seems to have begun in Germany during the First World War, when aluminum conductors were introduced in large rotating apparatus, windings and in some transformers. Although this development was checked when cheap copper was again available, it has now been resumed. The Germans have recently applied

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aluminum to transmission lines, busbars, trolley wires and cables to a much greater extent than in this country.

Both German and American electrical engineers, however, are skeptical of Germany's ability to overcome her copper shortage by these shifts. They point out that her increased aluminum production requires a large consumption of electrical energy. Dr. C. F. von Siemens recently called attention to the vast expansion in Germany's war demand for products of the electrical industry. "Please remember," he warned the Siemens stockholders, "that radio telegraphy was then [1914] in its infancy and did not yet command great respect, whereas radio telephony was still an unborn offspring of the electrical industry. Today every airplane contains a small but highly complicated electric plant. Not only in the armed forces, but also in the industries working for them, the use of electric power has been greatly multiplied."[3] Furthermore, the German *Ersatzwirtschaft* has imposed a great additional burden on the electrical industry. According to Dr. Siemens:

> We used to buy copper as ingots from foreign countries or in the form of unrefined copper; we then refined it by electric methods into electrolytic copper, which required 300 kwh. per ton. Today, copper is replaced by aluminum to a large extent. However, in order to produce a ton of aluminum, 20,000 kwh. are required or, in terms of equivalent electric conductivity, 10,000 kwh. are required for replacing one ton of copper.

The new synthetic products are not, as some American isolationists have implied, made out of nothing. They require large additional amounts of electrical energy, which means large amounts of metals in electrical installations. To quote Dr. Siemens again:

> Natural rubber requires no mechanical energy for its production, mechanical power being used only for its refinement. Its synthetic substitute "Buna," the discovery of which dates back to pre-World-War days, requires 25,000 to 30,000 kwh. per ton for its production. In order to obtain benzine from crude oil, 12 kwh. are required per ton. The production of synthetic benzine from coal, however, requires 3,000 kwh. Many more instances might be cited of increased use of electrical energy that has been due to our efforts to become as independent of foreign countries as possible.

The recent boom in magnesium production in Germany was made possible by new metallurgical processes and by the availability of large supplies of Austrian magnesite. Alloyed with aluminum, magnesium is used in place of steel in manufacturing

[3] Quoted from *Die Boersenzeitung*, March 20, 1940.

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airplanes and motorized transport vehicles. The resultant reduction in dead-weight makes possible certain economies in fuel consumption. Germany now ranks first in the production of magnesium, with an estimated 1938 output of 12,000 tons. Here again, however, the electric power industry is subjected to increasing strain, for the power requirements per ton of magnesium are almost as great as for aluminum.

Within the field of the ferro-alloys, substitutions have also been worked out. Tungsten can be replaced at least partially by molybdenum. But over 90 percent of the world's molybdenum is produced in the United States, and the American supply, for reasons to be discussed later, is not available. Germany's metallurgical skill cannot remedy the deficiency in ferro-alloys, since there are no domestic sources of supply of *any of the metals in this group*, and none of them is easily accessible in necessary quantities from unblockaded countries. Consequently, the replacement of one by another does nothing to relieve scarcity.

V

Finally, let us consider Germany's ability to satisfy her metal needs by importing, either through shifting to new sources of supply in countries not affected by the blockade, or by evading the blockade with circuitous imports via friendly countries.

Imports involve payment of some sort, in goods, in blocked marks or in gold and foreign exchange. It is beyond our scope to discuss in detail Germany's ability to continue to export during the war, either from the factories in the old Germany or from those in the occupied territories. Two points of weakness, however, are obvious: (1) the Allied blockade cuts off many raw materials such as cotton, wool and hides which are necessary for the export industries; and (2) the demands of the war economy absorb labor, materials and transportation facilities. Blocked marks are probably as useful as goods in dealing with the small neutrals of southeastern Europe, all of whom are intimidated by the fear of invasion. Japan and Russia are in a different category. In trading with them, any deficit in the accounts must be balanced by gold or foreign exchange. When the war began, Germany's supplies of *valuta* were supposed to have been very meager and her gold reserves practically non-existent. A year ago the bank vaults in Oslo, Copenhagen, Brussels and Amsterdam held gold worth hundreds of millions of dollars; but when the German

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invaders arrived, they were empty. The gold had been shipped to New York and London.

Assuming, however, that in one way or another Germany can pay, what imports are physically available to her? A glance at the map shows that a vast area is accessible to Germany in Russia and southeastern Europe. Italy is just another have-not nation. It can supply mercury and bauxite from its own rich deposits, but with respect to iron ore, copper and all other metals, it competes with Germany for the supplies most easily available, *i.e.*, in the Balkans. The vast area of the Soviet Union has not much to offer in the way of metals. To supply the needs of its own industries it has to import copper, lead, tin, nickel, tungsten, molybdenum, antimony — the very metals which the Nazis want. Only manganese is exported from Russia in substantial quantities. Five hundred thousand tons of this metal are supposed to have been guaranteed to Germany under the terms of the Russian-German trade agreement of September 1939. Assuming a metal content of only 35 percent, this amount of ore would be sufficient for a steel production of 25,000,000 tons. (The output of Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1937 was 24,000,000.) Although the Russian manganese deposits lie at a distance of over 1,000 miles from the German steel works, transportation difficulties will probably not be insuperable.[4]

Germany has long regarded southeastern Europe as a German economic dependency where raw materials can be exchanged for their industrial products. In this direction transportation facilities, both by rail and water (the Danube touches the borders of all the Balkan countries except Greece), are better developed than towards Russia. The region has deposits of certain minerals which Germany greatly needs: bauxite, copper, manganese, chromite, lead, antimony. But these resources have not as yet been exploited on a scale adequate to supply her deficiencies. Even if all the bauxite exportable from Hungary and Jugoslavia went to German aluminum works, it would hardly fill the gap left by the failure of supplies from France and the Netherlands East Indies. Similarly, the total output of Jugoslavia's copper mines and smelters would not replace what Germany has been importing from either Chile or Rhodesia.

But even were the Balkan supplies adequate, Germany can

[4] See Professor Hopper's discussion of this subject in his article "How Much Can and Will Russia Aid Germany?" in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1940.

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obtain them only in part. Italy also is dependent on metals from this region, and will demand her share. Moreover, British and French capitalists, who own some of the most productive mines in Jugoslavia, object to their metals being used to aid the German war machine. The Germans with characteristic forethought in October 1939 arranged a barter agreement with Jugoslavia by which they were to secure copper, lead, zinc, manganese and chromium. When the French and British companies refused to make deliveries, the Jugoslav Government was in a tight spot. It wanted to placate the Germans, its best customers, but it also preferred free exchange which the Allies offered instead of blocked marks. It therefore nationalized the mines. The state also took over control of both exports and production, asserting its right in the face of diplomatic protests to supply Germany with amounts of metals equal to those supplied before the outbreak of war. These quantities, as has already been pointed out, fall far short of what Germany needs. Later, however, it was reported that the Allies had won their original contention, *i.e.*, that none of the ores taken from British or French-owned mines was to be sent to Germany. As regards chromite (the ore from which chromium is derived) the Allies were forehanded. Under an agreement made in December 1939, Turkey will put all her chromite export at their disposition.

Italy and Russia, although not able to supply Germany from their own mines, are in a position to aid that country by bringing in metals through the backdoor. The Allied blockade of Germany has never been completely effective and leaks of various sorts have developed. Particularly valuable metals, such as tungsten and industrial diamonds, it is said, have been carried by a Swiss air service operating from Lisbon across Spain and Italy. Control of contraband traffic by air seems to be a problem which the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has not yet solved. The problem arises also with respect to trans-Atlantic plane service from the United States to Portugal. But air traffic can have but limited dimensions. The real loopholes of the blockade as far as metals is concerned have been through Russia and Italy.

As one after another of the North European states was invaded, the importance of German trade with Italy increased; it afforded practically the only means of access to the Atlantic. Since all ships bound for Italian ports had to pass Gibraltar or Suez, it might have seemed an easy task to enforce contraband

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control. But politically the problem was not so simple; Italy's neutrality was so precarious that the Allies did not apply their controls rigorously against her. Nevertheless, the rise in Italian copper imports from the United States during 1939 and early 1940 aroused Allied suspicions. Some cargoes were stopped; others allowed to proceed. The Italian Government is said to have refused to give the Allies guarantees that imported metals would not be reëxported.

In the Pacific, the blockade was practically non-existent during the early months of the war. One of its earliest applications there affected tungsten exports from China. According to a Sino-German agreement signed in 1935, the Chinese Government was to exchange tungsten for airplanes and other munitions. With the outbreak of the war in Europe, this agreement lapsed owing to Germany's inability to make deliveries. A similar agreement with Russia is now in force, but in this case the Chinese are unable to carry out their part of the bargain owing to English and French control over exports through the ports of Burma and Indo-China. Much tungsten, however, is smuggled into Hong Kong where it is purchased by the Japanese. Considerable shipments of this tungsten are thought to have been made to Vladivostok and thence transshipped to Germany. For Vladivostok is another backdoor through which copper and tin, and perhaps other metals, may be reaching Germany. Russia, which had bought no refined copper in the United States during the first ten months of 1939, suddenly came into the market and took 122,700,000 pounds in five months. Most of this metal was shipped from our Pacific ports with only occasional interference by British warships. Beginning in April a more rigorous policy seems to have been adopted, notwithstanding the Russian claim that her ships, being state-owned, were not subject to contraband controls.

VI

The American Government has aided Allied warships in stopping the backdoor metal trade with Germany. Since early in October 1939 our State Department has been applying voluntary or "moral" embargoes which have resulted in limiting our exports of several important metals. Soon after the war broke out, a marked increase was noted in our reëxports of certain metals which we do not produce in the United States. Among

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these were tin and antimony, commodities considered to be strategic for defense purposes. Tin shipments, which had averaged 47,126 pounds in the first seven months of 1939, rose to 161,000 in September. In order to put a check to this unusual trade, President Roosevelt on September 26, 1939, warned Americans not to sell to foreign purchasers any domestic stocks of tin, manganese, chrome ore or rubber. To do so, he maintained, would be an unpatriotic act and contrary to the Government's policy of accumulating stock piles for emergency use. This warning proved ineffective. The Army and Navy Munitions Board therefore issued a statement (October 11, 1939) calling attention to the attempts of foreign purchasers to obtain supplies of strategic materials "imported into this country by private interests for use by American industry." "From the standpoint of national defense," the statement continued, "it is perhaps imprudent to ship out of the country those materials which can be replaced only by imports . . ."

Long-established, responsible firms undoubtedly heeded these warnings; but the lure of large profits to be made on a quick turnover of capital drew new firms into the business, and reëxports still continued, as is indicated in the following table. In a second

REËXPORTS OF TIN FROM THE UNITED STATES

(in thousands of pounds)

	Total	*To Russia*	*To Sweden*	*To Canada*	*To Other Countries*
October 1939.....	302.8		206.8	13.3	82.8
November.....	880.8	67.2	654.6	8.4	150.6
December.....	2,992.9	1,889.5	468.1	207.4	428.0
January 1940.....	3,280.2	2,743.6	213.2	186.0	137.4
February.....	949.5	509.2	216.8	140.1	83.4
March.....	1,073.8	515.2	243.4	4.1	311.0

statement issued January 19, 1940, the Board called attention to the greatly increased exports of pig tin from this country to Europe as "a matter of much concern." It condemned those who continued to engage in export activities detrimental both to the nation's industrial economy and to its national defense. Finally, it warned that should appeals to voluntary coöperation prove ineffective, "other means" would be found.

Even this veiled threat seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Traders were informed by their lawyers that the Board had no legal authority to prohibit exports. The interruption of normal

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trade routes had made New York overnight the center of a flourishing entrepôt trade in metals. A sudden demand for tungsten on the part of Japanese buyers swept the New York market clear of that metal. In December and January Russia purchased in the United States 2,000 tons of tin, nearly all of which represented imports from British smelters in the Straits Settlements. At once an angry protest arose in the English Parliament; it was claimed that the tin had been supplied to American buyers on condition that it should not be reëxported. No threat was made that the rationing of raw materials which had been applied to other neutrals might be extended to the United States. Nevertheless, the desire to avoid this contingency, as well as our growing disposition to coöperate with the Allies may have affected American export policy.

A second type of moral embargo was launched by President Roosevelt's statement of December 2, 1939. He expressed the hope that American manufacturers and exporters of airplanes, aëronautical equipment and *materials essential to airplane manufacture* would not encourage unprovoked bombing of civilian populations by exporting such goods to nations obviously guilty of these acts. Supplementing this statement, the Department of State addressed letters to producers of two metals used in airplane manufacture, molybdenum and aluminum, inviting their attention to the President's request.

The molybdenum embargo centered interest on one of the newer ferro-alloys, a substitute for tungsten, of which the United States produces over 90 percent of the world's supply. Exports, which for the first six months of 1939 averaged 1,700,000 pounds monthly (ore and concentrates), shot up at the outbreak of war to 6,600,000 pounds. In the last quarter of 1939 they were: October, 8,447,000 pounds; November, 4,071,000 pounds; December, 6,181,000 pounds. Increased shipments went principally to the United Kingdom, Japan and to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union alone took five million pounds of American molybdenum in October 1939.

Neither the President nor the Department of State mentioned by name the countries to which they wished the embargo to be applied. But American firms took it for granted that Russia and Japan were taboo and stopped shipments to those countries, except for contracts already made. The resulting shrinkage in our exports is shown in the following table:

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MOLYBDENUM EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES
(in thousands of pounds of ores and concentrates)

	Total	*To U.S.S.R.*	*To Japan*	*To Italy*	*To Other Countries*
December 1939..	6,181	5,165	187	—	829
January 1940....	1,978	—	23	237	1,718
February.....	1,968	443	—	725	800
March.....	422	—	110	—	312

These export statistics are misleading in one respect: they appear to indicate that the embargo was not immediately effective. Export figures, however, are compiled from shippers' declarations, and in this case there may have been a considerable lag between sales and shipments.

VII

The bits of scattered information which are available regarding Germany's deficiencies in metals and her attempts to remedy them cannot, as I warned the reader at the outset, be added up to prove either defeat or victory for the Nazi armies. The outcome of the present war will be determined by a great complex of factors, economic and psychological as well as military; but in the final result Germany's lack of an adequate and easily accessible supply of metals will not have played an insignificant rôle. The necessity of using inferior ores and less effective processes, and of importing metals from distant countries by circuitous routes, all add to the strain which the war imposes on German economy.

One final reflection may be in order. Europe as a whole is poor in metals. If the aim of Hitler and his associates is to create a great, self-sufficient empire, their aggression must be carried beyond the limits of the European continent. That is something which Americans must take into account in shaping their defense policies.

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THE DUTCH EAST INDIES ADRIFT

By Rupert Emerson

THE German invasion of Holland and the flight of Queen Wilhelmina's Government have thrown the Dutch East Indies largely on their own devices. Indeed, as these lines are written there are indications that the center of Dutch economic and financial life is being transferred to the Indies. For instance, leading Netherlands banks and shipping companies are reported to have removed their headquarters to Batavia. Likewise in the political sphere, the Indies are becoming the center of Dutch power. The Governor-General, Jonkheer Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, has been empowered to act on his own authority, if necessary. The question therefore arises as to whether the East Indies will be able to survive as a Dutch possession. The answer to this question depends on such important factors as the economic and strategic value of the islands, the state of their defenses, and the policy which the United States would adopt towards any aggression against them.

On April 16, 1940, the Indies found, to their dismay, that they had become the object of those assurances of good will and disinterestedness which have come to be the first harbingers of imminent "protection" and destruction. On that day, Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister of Japan, stated in the veiled but significant language of diplomacy that because of economic and other considerations "the Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying the aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies." This declaration came two months after Japan's denunciation of her arbitration treaty with The Netherlands, an act which Tokyo officially described as having no political importance, being merely a routine gesture preparatory to the negotiation of a new treaty. To Mr. Arita's statement, the American Secretary of State replied on the following day (April 17) that "intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." The German invasion of The Netherlands early in May immediately brought forth from Mr. Arita a further assertion that Japan would not permit the Indies to change hands. Another official declaration was made in Washington reiterating the statement of April 17, and the American battle fleet was kept in Hawaii for "further tactical exercises."

Economically, strategically and politically the Netherlands Indies occupy a position of striking importance. The bare figures are in themselves impressive. With a land area of 734,000 square miles, the islands are some five times as large as Japan proper. They stretch, as Mr. Hull pointed out, "for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east." At the last census (1930) the rapidly growing population totalled nearly 61,000,000; at present 70,000,000 would be more nearly correct. About two-thirds of this number is crowded into Java, though that island accounts for little more

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than one-fifteenth of the Indies' total area. The outer islands are relatively underpopulated and undeveloped except for occasional tracts such as the great rubber and tobacco region on the east coast of Sumatra. The mass of the people are of the Malay race and predominantly Mohammedan in religion; but there are 1,233,000 Chinese and 240,000 persons in the official category of "Euro-



pean," which includes Americans, Japanese and a large proportion of Hollanders of mixed blood. The Japanese and Formosans in 1930 numbered just over 7,000, and the more recent migration figures indicate no marked increase. The number of Germans appears to be slightly under 7,000; late reports from Batavia indicate that all of them over sixteen have been interned.

Holland's East Indian empire constitutes the richest colonial plum in the world. It produces rubber, tin, petroleum, sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco, copra,

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palm oil and a host of other commodities, agricultural and mineral. Contrary to popular belief, most of the world's colonial areas are not great producers of essential raw materials; the Indies, however, are an exception, although even they lack certain types of coal as well as iron and cotton. Until the impact of the depression became seriously felt, the Indies concentrated almost exclusively upon the production of raw materials and foodstuffs for export, as well as of certain foodstuffs (notably rice) for local consumption; only to a limited degree were raw materials given a preliminary processing. The crushing effect of the depression on the islands can be seen in the catastrophic decline in the value of their exports from 1,488,000,000 guilders in 1929 to 493,000,000 in 1933 (by 1939 the figure had risen to 740,000,000). Of late there has been a marked swing in the direction of a planned industrialization in order to relieve unemployment, raise living standards and reduce the Indies' dependence on the world's industrial markets, thereby eliminating some of the causes for economic instability in the islands. Plans already being carried out include the creation of a chemical industry and the construction of plants for manufacturing aluminum, for melting scrap iron and for the production of aviation gasoline; in addition, many smaller native and local industries are being encouraged.

The United States is the world's largest consumer of rubber and tin; it also holds considerable investments in the islands, particularly in rubber plantations and in oil. We cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the fate of the Indies. (Incidentally, the neighboring territory of British Malaya is the world's largest single producer of rubber and tin, and any change in the status of the Dutch islands must inevitably have drastic repercussions on Malayan economy.) The total direct American purchases in the Indies in 1938 came to $68,800,000 and in 1939 to $93,000,000; but it is very difficult to assess our actual dependence on East Indian supplies because of the large quantities which are transshipped to us via European and Malayan ports. In 1939 the Dutch islands produced 372,000 tons of rubber (35 percent of the world total) as against 376,000 tons for Malaya, and 31,280 long tons of tin (17 percent of the world total). The United States needs large quantities of tin and rubber, not only for its normal peacetime industries such as automobile manufacturing, but for its present greatly expanded defense preparations. At least nine-tenths of the rubber and tin we consume comes from the Indies and the nearby British territories. Another important American import from the Indies is quinine, of which the Dutch produce 90 percent of the world's supply.

Neither Britain nor France depends very much upon the products of the Dutch Indies since their own colonial empires provide for most of their needs. Although in the statistics the British Empire showed as the destination of one-third of the Indies' total exports in 1938, approximately half of this figure represented goods sent to Singapore for distribution to other countries, including Japan and the United States. Great Britain and Eire took about 5 percent of the exports of the islands, and Australia, whose connections with the Indies have in recent years become increasingly important, accounted for over 4 percent. These figures do not, however, adequately reflect the close collaboration that has grown up between the British and the Dutch Empires in the East. It is, in fact, scarcely too much to say that since 1816, when the British returned Java to Holland, the Indies have depended for their protection pri-

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marily upon the British Navy. The British have also invested heavily in the islands; for instance, the Royal Dutch Shell has sunk a large amount of capital in the oil fields there. Territorially, too, the connections are close; many small Dutch islands are within sight of Singapore with its great naval base, and the whole northern part of Borneo is in British hands. Australia has a vital strategic interest in the fate of the Indies in general, and a particular interest in New Guinea, of which it controls the eastern half. One of the maxims of Australian foreign policy is that no aggressive Power must be allowed to gain a foothold on New Guinea. The Dutch are now engaged in hastily developing their half of the island in order to forestall outside encroachments.

In 1938, Germany's purchases in the East Indies amounted to 23,725,000 guilders, or 3.62 percent of the island's total exports. (The purchases of France amounted to 11,200,000 guilders.) Germany has found the Indies a valuable source of rubber, copra, fibers and other tropical produce; and a considerable number of Germans have entered not only into the economic life of the islands but also into the Dutch administrative and military services.

Japan's interest in Netherlands India is naturally very great. Besides being a major consumer of its rubber and tin, she has a peculiarly vital concern in its growing petroleum production. Since no detailed Japanese figures as to either petroleum or mineral imports have been published since July 1937, and since Dutch export figures are not very relevant because of the large transshipments made through Singapore, it is impossible to estimate with any precision the extent of Japan's reliance on East Indian oil. It is obvious, however, that in case Japan should be cut off from American and British supplies, the wells in the nearby Indies would prove invaluable to her. The Indies stand fifth among the world's petroleum producers. Their 1939 output was 61,580,000 barrels, the largest in their history. The principal oil-producing region is on the east coast of Borneo, although the production of this field has been declining in recent years while that of southern Sumatra has been growing. According to recent reports, the new wells being bored by the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company, in which both American and British capital is represented, have not yielded promising results. It is generally believed that the producing oil wells have been mined and would be promptly destroyed in case of a Japanese attack. The German experience in Rumania during the World War appears to indicate that this would impede Japanese utilization of the wells for a considerable, and perhaps crucial, period. New refining plants for the production of aviation gasoline are just coming into operation; the first one, near Palembang in Sumatra, began producing on March 2.

As a market the Indies are less important than as a source of raw materials, primarily because of the very low purchasing power of the mass of the people. However, for Japan's low-cost producers of cheap textiles and other commodities they offer attractive inducements in a world of shrinking and increasingly protected markets. A few years ago the Japanese share in the imports of the Indies skyrocketed upwards at the expense largely of Dutch and British importers; but this trend was checked abruptly by the imposition of tariffs and quotas primarily aimed at Japan. More recently the internal strains developed in Japan by the "China incident" have seriously impaired her ability to compete in the islands. The Japanese doubtless feel that Holland has unfairly

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deprived them of a market which they regard as an integral part of that Far Eastern economy in which they believe themselves to be the major partners. The Dutch, on the other hand, complain that the failure of Japanese purchases in the Indies to keep pace with the flood of Japanese exports to them has been one of the chief causes for the disequilibrium in the islands' economy.

In 1939, Japan sold to the Indies goods worth 85,108,000 guilders, while she bought from them goods valued at only 24,788,000 guilders. Of Japan's total exports in 1939 only 3.9 percent went to the Dutch possessions, and of her total imports only 3.3 percent came from them directly. The Japanese Government has manifested its determination to continue drawing on the raw materials of the East Indies in the same proportions as before Holland was invaded. Both the Dutch and British Governments have assured Tokyo that they will not interfere with Japanese trade in the Indies.

The Japanese authorities have at no time given any overt indication of a desire to assume political control over the Dutch islands, although there are a number of unofficial statements which point in that direction. They have, however, regularly expressed their deep interest in strengthening economic ties. Japan's Foreign Minister declared to the Diet early this year that "With regard to the South Seas regions, the Japanese Government are desirous of maintaining with them a relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity through economic coöperation and collaboration in the development of natural resources. We intend to put forth every effort along this line toward enhancing the existing close relation between Japan and those regions." The Dutch, for their part, have shown themselves eager to maintain friendly relations with Japan and to avoid any gestures which might be interpreted as hostile. They have come to find, however, that Japan's ideas as to what constitutes "coöperation and collaboration" overreach the limits of acceptable friendship. This has been especially obvious in Japan's efforts to secure opportunities for settlement and exploitation in New Guinea, which lies less than 500 miles from Japanese mandated islands. For many years Dutch New Guinea has been rife with reports of Japanese espionage, of Japanese fishing vessels far from legitimate fishing grounds, and of Japanese plantations with excellent sites for gun emplacements and landing fields.

Strategically and politically the Indies are extremely important because of the commanding position which they occupy at the crossroads of sea and air routes between Europe, the Far East and Australasia. For the British Empire, and for Australia and New Zealand in particular, it is of the utmost importance that these islands remain in friendly hands. Were Netherlands India to pass to a hostile Power, Britain would find it very difficult to retain Singapore and Hong Kong and to maintain free communications with her Pacific Dominions and with China. Much the same can be said for France in connection with Indo-China and her Pacific islands. As for the United States, it is concerned in several ways with the political fate of the East Indies. There is our interest in maintaining the balance of power in the Pacific. There is also our interest in keeping open the sources from which we obtain much of our rubber and tin. Above all, there is our interest in the Philippines. Manila may be some 1,800 miles by air from Batavia, but the Dutch islands northeast of Borneo are almost within sight of Mindanao. The Japanese now control all the islands to the east of the Philippines (except Guam); Formosa has been theirs

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for nearly half a century; they are said to be fortifying the island of Hainan; and they are now occupying the Spratly Islands in the China Sea. If the Dutch East Indies should pass into Japanese hands — and with them perhaps the British possessions on the north coast of Borneo — the Philippines would be completely surrounded.

From an economic point of view, the United States might not in the long run lose heavily from a Japanese occupation of the East Indies. Except for petroleum Japan could absorb only a fraction of the island's vast production, which would still have to be disposed of on the world market — where the United States would remain by far the best and most available customer. Control over these supplies would, however, give Japan a strong economic and political weapon for compelling concessions from the United States, and in the short run this weapon might prove of great importance. Despite our ambitious projects for stock-piling and our barter agreement with Great Britain, we have as yet accumulated very limited reserves of either rubber or tin. It is estimated that the present supplies of both commodities in this country would not last for more than three or four months *at the normal rate of consumption*. The extent of our anxieties in this direction is indicated by the fact that imports of rubber since the beginning of December 1939 have been the heaviest in history. In case the United States should become involved in the war, we would doubtless resort, as in the days of the Stevenson restriction scheme, to an extensive use of scrap rubber. There are also possibilities for making synthetic rubber in the United States and for increasing natural rubber production under American auspices in Central and South America. But neither of these sources has yet been developed to a point where it could fill immediate and pressing needs. In the case of tin, we could obtain a large part of what we need from Bolivia.

Turning to the question of defense, it must be admitted at the outset that for various reasons, including the rapidly changing techniques of warfare, only a very tentative estimate is possible. Even the strength of the Japanese Navy is a matter of surmise, though there is no doubt that Japan has a large preponderance over any other Power in Far Eastern waters. The serious plight of Britain and France offers little hope that any substantial part of their naval or air forces could come to the aid of the Dutch islands. Presumably, neither the British or the French have any capital ships in the Far East at the present time. Just prior to the outbreak of the European war, the British Admiralty reported four of its cruisers in Chinese waters, with a fifth expected, and three more cruisers on the East Indies Station; to this must be added the six Australian cruisers and the two of New Zealand. Only the American Navy remains as a possible challenge to Japan, and it has been accepted by American naval opinion that operations in waters relatively close to the Japanese bases and shielded in part by the Japanese mandated islands would be extremely difficult and hazardous. The fortifications and bases of the Philippines and Guam are quite inadequate for the main American fleet, which would therefore have to base on Pearl Harbor, some 7,000 miles from Batavia.

The scanty but mobile defense forces of the Indies themselves could cause an attacking force great annoyance but could probably not put up resistance for any considerable time. The Dutch have been keenly aware of their exposed position in the Indies ever since Japan's invasion of Manchuria; yet they

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appear to have taken no very substantial steps to increase their defense forces in the islands. The army is estimated to number 50,000 (representing roughly a ratio of four natives to one European), although somewhat larger reserve forces are undoubtedly available. According to late reports, the Dutch Navy in the Indies consists of two cruisers of 7,000 tons, one of 6,000 tons, two smaller ones of 3,500 tons, twelve destroyers, eighteen submarines and a number of light auxiliary vessels. In recent years the Dutch have built up a fleet of seaplanes, many of them purchased in the United States; used as a scouting and bombing force these planes would prove invaluable in holding the narrow straits against invasion. It must, however, be kept in mind that the islands are scattered over a vast area and that the Japanese would therefore find no great difficulty in landing on such outlying islands as Borneo or New Guinea. Against this possibility must be balanced the fact that the distances from Japan to the Indies are great — from Yokohama to Borneo is some 2,400 miles — and that Japanese shipping is already heavily occupied in keeping essential supplies moving to Japan and to the Japanese-occupied parts of China. For Japan to strike far to the south would be to open herself, if not to war with the United States, at least to the sharp curtailment of her vital trade with North America and with the British and French Empires. And, of course, she would be exposing her flank to Soviet pressure, exerted either indirectly through Nationalist China or directly on Manchukuo. As these lines are written, there are reports that Japan is trying to extricate herself as gracefully as possible from China and to reach an understanding with the totalitarian Powers with the object of exploiting to the full the present dire straits of the Western Powers. Should these reports turn out to be true, the situation of the Dutch East Indies would indeed become precarious.

What the attitude of the native peoples in the Indies would be in face of a Japanese attack is difficult to say. The nationalist movement is strong and no great love is lost for the Dutch rulers. However, relations between the nationalist leaders and Japan have not, it appears, been close. Japanese imperialism is something the East Indians have no desire to experience. Yet on the other hand, they also lose no love for the Chinese, who control much of the islands' economic life. The East Indians are hence watching the progress of the present war in China with mixed emotions. Some of them feel that a Chinese victory, resulting in a much strengthened and unified China, would represent an even greater danger for the East Indies than a Japanese victory.

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ICELAND AND GREENLAND: AN AMERICAN PROBLEM

By Philip E. Mosely

THE German occupation of Denmark on April 9 peremptorily raised the question as to the future of Greenland and Iceland. In the long run, of course, the fate of these two islands depends on the outcome of the present war; their present status, however, is a matter of immediate concern to several governments including that of the United States. American consular representatives, for instance, have been sent both to Reykjavik and to Godthaab. The million dollar credit opened for Iceland by the Export-Import Bank in March 1940 has been confirmed. Both the American Red Cross and a privately organized committee are actively preparing to aid Greenland in the emergency. As for Great Britain, on May 9 she placed Iceland under British protection for the duration of the war. British troops are now stationed in Iceland to prevent a surprise landing there by German air or naval forces.

Greenland, last of Denmark's colonies, has been administered by a benevolent bureaucracy whose enlightened social and educational policies have been highly beneficial to the natives. Only in Greenland have the Eskimos grown in numbers; everywhere else under white rule their race has declined. Since Greenland is a colony, Denmark is legally free to transfer her sovereignty over it to Germany; or the German Government, acting as a self-appointed defender of a vassal Danish state, might seek to exercise the latter's rights there.

Iceland is in a very different position. The Law of Union of November 30, 1918, which was adopted by the Danish Rigsdag and the Icelandic Alting, placed the relations of the two countries on a new basis. Strictly speaking, this law was neither a statute nor a treaty, but a *tertium quid*. It recognized Iceland as a sovereign state and established a personal union between the two nations. It also provided a limited measure of real union in that the conduct of Iceland's foreign relations was left in the hands of Denmark until such time as Iceland should itself take over this function. However, any subsequent agreements which Denmark made with outside states were to be binding on Iceland only with the consent of the Icelandic Government. Unlike Austria and Hungary under the Dual Monarchy, Denmark and Iceland were separate entities in international law. The relation of Iceland to Denmark was, for all practical purposes, identical with that of the British Dominions to the United Kingdom under the Statute of Westminster. The absence of a common authority for the two countries was emphasized by a provision that the Swedish and Norwegian Governments should appoint arbitrators to settle disputes which could not be ironed out by direct negotiation between the two partners to the union.

The Law of 1918 also provided for the eventual abrogation of the union; after December 31, 1940, either country was to be free to demand the opening of negotiations for revising the Law. If no new agreement were effected within three years of such a demand, the parliaments might annul the union by a two-thirds vote, which had to be confirmed in a popular plebiscite by a three-fourths majority of those voting, with three-fourths of the electorate participat-

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ing. Since 1918 there has been some speculation as to whether Iceland would exercise its right of separation after 1940. Some Icelanders were desirous of breaking off the remaining ties with Denmark because of long-remembered grievances, others because the union was of no practical value to the country.

By a curious inconsistency in the Law of 1918, the governments and electorates of both countries were required to participate in the process of separation; yet Iceland, as a sovereign state, would logically be entitled to separate from Denmark by the act of its legally constituted government, an act which the joint king, as a constitutional ruler, would have no choice but to sanction. As a matter of fact, upon the German occupation of Denmark the Icelandic Alting promptly exercised this constitutional prerogative by declaring the



king temporarily incapable of fulfilling his functions and therefore entrusting his powers to the Icelandic Cabinet. It also regularized its international status by appointing diplomatic agents, particularly in England and the United States. Furthermore, in Article 19 of the Law, Iceland was declared permanently neutral, though this declaration apparently has force only as regards Denmark and Iceland, for there is no record of any international legislation creating a status for Iceland comparable to that of Switzerland since 1815.

For over a century and a half Greenland's economic connections have been almost entirely with Denmark. This situation is largely a consequence of the operation of the trade monopoly which has attempted, with notable success, to protect the Eskimos against the inroads of "civilized" epidemics, and to safeguard their scanty resources of livelihood against the dangers of overrapid exploitation and possible exhaustion. The Greenland administration

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has consistently shown a deficit, and this has been made good by the home government, whereas the trading monopoly, in which the royal family reputedly has an interest, has shown a regular profit. The economic importance of Iceland, on the other hand, is substantial. Its relatively high standard of living has rested upon its participation in world commerce: in 1937, for instance, the per capita value of Iceland's foreign trade was $230, compared with $170 for Great Britain and $41.50 for the United States.[1] The economic crisis of the 1930's caused an important shift in Iceland's foreign commerce. In 1930 it sold 52.6 percent of its exports to (in order of importance) Portugal, Spain and Italy, and bought 81.7 percent of its imports from Denmark, Great Britain, Germany and Norway. The breakdown of a relatively free world economy wreaked havoc with Iceland's business position, and drastic trade and monetary controls had to be introduced. By 1937 the country's leading customers were Germany, Great Britain, Norway and Portugal, while the largest exporters to Iceland were Great Britain, Germany, Denmark and Sweden.[2] Iceland's commercial ties with Great Britain have been reënforced by its dependence on the London money market: seventy percent of its total indebtedness is in British loans.[3] With a per capita foreign indebtedness of $192 (1935) — compared with $131 for Norway, $73 for Denmark, and $7 for Finland — Iceland has depended to an extraordinary degree on foreign capital to make the most of its scanty resources and to raise its standard of living.

The economic interests of the United States in Greenland are slight. A cryolite mine at Ivigtut has been operated for several decades by an American company, but the exploitation of numerous other mineral deposits has remained economically impracticable. Whatever claims had been staked out in northwest Greenland as a result of the discoveries of Peary and Kane were abandoned by the declaration of August 4, 1916, which was made as a condition of the purchase of the Virgin Islands. During the early stages of the 1916 negotiations Secretary of State Lansing was willing to acknowledge full Danish sovereignty over Greenland on condition that Denmark recognized "the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations" in her colony. The Danish negotiators urged with persistence, however, that the United States agree not to "object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland." In this unqualified form, which became that of the final declaration, the United States abandoned, at the last moment in the negotiation, its half-hearted effort to safeguard the economic "open door" in Greenland.[4]

American connections with Iceland have also been slight. In normal times there has been no direct shipping service between the two countries. Only during the emergency of 1917–1918, and again since September 1939, has a

[1] The figures for Great Britain and the United States are for 1936.

[2] Vilhjalmur Stefansson: "Iceland, the First American Republic" (New York, Doubleday, 1939), p. 275.

[3] As of December 31, 1936. J. Bowering, "Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Iceland" (London, Department of Overseas Trade, 1937), p. 4.

[4] *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, p. 607, 618, 700; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914–1920*, II, 504; C. C. Tansill: "The Purchase of the Danish West Indies." (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1932), p. 493–496.

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regular service been maintained in order to assure Iceland of its indispensable supply of foodstuffs and fodder. Its strongest bond to the United States and Canada is that supplied by the Icelandic settlements, chiefly in North Dakota and Manitoba. The colonies have preserved a lively sense of cultural attachment to the mother country and have contributed considerably to its economic progress. The Export-Import Bank, as already mentioned, accorded a million dollars in credit to Iceland in March 1940, and private credits are also reported to have been made available. One great obstacle to the expansion of American-Icelandic trade is that Iceland must buy where it can sell; the American market takes only a small portion of its fish products, which constitute the country's chief export commodity.

In recent years American interest in Greenland and Iceland has revolved primarily around their potential value as stepping stones along trans-Atlantic routes.[5] In 1928 Pan American Airways began its study of the northern route to Europe, and in 1932 Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the great explorer, became its adviser for northern operations. Pan American financed the Lindbergh expedition of 1933 and has also contributed to the work of four land expeditions. Its exploratory permit for Greenland aviation lapsed in 1939. In 1932 Pan American had acquired a franchise for Iceland from the Transamerican Air Lines Corporation. This expired on December 31, 1936, without regular service having been established. Negotiations for a new concession were continued, but for various reasons no new agreement had been reached when the outbreak of the war in Europe created an entirely new situation.

From 1928 to 1931 the German Lufthansa had collaborated with the Flugfjelag Islands (Flying Company of Iceland) in maintaining a local service. When this German-Icelandic company went out of existence, Lufthansa secured a letter from the Icelandic premier which, according to the German interpretation, assured it of equal enjoyment of any flying rights which Iceland might grant to any other nation or its nationals up to April 1, 1940. Confronted with strong German pressure in March 1939, the Icelandic Government, while disputing this interpretation of the letter, preferred to postpone for a year all negotiations with foreign companies rather than give a foothold to Lufthansa.

In February 1940 a new element was injected into the situation with the arrival in the United States of a Scandinavian air mission representing the governments of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. The delegation discussed with American officials and aviation companies the possibility of opening a direct airline to Northern Europe by way of Iceland. This project, in which a strong interest was expressed on both sides, collapsed with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway.

The expectation that Greenland and Iceland would play an important rôle in commercial aviation has therefore not been borne out by events, for by the time political obstacles to trans-Atlantic aviation had been overcome, technical advances made it possible for commercial planes to be flown directly from Newfoundland to Ireland, and from Bermuda to the Azores. Careful study has also

[5] For a more detailed discussion of the importance of the American north as a base for air operations see Vilhjalmur Stefansson: "The American Far North," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1939, p. 508–523.

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shown that Greenland is not very well suited to commercial aviation. Its southern part is dangerous in summer because of fog, in winter because of ice, although ports on the west coast, such as Holstensborg, are usable by hydroplanes during summer. While Greenland's ice cap and ice floes may serve as emergency landing fields for landplanes, they have no commercial value at present. Quite possibly Greenland may in the future be useful as a stepping stone from the American Middle West to Scandinavia and Russia, and, as the land mass nearest the North Pole, it may acquire value through the development of trans-polar airlines. Iceland's ports, on the other hand, can be used by hydroplanes throughout the year despite occasional fogs; facilities for landplanes could also be developed. The main importance of Iceland and Greenland in aviation lies rather in the military sphere. A strong air Power established in Iceland could destroy both air and sea traffic passing over the Great Circle route between Europe and America. Furthermore, Greenland could not be defended against an air force based on Iceland. From both Greenland and Iceland a large part of the North American continent is within range of large bombing planes, as President Roosevelt indicated in his speech to Congress on May 16, 1940. What happens in Iceland and Greenland is thus of vital strategic importance to the United States as well as to Canada.

While it is taken for granted that Greenland lies within the Western Hemisphere, the position of Iceland is not so clearly defined. A glance at the map shows, however, that the twelfth parallel of west longitude, which touches eastern Greenland, passes to the east of Iceland. Yet in air distances Iceland is much closer to the British Isles and to Scandinavia than to North America,[6] and its political and economic ties are with Europe. Iceland's anomalous position shows that the concept of the Western Hemisphere is at bottom a political concept, and that the privileges and duties connected with being a part of this hemisphere cannot be defined by geography alone. For instance, the assumption that the United States could not conceivably allow any European state other than Denmark to possess Greenland needs to be weighed against the realization that Greenland could not be defended against a strong Power in control of Iceland.

In the event that Great Britain and France emerge victorious from the present war, we can assume that Greenland would be returned to the control of an independent Denmark, and that Iceland would be free to choose whether to restore the personal union with that country, to declare itself a completely independent state, to pass under some sort of dependence on Great Britain, or even, as a remote possibility, to join Canada. If, however, the war should result in a German victory, two questions would then arise. First, could the American Government, committed to the protection of a defeated belligerent, Canada, afford to see Iceland, and with it Greenland, fall into the hands of a Power which held Europe in its armed grasp and which would presumably be hostile to the United States? Second, could the United States afford to undertake the defense of Iceland against such a powerful state?

[6] From Reykjavik to Botwood (Newfoundland) is 1,487 miles; from Reykjavik to London is 1,171 miles.

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General: Political, Military and Legal

MODERN DICTATORSHIP. By DIANA SPEARMAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 272 p. $2.75.

A diagnosis of the causes of modern dictatorships and an analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. At times the reader will feel Mrs. Spearman to be too exclusively rationalistic in her values.

IDEAS ARE WEAPONS. By MAX LERNER. New York: Viking, 1939, 553 p. $3.50.

Some sixty essays and book reviews, originally printed in various periodicals during the last nine years, by the former editor of the *Nation*, now professor of government at Williams College. These papers cover a wide range of ideas and personalities.

THE DANGER OF BEING A GENTLEMAN, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By HAROLD J. LASKI. New York: Viking, 1940, 270 p. $2.75.

Eight essays on social and political questions published between 1926 and 1938.

NEW TYRANNIES FOR OLD. By LORD SNELL AND FIVE OTHERS. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 176 p. $1.50.

Essays on general European problems, written before the war by Wickham Steed, Herbert Morrison and others.

THE STORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS. By GEORGE CATLIN. New York: Whittlesey, 1939, 802 p. $5.00.

A rambling, frequently opinionated, treatise.

EL FALSO DILEMA: FASCISMO O BOLCHEVIQUISMO. By TOMÁS AMADEO. Buenos Aires: Librería del Colegio, 1939, 256 p. Pesos 2.50.

An Argentine writer finds the real conflict to be between despotism and democracy.

HISTOIRE DES GRANDES PUISSANCES DEPUIS LA GUERRE. By MAXIME MOURIN. Paris: Payot, 1939, 484 p. Fr. 50.

A chronicle of events, arranged by country.

WHY WAR? By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. New York: Scribner, 1940, 323 p. $2.50.

Recent essays and addresses by the President of Columbia University.

DIE DIPLOMATEN. By RICHARD VON KÜHLMANN. Berlin: Hobbing, 1939, 174 p. M. 6.20.

Agreeable chapters on the lives of several modern diplomats and on various aspects of the diplomatic career, by a former Minister of Foreign Affairs for Germany.

THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION. By W. B. CURRY. New York: Penguin, 1939, 213 p. 25 cents.

Why it is needed, what form it will have and how it will work.

THREE PORTRAITS. By EMIL LUDWIG. New York: Alliance, 1940, 127 p. $1.50.

The characters of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin probed and compared. These sketches are trivial and contain little that is new.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JEWS AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By Harry L. Kessler. New York: Bloch, 1939, 158 p. $1.00.

Brief chapters on the status of the Jews in various lands.

THE EARTH AND THE STATE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Derwent Whittlesey. New York: Holt, 1939, 618 p. $3.75.

The field of political geography has only begun to be cultivated in this country. The present book, by a professor of geography at Harvard University, is the best one so far to appear on the subject. The author manages on the whole to eschew the facile rationalizations that characterize German "geopolitics." His most original section is that on Africa.

THE CONQUEST OF THE ARCTIC. By Louis Segal. London: Harrap, 1939, 285 p. 10/6.

The story of American and European explorations in the Far North.

ARMIES WITH WINGS. By James L. H. Peck. New York: Dodd, 1940, 274 p. $2.50.

Modern air warfare described for the layman.

AHRIMAN: A STUDY IN AIR BOMBARDMENT. By Brigadier General Oliver Lyman Spaulding. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1939, 143 p. 50 cents.

The theory, technique and results examined by a retired United States Army officer.

LES ENSEIGNEMENTS AÉRIENS DE LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By C. Rougeron. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939, 249 p. Fr. 30.

A case study by an expert.

A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES. Edited and Annotated by Francis Deák and Philip C. Jessup. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1939, 2 v. $10.00.

Arranged by country and in most instances given in English translations.

JAHRBUCH FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK, 1939. Edited by Fritz Berber. Berlin: Gross, 1939, 512 p. M. 7.50.

A handy reference annual.

HOCHSCHULE FÜR POLITIK. JAHRBUCH, 1939. Edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1939, 475 p. M. 5.

Two dozen essays on a variety of topics.

General: Economic and Social

WORLD TRADING SYSTEMS. By Henry J. Tasca. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 172 p. $1.50.

"A Study of American and British Commercial Policies" prepared for the International Studies Conference.

MODERN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. By Albert L. Meyers. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939, 311 p. $2.50.

Contains *inter alia* chapters on planning and international economic policy.

STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH. Volumes II and III. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938–1939, $6.50.

Further papers in a series of fundamental importance.

GUERRE OU BLOCUS ÉCONOMIQUE? By Georges Valois. Paris: Éditions Liberté, 1939, 319 p. Fr. 20.

A repetitious book proposing that the workers of the world unite to force peace by carrying out an economic blockade against the dictator countries rather than by war.

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THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY. By John Middleton Murry. London: Cape, 1939, 315 p. 10/6.

Mr. Murry finds that Marxism lacks ethical content and seeks to show that only through a synthesis of Christianity and Socialism can real democracy come into being.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM. By Charles J. McFadden. New York: Benziger, 1939, 345 p. $3.50.

A Catholic critique of Communist doctrines.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF CLASS CONFLICT AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Lionel Robbins. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 277 p. $2.25.

Thought-provoking papers by a prominent English economist.

DIE HISTORISCHE TRAGIK DER SOZIALISTISCHEN IDEE. By Valentin Gitermann. Zurich: Oprecht, 1939, 371 p. Swiss Fr. 8.

An effort to show how social evolution has failed to follow Marxist patterns, especially in Russia and Germany.

PERSONAL AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR. By E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 154 p. $1.50.

Psychology and anthropology used to explain the phenomena of international war.

POPULATION AND PEACE. By Fergus Chalmers Wright. New York: Columbia University Press, for the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris, 1939, 373 p. $2.00.

"A survey of international opinion on claims for relief from population pressure," prepared for the International Studies Conference.

RACE RELATIONS AND THE RACE PROBLEM. Edited by Edgar T. Thompson. Durham: Duke University Press, 1939, 338 p. $3.50.

An important problem surveyed by a dozen American scholars. Bibliography.

The First World War

DER AUSBRUCH DES WELTKRIEGES, 1914. By Alfred von Wegerer. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 2 v.

As editor of *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* (later the *Berliner Monatshefte*), Dr. von Wegerer was the intellectual leader of the movement to disprove the charge that Germany was responsible for the First World War. The present work represents the synthesis of some fifteen years of research and discussion. Though it contains little that is new in the way of information, it constitutes a more or less definitive exposition of the German point of view. All except the first 80 pages are devoted to a minutely detailed account of events between the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, and England's declaration of war on August 4. Dr. von Wegerer confines himself quite rigidly to diplomatic developments and pays little attention to the constitutional, economic or social problems of the various states. His account of the course of events is sometimes hard to follow because the subject is not treated in strict chronological sequence. There is thus considerable repetition. The work can be commended for its diligent scholarship, though it cannot be characterized as completely impartial. The author does not pretend that Germany was without blame, but he insists on her right to arrange affairs in Central and Eastern Europe without British interference. He ends with a 13-page summary, of which the concluding sentence is: "So war der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges nicht Wille, sondern Schicksal!"

PERISH BY THE SWORD. By R. Ernest Dupuy. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1939, 302 p. $2.50.

An illustrated account of the Czechoslovak Legion's struggle across Siberia and of the

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American campaigns in North Russia and Eastern Siberia. The author, an American Army officer, dwells on the futility of our intervention in those regions.

THE BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RECORD OF WORLD WAR YEARS. New York: Seibert, 1939, 427 p. $1.00.

A factual chronicle of what happened to the money market, commodity prices, industrial production, etc., in the United States between 1914 and 1918.

The Second World War

FAILURE OF A MISSION. By Sir Nevile Henderson. New York: Putnam, 1940, 334 p. $3.00.

Sir Nevile was sent to Berlin as British Ambassador just before Mr. Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937. He thus played a very important part in carrying out the policy of appeasement that led to the results that are now so painfully obvious. This book is Sir Nevile's sincere, sometimes naïve, always interesting and highly readable, account of his two and a half years in the center of European diplomacy, and as such is an important contribution to diplomatic history. It also clearly reveals the author's personal predilection for many Nazi theories, practices and personages, and thus constitutes a remarkable document illustrating the moral and intellectual dry rot that has come to paralyze such a wide section of Britain's ruling class.

THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC LOOKING-GLASS. By Oliver Benson. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939, 239 p. $2.00.

A hectic and not particularly penetrating résumé of events between Munich and the outbreak of the war, written too soon to take account of documents and other revelatory writings (*e.g.*, Sir Nevile Henderson's book) published since last October.

FOR WHAT DO WE FIGHT? By Norman Angell. New York: Harper, 1939, 327 p. $2.50.

A balanced review of the events that led to the present war and an outline of what the coming peace settlement must be if it is to insure political security for all nations.

THE PATHS THAT LED TO WAR. EUROPE: 1919–1939. By John Mackintosh. London: Blackie, 1940, 364 p. 10/6.

A competent chronicle, but without interpretative insight.

THE STORM BREAKS. By Frederick T. Birchall. New York: Viking, 1940, 366 p. $3.00.

This book, by the well-known correspondent of *The New York Times*, consists of colorful but episodic personal reminiscences rather than a coherent, critical narrative. The period covered is roughly the last decade, and the scene is Western Europe.

HISTORY OF THE WAR. Volumes I, II and III. By Stephen King-Hall. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1939, 6/.

A conventional chronicle of the war's causes and its course to November 1939.

SIEGE. By Julien Bryan. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 64 p. $2.75.

An American photographer records, in picture and in prose, the terrible ordeal inflicted on the Polish civil population, particularly in Warsaw during the siege.

WITHIN GERMANY. By Oswald Garrison Villard. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 87 p. $1.00.

Mr. Villard has known Germany well throughout his long and active career as journalist and editor. This brief report on his visit there shortly after the outbreak of the present war is of particular interest since he seems to have been given fairly free rein as to where he went and whom he saw. He concludes that Germany cannot win because "humanity, human decency and dignity forbid it."

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THE GERMAN ARMY. By Herbert Rosinski. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 267 p. $3.00.

A history and appreciation of the German — or more particularly, the Prussian — Army from Frederick the Great to today, by a former professor in the German Military and Naval Academies. Dr. Rosinski discusses not only the more obvious questions of strategy, organization and morale but also the army's rôle in the life of the nation.

L'ITALIA DI FRONTE AL CONFLITTO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 319 p. L. 15.

The texts of Ciano's speech of December 16, 1939, and of numerous other documents.

BLACKOUT: THE HUMAN SIDE OF EUROPE'S MARCH TO WAR. By Hubert P. Earle. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939, 290 p. $2.00.

Superficial reminiscences of a young American attached to the United States Embassy in Paris during the two months before the war broke out.

NAZI GERMANY CAN'T WIN. By Wilhelm Necker. London: Drummond, 1939, 364 p. 10/6.

Though there is little that is new in this book, it nevertheless contains a good summary of Germany's strategic situation and of the Nazi war plan. Dr. Necker, a former German officer, shows how Germany's "fatal weaknesses" unfit her for a long war.

UM EIN NEUES EUROPA: TATSACHEN UND PROBLEME. By Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben. Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1939, 380 p. M. 3.75.

A political survey of Europe just before the war, by a former State Secretary.

THE WAY OUT OF WAR. By César Saerchinger. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 125 p. 60 cents.

Mr. Saerchinger, for many years an American newspaper correspondent and radio commentator in Europe, traces the causes of war to nationalism, industrialism and imperialism. The United States, he holds, can best serve humanity by staying out of this war in order to be able to take the lead in making a durable peace.

INSIDE EUROPE. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1940, 606 p. $3.50.

A revised and reset "war edition" of a best-seller.

HANDBOOK OF THE WAR. By John C. de Wilde and Others. Boston: Houghton, 1939, 248 p. $2.00.

A well-organized, reliable and readable source of useful political, military and economic information for the general reader.

WAR CHECK LIST. A WORKING GUIDE TO THE BACKGROUND AND EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR. Parts I and II. Compiled by Richard H. Heindel and Others. Philadelphia: War Documentation Service, University of Pennsylvania, 1940, 46 p. and 78 p. (mimeographed) $1.00.

A useful, though somewhat hastily compiled, bibliography covering the background and the first five months of the war, and consisting chiefly of items published between September 1938 and January 31, 1940.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1939. By Whitney H. Shepardson, in Collaboration with William O. Scroggs. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939, 423 p. $3.00.

An objective, carefully documented and readable discussion of the principal world events of the past year which have influenced the foreign relations of the United States. The volume's somewhat detailed analysis of political developments at home and abroad preceding the outbreak of the European war is especially useful for an understanding of the foreign policies of the American Government in a difficult period. The work deals

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with such timely topics as preparedness, the maintenance of neutrality in the Americas, the resort by the Roosevelt Administration to "methods short of war" *vis-à-vis* the European dictators, the economic dislocations resulting from the conflict, and the wartime relations of the United States with China, Japan and the Soviet Union. Maps, an appendix of documents and a chronology add to its usefulness.

MOBILIZING CIVILIAN AMERICA. By Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1940, 288 p. $2.75.

A most timely study of the War Department's plans for the mobilization of American industry, which treats fully and critically such controversial subjects as conscription, labor policy, price control, propaganda and censorship.

AMERICAN WHITE PAPER. By Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 108 p. $1.00.

Two Washington reporters give a surprisingly circumstantial account of the diplomatic activities of President Roosevelt and the State Department during the days in which Europe went to war.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA. By Charles A. Beard. New York: Knopf, 1940, 161 p. $1.50.

Mr. Beard is a recognized authority on American history, but he is obviously out of his depth in trying to understand what has been going on in the world at large during the last two decades. He suffers a further handicap in that his almost exclusively materialistic interpretation of history prevents him from appreciating the motives that guide most men, even in this day and age.

ISOLATED AMERICA. By Raymond Leslie Buell. New York: Knopf, 1940, 470 p. $3.00.

A history of recent American foreign policy and an appraisal of our place in a warring world where there can be no such thing as isolation. Mr. Buell, formerly President of the Foreign Policy Association, holds that we would be helping ourselves by helping the Allies with every means short of sending over troops. This is a sound and scholarly work, long-range in its vision and realistic in its approach.

PEACE IN OUR TIME? By James P. Warburg. New York: Harper, 1940, 76 p. 75 cents.

A brief description of the part which the author believes the United States should play in the coming peace settlement. Mr. Warburg is eminently rational but rather vague, especially in regard to the possibilities of a Nazi victory.

CHART FOR ROUGH WATER. By Waldo Frank. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 182 p. $1.75.

A passionate appeal for a spiritual regeneration among the American people as the way out of our present difficulties — economic and otherwise — and as a preparation for our new rôle in the world.

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York: Crofts, 1940, 806 p. $6.00.

Professor Bailey, of Stanford University, has turned out a very readable and a thoroughly reliable synthesis. Though intended primarily as a text, it will appeal to the general reading public, which will doubtless come to regard it as the best up-to-date source for enlightenment concerning our diplomatic history.

THE AMERICAN STAKES. By John Chamberlain. New York: Carrick and Evans, 1940, 320 p. $2.75.

Mr. Chamberlain is an editor of *Fortune*, a well-known book reviewer and the author of "Farewell to Reform." In this work he analyzes somewhat disconnectedly various American problems — political, economic and social. His conclusions reveal an eclectic rather than an original mind.

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LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE DES ÉTATS-UNIS DEPUIS LA GUERRE. By Charles Daniel Hérisson. Paris: Librairie Sociale et Économique, 1939, 701 p. Fr. 100.

A compendious survey and critique, covering principally the last decade.

THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE. By Francis B. Sayre. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940, 93 p. $1.50.

Lectures explaining the Hull Trade Agreement Program, by the former Assistant Secretary of State in charge of negotiating them.

NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ALASKA SALMON. By Homer E. Gregory and Kathleen Barnes. New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939, 322 p. $3.00.

The economic, social and legal aspects of the problem thoroughly canvassed.

YOUR NAVY. By Captain Claude Banks Mayo. Los Angeles: Parker and Baird, 1939, 372 p. $3.50.

The Navy's organization, functions and traditions, set forth in simple language for the layman, by an American naval officer.

A NAVY SECOND TO NONE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. By George T. Davis. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 508 p. $3.75.

A scholarly history which seeks to interpret the metamorphosis of American naval policy in its relation to the country's general international interests.

FALSE PROPHETS OF PEACE. By W. Armin Linn. Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1939, 367 p. $2.00.

American history ransacked to show the heavy cost, in lives and property, which the country has paid due to "misguided altruism, blind sentiment and criminal neglect." In spite of its wealth of factual and documentary apparatus, this book cannot be regarded as in any sense a scholarly treatise.

AMERICA'S HOUSE OF LORDS. By Harold L. Ickes. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 214 p. $1.50.

The Secretary of the Interior delivers a stinging, documented attack on some of the abuses prevalent among certain newspaper publishers in the United States.

SINCE YESTERDAY. By Frederick Lewis Allen. New York: Harper, 1940, 362 p. $3.00.

In this sequel to "Only Yesterday," Mr. Allen depicts the transformation of the American scene wrought during the thirties.

1940. By Jay Franklin. New York: Viking, 1940, 319 p. $2.75.

A wholehearted journalistic supporter of the New Deal justifies its policies and nominates Mr. Roosevelt for a third term.

YOU AMERICANS. Edited by B. P. Adams. New York: Funk, 1939, 348 p. $2.50.

Penetrating, readable, and on the whole sympathetic appraisals of the *homo Americanus* by fifteen foreign correspondents — European, Latin American and Asiatic.

THE NEW DEAL GOOSE STEP. By Carl H. Mote. New York: Daniel Ryerson, 1939, 260 p. $2.50.

Mr. Mote, an American lawyer and businessman who hates intellectuals, liberals, Jews and Communists, seeks in this illogical and very unfair book to lump these groups together as the destroyers of America.

LABOR AND DEMOCRACY. By William Green. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939, 194 p. $2.50.

The philosophy of the president of the American Federation of Labor.

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LESSONS IN LIBERTY: A STUDY OF GOD IN GOVERNMENT. By Clarence Manion. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1939, 297 p. $1.50.

This interpretation of American political institutions and ideas proceeds from the belief that religion is their fundamental basis. The author is professor of constitutional law at Notre Dame University.

WHICH WAY, DEMOCRACY? By Wilfred Parsons. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 295 p. $2.00.

Father Parsons, a Jesuit, would like to see American democracy assume more authoritarian and "corporative" forms, for he thoroughly distrusts real democracy.

THE CATHOLIC CRISIS. By George Seldes. New York: Messner, 1939, 357 p. $3.00.

The trends of Catholic thought manifested by Father Parsons, and the policies which are now being pursued by the Church to put them into effect, are candidly analyzed at considerable length by the author of "The Vatican: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." He warns the hierarchy that it may expect the rise of an anti-clerical movement in this country if the Church continues its present policies and tactics.

LA CRISE DU SYNDICALISME AMÉRICAIN (1933–1939). By Edward N. Agopian. Paris: Domat-Montchréstien, 1939, 224 p. Fr. 40.

An interpretation of recent American trade union developments.

CALVIN COOLIDGE. By Claude M. Fuess. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 522 p. $4.75.

If you are an admirer of Coolidge, you will probably like this biography; if you regard him as a political accident, you will feel that several things about his strange rise to the highest office in the land still require more candid explanation than Dr. Fuess has given them here in spite of his having had access to Coolidge's private papers.

ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE: THE STORY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY. By Rupert Hughes. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 361 p. $2.75.

A warm admirer records the brief career of a presidential aspirant.

Western Europe

THESE RULE FRANCE. By Stanton B. Leeds. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 367 p. $3.00.

Muddled and not particularly accurate pen-portraits of outstanding French politicians, intellectuals, financiers, publicists and military men.

POUR RECONSTRUIRE NOTRE FRANCE. By Léopold Perréal. Besançon: Éditions Notre France, 1939, 350 p. Fr. 22.50.

A sociologist suggests social and economic reforms.

FRANKREICH HEUTE UND WIR. By Hans Wendt. Berlin: Mittler, 1939, 452 p. M. 6.

Clichés of post-Munich French life and ideas.

L'INSTABILITÉ MINISTÉRIELLE SOUS LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE (1871–1938). By A. Soulier. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 603 p. Fr. 80.

An exhaustive analysis and case history. There is a bibliography and a chronological table of the 107 ministries that held office between 1870 and 1939.

L'ÉVOLUTION POLITIQUE DU SOCIALISME FRANÇAIS: 1789–1934. By Marcel Prélot. Paris: Spes, 1939, 302 p. Fr. 18.

A reliable, unexciting history, useful for reference.

IN CORSICA. By Paolo Monelli. Milan: Garzanti, 1939, 153 p. L. 12.

A tract on the wrongs suffered by "Italian" Corsica at French hands.

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THE KEYSTONE OF EUROPE. By Émile Cammaerts. London: Davies, 1939, 393 p. 15/.

A somewhat superficial history of Belgium during the last century, in which the rôle of the monarchs is given special emphasis.

THE DUTCH. By Adriaan J. Barnouw. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 297 p. $3.00.

An excellent introduction to Dutch life, by a professor at Columbia University.

LES PAYS-BAS DANS LE MONDE. By H. Riemens. Paris: Payot, 1939, 354 p. Fr. 40.

A much more compendious work than Professor Barnouw's, but less likely to appeal to the general reader.

SCANDINAVIA: THE BACKGROUND FOR NEUTRALITY. By Alma Luise Olson. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940, 358 p. $2.50.

The sweetness and light which permeate this chatty book seem to have little relation to the world of which Scandinavia has now abruptly discovered it is a part.

DIE INDUSTRIALISIERUNG NORWEGENS. By Allan Lyle. Jena: Fischer, 1939, 101 p. M. 5.

An historical and statistical study of particular timeliness.

SWEDISH IRON ORE. By A. F. Rickman. London: Faber, 1939, 170 p. 8/6.

The history and economics of one of Europe's most strategically important industries.

WHAT GERMANY FORGOT. By James T. Shotwell. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 152 p. $1.50.

Professor Shotwell holds that most of Germany's troubles during the last two decades resulted from the war rather than the Treaty of Versailles. Some readers may feel that the treaty and the attempts to enforce its provisions (*e.g.*, the Ruhr invasion) were not without blame. Nevertheless, Professor Shotwell's thesis is a much-needed and salutary corrective to loose talk and writing now current not only in pro-Nazi quarters but among sentimental liberals and pacifists.

THE VOICE OF DESTRUCTION. By Hermann Rauschning. New York: Putnam, 1940, 295 p. $2.75.

The author of "The Revolution of Nihilism" continues his discursive remarks, some of them revelatory, about Hitler's personality and plans.

DEUTSCHLANDS AUSSENPOLITIK, 1933–1939. By Axel Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven. Berlin: Stollberg, 1939, 239 p. M. 5.

A one-dimensional chronicle by a Baltic baron, an extreme Nationalist, member of the Reichstag under Hitler and professor of international law at Breslau.

VON WEIMAR ZU HITLER. By Otto Braun. New York: Europa Verlag, 1940, 458 p. $3.00.

Braun was one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party in Germany and after the Kapp Putsch (March 1920) he became Prime Minister of Prussia, retaining that office until he was deposed by Hindenburg and Von Papen in 1932. He left Germany early in 1933. His book deals largely with internal German affairs, on which he throws much new light by quoting hitherto unknown documents and conversations.

GERMANY PUTS THE CLOCK BACK. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York: Morrow, 1939, xxxvi+410 p. $2.50.

In this revised edition of one of the better books on Nazi Germany (first published in 1932) about a quarter of the text is new.

HITLER'S TWELVE APOSTLES. By Oswald Dutch. New York: McBride, 1940, 249 p. $3.00.

Unfriendly profiles of 12 high Nazis, by a former editor of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*.

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HITLER IS NO FOOL. By Karl Billinger. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 198 p. 50 cents.

Hitler's mentality and program as revealed in "Mein Kampf." The author, who writes under a pseudonym, holds that the Nazis' seizure of power represented "not the victory of one single man, but of one part of the German people over another."

MIGHT IS RIGHT. By Friedrich Roetter. London: Quality Press, 1939, 417 p. 12/6.

The best parts of this book by an anti-Nazi exile are those dealing with Nazi "justice" and police methods — with which the author had considerable experience.

RELIGION IN THE REICH. By Michael Power. New York: Longmans, 1940, 240 p. $2.00.

An "eye-witness report" on how Hitler's unproclaimed war against Christianity has undermined both the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany.

HEIL HUNGER! HEALTH UNDER HITLER. By Martin Gumpert. New York: Alliance, 1940, 128 p. $1.75.

On the basis of Nazi statistics Dr. Gumpert shows how German health and nutrition standards have deteriorated under Hitler.

WORD WARFARE. By John Gloag. London: Nicholson, 1939, 154 p. 3/6.

Nazi propaganda methods examined and appraised.

AUSTRIA (OCTOBER 1918 — MARCH 1919). By David F. Strong. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 329 p. $4.00.

A scholarly history of Austria's transition from empire to republic.

PAROLE: DAS REICH. By Wladimir von Hartlieb. Vienna: Luser, 1939, 520 p. M. 7.50.

A Nazi interpretation of Austrian history, 1933–38.

LA SUISSE ET L'AUTARCIE. By Ch. Burky and Others. Paris: Sirey, for the Comité Suisse de Coordination des Hautes Études Internationales, 1939, 165 p. Fr. 25.

A brief study showing that Switzerland's economic life cannot be based entirely either on free trade or on self-sufficiency.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITALY. By Luigi Salvatorelli. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 688 p. $5.00.

A reliable synthesis by a leading Italian historian.

STORIA DELLA RIVOLUZIONE FASCISTA. By Roberto Farinacci. Cremona: "Cremona Nuova," 1937–1938, 3 v. L. 42.

A former Secretary General of the Fascist Party and one of its fire-eating hierarchs gives his version of how it attained power.

ITALY. By C. Pellizzi. New York: Longmans, 1939, 223 p. $2.00.

A handy précis, pro-Fascist in tone, of Italian foreign policy since 1914.

LA POLITICA ESTERA DI MUSSOLINI. By Mario Missiroli. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 192 p. L. 10.

A "semi-official" and sketchy summary, primarily of the last six years.

ORIENTAMENTI INTERNAZIONALI. By Pasquale Pennisi. Rome: Cremonese, 1939, 233 p. L. 10.

Opinionated essays on Mediterranean and Central European problems.

BIBLIOGRAFIA DELLA CIVILTÀ DEL FASCISMO. Milan: "Dottrina Fascista," 1939, 173 p. L. 5.

A comprehensive catalogue arranged under 16 subject headings.

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PROSPETTIVE AUTARCHICHE. By Angelo Tarchi. Florence: Cya, 1939, 422 p. L. 40.

An indispensable statistical study of Italy's position in regard to all the important foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods.

LA CAMERA DEI FASCI E DELLE CORPORAZIONI. Rome: "L'Economia Italiana," 1939, 252 p. L. 15.

The origins, structure and operation of the new Chamber of Fasci and Corporations described by various experts.

LES LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES DANS L'ITALIE FASCISTE. By M. Breillat-Milhaud. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 158 p. Fr. 38.

A fair-minded legal monograph.

PAPA PIO XI. By Giovanni Galbiati. Milan: Áncora, 1939, 393 p. L. 30.

A lengthy eulogy by the Prefect of the Ambrosian Library at Milan.

LA TRAGEDIA DE ESPAÑA. By Indalecio Prieto. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1939, 168 p. 1 Peso.

Speeches delivered in South America during December 1938 and January 1939 by the former Loyalist Minister of Defense.

I HELPED TO BUILD AN ARMY. By José Martín Blázquez. London: Secker and Warburg, 1939, 361 p. 15/.

The author was one of the few staff officers in the Spanish Army who remained loyal to the Republic. After serving it until March 1937, he then went to France where he wrote this book, one of the most reliable and important so far published on the Spanish Civil War. His account casts a lurid light on the party and regional jealousies that crippled the Loyalist Government's efforts to organize and equip an army.

PREPARACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DEL ALZAMIENTO NACIONAL. By Felipe Bertrán Güell. Valladolid: Librería Santarén, 1939, 335 p. Ptas. 7.

A detailed study into the causes of and the preparations for the military rising, told from the Nationalist point of view. This book shows that the revolt originated among disgruntled officers and that civilian help came only from the numerically insignificant Phalanx and Carlists. As early as 1933, the author asserts, Catholic youths from Navarre were sent to Italy and Tunis for military training.

NOTHING BUT DANGER. Edited by Frank C. Hanighen. New York: McBride, 1939, 285 p. $2.75.

Ten eye-witness stories by newspaper correspondents with the Loyalist forces.

THE LAST DAYS OF MADRID. By Colonel S. Casado. London: Davies, 1939, 302 p. 8/6.

The officer who revolted against the Negrín Government at Madrid in March 1939 and sought peace with Franco justifies his actions during the Civil War and makes various accusations against other men. Polemical and far from convincing.

THE LINCOLN BATTALION. By Edwin Rolfe. New York: Random House, 1939, 321 p. $2.50.

The history of the Americans who fought for the Loyalists, by one of their number.

Eastern Europe

STALIN: CZAR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS. By Eugene Lyons. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940, 292 p. $2.50.

A hard-hitting and highly "unauthorized" biography, by the author of "Assignment in Utopia." Mr. Lyons interprets the life of the Soviet dictator as a symbol of the changes through which Russia has passed in the last half-century. Though not as original or full as Souvarine's work on Stalin, this book is more readable.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STALIN'S KAMPF. Edited by M. R. Werner. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1940, 358 p. $2.50.

Speeches, writings and interviews by Stalin — or about him — edited as a parallel to Hitler's "Mein Kampf." On the whole it is dull reading, though Stalin is much more comprehensible than his turgidly rhetorical counterpart in Germany. The two are, however, clearly seen to resemble each other in the ease with which they use words to conceal their real motives and to make black seem white.

STALIN'S RUSSIA AND THE CRISIS IN SOCIALISM. By Max Eastman. New York: Norton, 1940, 284 p. $2.50.

Mr. Eastman has for a number of years been trying to ascertain and expound the real truth about the Communist experiment in Russia. In the pursuit of this object he has been among the vanguard of those who believe that Marxism, as a religion and a social pattern, has its serious shortcomings and that Stalin's dictatorship represents a serious setback for the Socialist ideal.

RUSSIA UNDER SOVIET RULE: TWENTY YEARS OF BOLSHEVIK EXPERIMENT. By N. de Basily. New York: Norton, 1940, 508 p. $5.00.

A former Tsarist official of liberal tendencies, after carefully weighing the credit and debit sides of the Soviet ledger, decides that the material progress has not been worth the cost in human suffering and the loss of liberties.

VELIKI POKHOD ARMII K. E. VOROSHILOVA OT LUGANSKA K TSARITSYNA. PUTEVODITEL' PO SLEDAM GRAZHDANSKOI VOINY. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1939, 299 p. 60 cents.

An account of a decisive campaign of the Russian Civil War, in which Stalin played an important rôle.

PUT' BOL'SHEVIKA. STRANITSY IZ VOSPOMINIANII O SERGO ORDZHONIKIDZE. By Z. Ordzhonikidze. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy literatury, 1939, 166 p. 40 cents.

Memoirs of Ordzhonikidze, one of Stalin's closest colleagues.

VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA SSSR ZA 20 LET 1918–1937 GG. STATISTICHESKY SPRAVOCHNIK. Compiled by S. N. Bakulin and D. D. Mishustin. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1939, 264 p. $1.50.

An official statistical study of Soviet foreign trade.

ANARKHIZM V ROSSII. By Em. Yaroslavsky. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 118 p. 30 cents.

A history and a denunciation of the anarchist movement in Russia.

UKRAINE: LAND DER ZUKUNFT. By Axel Schmidt. Berlin: Hobbing, 1939, 206 p. M. 6.80.

The history and culture of the Ukrainian people described in a way to demonstrate their right to separate nationhood.

L'ASIE CENTRALE SOVIÉTIQUE ET LE KAZAKHSTAN. By Charles Steber. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1939, 297 p. Fr. 35.

A treatise glorifying the economic and social advances made under Soviet rule.

SEVERNYI POLIUS. By A. F. Laktionov. Edited by V. Yu. Vize. Archangel: Arkhangelskoye Oblastnoye Izdatelstvo, 1939, 124 p. 80 cents.

A description of the Polar regions, edited by the head of the Polar Institute.

FINLAND FIGHTS. By H. B. Elliston. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 443 p. $2.75.

Mr. Elliston, Financial Editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, arrived in Finland just as the Soviet invasion began. His book is the best eye-witness account of the conflict. It also deserves attention because of the explanation it gives of the background and origins of the war — diplomatic, psychological and otherwise.

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THE SPIRIT OF FINLAND. By Willis N. Bugbee. Syracuse: Bugbee, 1940, 157 p. $2.00.
A popular description of the land and people.

FINLAND: LAND OF HEROES. By Toivo Rosvall. New York: Dutton, 1940, 272 p. $2.50.
An informal, friendly portrait of a brave nation.

BALTENLAND. By F. W. von Oertzen. Munich: Bruckmann, 1939, 338 p. M. 7.50.
A history of German colonization in the Baltic countries.

JUDENVIERTEL EUROPAS. Edited by Hans Hinkel. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1939, 151 p. M. 3.
Anti-Semitic propaganda disguised under the outward trappings of scholarship.

THE RACES OF CENTRAL EUROPE. By G. M. Morant. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 163 p. 5/.
An anthropologist's "footnote to history."

LETTONIA. By Arnold Spekke and Others. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1939, 191 p. L. 10.
A coöperative survey of many aspects of Latvian life.

THE POLISH TRADITION. By Paul Super. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 215 p. 7/6.
A sound, informative, friendly interpretation of Poland's history.

MARSHAL PILSUDSKI. By W. F. Reddaway. London: Routledge, 1939, 334 p. 15/.
A competent, pedestrian "life and times."

HITLER'S ROUTE TO BAGDAD. By Barbara Ward and Others. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 356 p. 10/6.
The chapters on Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey are useful guides to the political and economic problems of those countries; the others are less reliable.

THE HISTORY OF HUNGARY. By Otto Zarek. London: Selwyn, 1939, 390 p. 10/6.
A conventional *précis*, going down to the end of the World War.

UNGHERIA D'OGGI. By Rodolfo Mosca and Others. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1939, 174 p. L. 10.
Hungary's history, economic life, culture and relations with Italy described by a group of Magyar and Italian writers.

DIE EISERNE GARDE. By Klaus Charlé. Berlin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939, 112 p.
An uncritical defense of the aims and activities of the Rumanian Iron Guard.

LA GRÈCE ÉCONOMIQUE. By G. N. Gofinas and Others. Brussels: "Revue Économique Internationale," 1939, 150 p.
Essays on agriculture, industry, merchant marine, currency and finance.

ALBANIA: QUINTA SPONDA D'ITALIA. By Pio Bondioli. Milan: Casa Editrice T. I. M., 1939, 222 p. L. 10.
A concise history stressing Italy's rôle. Bibliography.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

EMPIRE ON THE SEVEN SEAS. By James Truslow Adams. New York: Scribner, 1940, 391 p. $3.50.
A very readable explanation of the origins, growth and present state of the most remarkable political phenomenon of the nineteenth century — the British Empire — written in Mr. Adams' usual distinguished style.

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AN EMPIRE PREPARED. By Donald Cowie. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 277 p. 6/.

A reassuring, prewar picture of the state of Britain's imperial defenses.

DEMOCRACY UP-TO-DATE. By Sir Stafford Cripps. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 108 p. 2/.

"Some practical suggestions for the reorganization of the political and parliamentary system" by a leader of the Leftist dissidents in the Labour Party.

THE BRITISH APPROACH TO POLITICS. By Michael Stewart. New York: Norton, 1940, 426 p. $2.25.

How Britain is ruled, set forth in simple terms.

"CONSERVATISM THE ONLY WAY." By Reginald Northam. London: Gifford, 1939, 276 p. 10/6.

The author holds that there can be no liberty without authority.

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY: THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND ITS PLACE IN NATIONAL UNITY. By Karl Walter. London: King, 1939, 120 p. 6/.

A concise appraisal of the Labour Movement.

MEN IN OUR TIME. By Audax. New York: McBride, 1940, 217 p. $2.50.

Candid and entertaining profiles of nine leading English public figures.

BEWARE OF THE ENGLISH! GERMAN PROPAGANDA EXPOSES ENGLAND. Compiled by W. G. Knop. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939, 304 p. 8/6.

German articles on British decadence, perfidy and tyranny, together with numerous cartoons in the same vein. By publishing this book the British show who it is that has the sense of humor. The numerous Nazi jibes at Britain's "flirtations" with Communist Russia are especially amusing now that they have backfired.

INDUSTRIAL AND LABOUR RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN: A SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Frank E. Gannett and B. F. Catherwood. New York: America's Future, 1939, 364 p. $2.50.

An American chain-newspaper publisher and a professor of social sciences at Ithaca College edit a symposium of articles on various aspects of the British trade-union movement, by 16 British authorities.

BRITISH AGRICULTURE. New York: Penguin, 1939, 284 p. 25 cents.

A report on the principles that should govern future policy, drawn up after an exhaustive inquiry by a committee organized in 1934 and headed by Viscount Astor.

THE BRITISH TARIFF SYSTEM. By E. B. McGuire. London: Methuen, 1939, 312 p. 10/6.

An explanation of its theory, practice and political objectives.

THE FRENCH CANADIANS TODAY. By Wilfrid Bovey. Toronto: Dent, 1939, 362 p. 15/.

Their political, economic and social problems sympathetically described by the Director of Extra-Mural Relations at McGill University.

NORTH AGAIN FOR GOLD. By Edgar Laytha. New York: Stokes, 1939, 360 p. $3.00.

Engaging chapters on the development of Canada's Far North.

CANADA AND INDIA. By Sir Firoz Khan Noon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 140 p. $1.50.

Impressions of contemporary Canada, by the High Commissioner of India in London.

LAND UTILIZATION IN AUSTRALIA. By S. M. Wadham and G. L. Wood. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1939, 360 p. 21/.

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An important scientific study describing the use now made of the Commonwealth's agricultural, grazing and timber resources, and their future possibilities.

AUSTRALIAN STANDARDS OF LIVING. By F. W. Eggleston and Others. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939, 193 p. 10/.

Primarily a statistical study.

THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE CONGRESS IN INDIA. By C. F. Andrews and Girija Mookerjee. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 304 p. 7/6.

A well-informed history of the remarkable development of Indian Nationalism.

THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES OR COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN INDIA. By K. B. Krishna. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 359 p. 15/.

A scholarly work of historical and institutional research, critical of the British.

THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER IN INDIA. By B. Shiva Rao. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 263 p. 10/6.

The story of the very uphill struggle which has been waged in India to obtain better conditions for the worker and to organize him into trade unions.

INDIA'S TEEMING MILLIONS. By Gyan Chand. New York: Norton, 1940, 374 p. $3.75.

A sound treatise on population and allied problems such as industrialization and scientific agriculture. The author, professor of economics at Patna University, admits that India's population growth must be checked by birth control.

The Near East

MINARET AND PIPE-LINE: YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY IN THE NEAR EAST. By Margret Boveri. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 422 p. $5.00.

A vividly written book on the lands of the Near East — their history, religious problems, political structure and international position. A map is folded in at the back.

LA POLITIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE L'ALLEMAGNE. By Bernard Vernier. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 117 p. Fr. 15.

Information concerning German activities in Moslem countries since 1914.

ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE. Volume III. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 189 p. Fr. 20.

More papers on the political and social problems of the Arab countries.

TURKEY AT THE STRAITS. By James T. Shotwell and Francis Deák. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 196 p. $2.00.

A timely and authoritative diplomatic history of the perennial Straits question, with appendices, bibliography and chronology.

LE ISOLE ITALIANE DELL'EGEO DALL'OCCUPAZIONE ALLA SOVRANITÀ. By Renzo Sertoli Salis. Rome: Vittoriano, 1939, 371 p. L. 40.

A scholarly diplomatic history of the Dodecanese Islands from 1912 to 1927, with a chapter outlining Italy's Ægean policy since then.

PALESTINE: THE REALITY. By J. M. N. Jeffries. London: Longmans, 1939, 728 p. 25/.

This is probably the most comprehensive statement of the Palestine problem from the Arab point of view that has been published. Mr. Jeffries, who has been connected with the Arab Centre in London, is not sparing in his condemnation of persons whom he regards as responsible for the present plight of the Holy Land.

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AN OBSERVER IN PALESTINE. By Winifred Lowe Fox. New York: Revell, 1939, 253 p. $2.50.
This observer went into the byways as well as the highways.

REBUILDING PALESTINE. By Ben M. Edidin. New York: Behrman, 1939, 264 p. $1.50.
The Jewish accomplishment in Palestine graphically described with the aid of many charts, maps and photographs.

STRADE E COMMERCIO DELL'IRAN. By Elio Migliorini. Milan: Principato, 1939, 150 p. L. 12.
A monograph on the foreign trade of Iran.

Africa

EUROPA BLICKT NACH AFRIKA. Edited by Erwin Barth von Wehrenalp. Leipzig: Lühe, 1939, 356 p. M. 7.
A coöperative work on Africa's resources, industries and commerce.

AFRIKA HEUTE UND MORGEN. By Paul Rohrback and Justus Rohrback. Berlin: Hobbing, 1939, 312 p. M. 8.20.
A popular survey of economic and native questions in black Africa.

L'OPERA DEL FASCISMO IN AFRICA. Volume II. L'AFRICA ITALIANA SUL PIANO DELL'IMPERO (1933–1938). By Alberto Giaccardi. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 134 p. L. 4.
A handy, well-organized summary.

DIE FASCHISTISCHE KOLONISATION IN NORDAFRIKA. By Oskar Schmieder and Herbert Wilhelmy. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1939, 204 p. M. 5.80.
A sympathetic description of the development of Libya during the last twenty years.

IL CANALE DI SUEZ ED I RAPPORTI ANGLO-EGIZIANI. By Bruno Aglietti. Florence: Cya, 1939, 138 p. L. 18.
A juridico-historical monograph.

THE GREATEST COLONIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE WORLD. By Amedeo Tosti. Rome: Novissima, 1939, 140 p.
A brief official account of the conquest of Ethiopia, with maps.

QUADERNO AFFRICANO. By Giuseppe Bottai. Florence: Sansoni, 1939, 185 p. L. 15.
Diary of the Ethiopian War by the present Fascist Minister of Education.

À TRAVERS L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE. By Lt.-Colonel de Burthe d'Annelet. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1939, 2 v. Fr. 500.
A report of the author's extensive explorations in French West and Equatorial Africa, carried out between 1932 and 1935 under the auspices of the Ministry of Colonies. It is a gold mine of political, economic, social and geographical information. There are also six chapters on Morocco. The volumes are in large format, the text is in two columns, and there are many illustrations.

The Far East

SPECIAL UNDECLARED WAR. By Frank Oliver. London: Cape, 1939, 368 p. 12/6.
Mr. Oliver's sympathy for the Chinese cause has not prevented him from setting down an objective record of the origins of the present war in the Far East and its course to the end of 1938.

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SHANGHAI: CITY FOR SALE. By Ernest O. Hauser. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 323 p. $3.00.
A breezy account of the rise and imminent fall of one of the most amazing manifestations of white imperialism — the International City of Shanghai.

THROUGH CHINA'S WALL. By Graham Peck. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 371 p. $3.50.
A vivid report on wanderings into China's deep hinterland.

NEWS IS MY JOB: A CORRESPONDENT IN WAR-TORN CHINA. By Edna Lee Booker. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 375 p. $3.00.
Two decades ago Miss Booker began her remarkable career as a journalist in China. She knows most of the prominent men and women in China and has visited much of the country. Her recollections are guaranteed to hold the interest of the reader.

AGRARIAN CHINA. Compiled and Translated by the Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, 258 p. $2.50.
"Selected source materials from Chinese authors."

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN CHINA. By Lowe Chuan-Hua. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 179 p. 7/6.
Japan's chances for victory viewed pessimistically.

THE RISE OF A PAGAN STATE: JAPAN'S RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND. By A. Morgan Young. New York: Morrow, 1939, 224 p. $2.50.
An informative study on the cult of emperor-worship in Japan and the political uses to which it has been put. The author's predilections are distinctly anti-Japanese.

JAPAN: REMINISCENCES AND REALITIES. By Leslie W. Johns. London: Paul, 1939, 256 p. 15/.
Mr. Johns believes that it is Japan's destiny to rule the Orient.

LAND BELOW THE WIND. By Agnes Newton Keith. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939, 371 p. $3.00.
Life in North Borneo entertainingly portrayed.

Latin America

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI HISPANIC-AMERICAN STUDIES. Edited by Robert E. McNicoll and J. Riis Owre. Coral Gables: University of Miami, 1940, 277 p.
Lectures on a variety of subjects, delivered at the Hispanic-American Institute.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE. By Thomas Harrison Reynolds. Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1938, 194 p.
A departure from the usual interpretation of the development of the Doctrine.

ESSAYS IN PAN-AMERICANISM. By Joseph Byrne Lockey. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939, 174 p. $2.00.
Nine papers on episodes in Inter-American history.

REFORMAS AGRARIAS EN AMÉRICA Y EUROPA. By Bernardino C. Horne. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1938, 234 p.
Useful chapters on agrarian legislation, stressing Latin American trends.

TWO STRIKES AND OUT. Edited by William E. McMahon. Garden City: Country Life Press, 1939, 156 p. $1.00.
A reply to the Mexican Government's case regarding the oil expropriations.

MEXICO AT THE BAR OF PUBLIC OPINION. By Burt M. McConnell. New York: Mail and Express Publishing Company, 1939, 320 p. $1.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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A survey of recent editorials on Mexico in American newspapers, prepared by a former member of the *Literary Digest* staff and published for the Standard Oil Company.

LA CENA DE LAS BURLAS. By Miguel Alessio Robles. Mexico City: Botas, 1939, 231 p.

Articles dealing with various aspects of the present political situation in Mexico, sharply critical of both the United States and the former Calles régime.

GUATEMALA, PAST AND PRESENT. By Chester Lloyd Jones. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1940, 420 p. $5.00.

A solid, definitive treatise on the history and present state of Guatemala, by the leading American authority on Caribbean politics and economics.

HISTORIA DE COSTA RICA. By León Fernández Guardia. San José: Lehmann, 1939, 147 p.

An elementary text bearing an official imprimatur.

LA NATION HAÏTIENNE. By Dantès Bellegarde. Paris: Gigord, 1938, 361 p. Fr. 25.

A valuable compendium of historical, economic, social and cultural information, by a Haitian educator and former diplomat.

UNKNOWN TO THE WORLD — HAITI. By Mabel Steedman. London: Hurst, 1939, 287 p. 12/6.

In spite of its exaggerated title, this is a sober and informative book about the Haitian people: their country, their economic and social life, and their customs.

CARIBBEAN NIGHTS. By William J. Makin. London: Hale, 1939, 287 p. 12/6.

An English journalist starts a daily newspaper in Jamaica and learns a great deal about the island in the process. An entertaining and informative book.

PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS. By Daisy Reck. New York: Farrar, 1939, 241 p. $2.50.

Entertaining glimpses of our two Caribbean possessions.

THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF BARBADOS. By Otis P. Starkey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 228 p. $3.00.

An economic and social history of the island.

MINES AND MINERALS IN BRAZIL. By Josias Leão. Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Estudos Economicos, 1939, 243 p. $1.00.

A statistical handbook on resources and production.

GETULIO VARGAS, PRÉSIDENT DES ÉTATS-UNIS DU BRÉSIL. By Jean-Gérard Fleury. Paris: Plon, 1940, 93 p.

The President of Brazil as seen by an admirer.

THE NEGRO IN BRAZIL. By Arthur Ramos. Washington: Associated Publishers, 1939, 203 p. $2.15.

A careful study of the negro's place in Brazilian history, culture and economic life.

L'ARGENTINA E GLI ARGENTINI. By Mario Puccini. Milan: Garzanti, 1939, 221 p. L. 25.

A pictorial survey.

EL GOLPE DE ESTADO DE 1924. AMBIENTE Y ACTORES. By E. Rodríguez Mendoza. Santiago (Chile): Ercilla, 1938, 405 p. Pesos 40.

A detailed and somewhat satirical account of the Chilean *coup d'état* of 1924.

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AIR LAW

FOURTH International Conference on Private Air Law. Brussels, September 1938. Report of the American Delegation to the Secretary of State. Washington, 1939. iv, 95 p. 23 cm. (Conference Series No. 42.) 15c.

BALKAN ENTENTE

L'ENTENTE Balkanique du 9 février 1939 au 8 février 1940. Bucharest, Imprimeria Nationala, 1940. 109 p.

FILMS

THE INTERNATIONAL circulation of educational films. The Geneva Convention of October 11, 1933. Regulations for the execution of the Convention. Prerogatives and obligations of the governments. Organs for the execution of the convention and their rôle. Conditions and formalities to be fulfilled by producers and distributors of educational films. Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation, 1940. 44 p. 22½ cm.

HAITI

HAITI. Annual report of the fiscal representative for the fiscal year October, 1938–September, 1939, submitted to the Secretary of State for Finance, and the Secretary of State for Commerce of the Republic of Haiti, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America. Haiti, 1939. 209 p. 23½ cm.

HUNGARY

PAPERS and documents relating to the foreign relations of Hungary. Published by the Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Collected and edited by Prof. Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry. . . . Budapest, 1939. (New York, Columbia University Press.) 107 p. $5.00.

INDIA

INDIA and the war. Announcement published by the Governor-General of India on 6th November, 1939, and correspondence connected therewith. London, 1939. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6129.) 2d.

INTER-AMERICAN UNION OF THE CARIBBEAN

UNION interamericana del Caribe, 1ª reunión, Habana, 1939. Reuniones interamericanas del Caribe. Primera: 9–12 octubre de 1939. [Habana, 1939] [1 v.] 28 cm.

—— Primera reunion; recomendaciones, acuerdos, votos y resoluciones. Habana, 1939. 65 p. 23½ cm.

MANDATES

PERMANENT mandates commission. Minutes of the thirty-seventh session held at Geneva from December 12th to 21st, 1939 including the report of the commission to the Council. Geneva, 1939. 135 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.7.M.5.1940.VI.A.1.)

NEW ZEALAND. Mandated territory of Western Samoa. (Nineteenth report of the Government of New Zealand on the administration of, for the year ended 31st March, 1939). Wellington, N. Z., 1939. 37 p. 33 cm. 50c.

RÉPUBLIQUE française. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Rapport à la société des nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban (année 1938). Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1939. 223 p. 31 cm.

RAPPORT présenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1938. Bruxelles, Établissements Généraux d'Imprimerie, 1939. 282 p. 31 cm. $2.75.

RAPPORT annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au conseil de la Société des Nations conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Cameroun pour l'année 1938. Paris, Imprimerie Cogery, 1939. 250 p. 32 cm. $2.50.

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RAPPORT annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au conseil de la Société des Nations conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Togo pour l'année 1938. Paris, Imprimerie Cogery, 1939. 279 p. 32 cm. $2.50.

NATIONALITY

A BILL to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code. Washington, 1939. 92 p. 28 cm. (at head of title: 76th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 6127.)

REGULATING military obligations of persons having dual nationality. Convention between the United States of America and Finland. Signed at Helsinki, January 27, 1939. Washington, 1939. 3 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 953.)

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

TO ESTABLISH the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes. Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 3d session, on H. R. 7665 and H. R. 8026. . . . January 8–31, February 5, 14, 1940. Washington, 1940. ii, p. 1709–2202. 23 cm.

ESTABLISHING the composition of the United States Navy and authorizing the construction of certain naval vessels. February 14, 1940. Report to accompany H. R. 8026. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23 cm. (H. Rept. No. 1593, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

NAVY department appropriation bill for 1941. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 3d session, on the Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1941. Washington, 1940. 808 p. 23 cm.

NEUTRALITY

DECREES and regulations on neutrality transmitted to the Pan American Union by the member Governments pursuant to Resolution I of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held at Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939. Supplement No. 1. Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 70 p. 27 cm. (Law and Treaty Series No. 13.)

PALESTINE

PALESTINE Land Transfers Regulations. Letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. London, February 28, 1940. London, 1940. 10 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 2 (1940) Cmd. 6180.) 2d.

SPEECH by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in the House of Commons on the 6th March, 1940. Palestine. London, 1940. 11 p. 25 cm.

PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION

RAPPORT du conseil administratif de la Cour permanente d'Arbitrage, sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses de l'exercice 1939. La Haye, Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, 1940. 35 p. 33 cm.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

THE ELECTRICITY company of Sofia and Bulgaria. Order of February 26, 1940. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1940. 4–10 p. 24½ cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A./B., Fascicule No. 80.)

PERMANENT court of international justice. Letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations transmitting two declarations regarding the position of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in relation to the optional clause of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, London, February 28, 1940. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 3 (1940), Cmd. 6185.) 1d.

PHILIPPINES

THIRD annual report of the President of the Philippines to the President and the Congress of the United States covering the period January 1 to December 31, 1938. Washington, 1940. v, 35 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 545, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

POLAND — UNITED KINGDOM

EXCHANGE of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Poland regulating the utilisation of units of the Polish mercantile marine in the prosecution of the war against Germany. London, October 12/November 25, 1939. London, 1940. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 5 (1940), Cmd. 6172.) 1d.

RUBBER

RUBBER industry of the United States, 1839–1939, by P. W. Barker. Washington, 1939. 42 p. 23 cm. (U. S., Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, No. 197.) 10c.

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RURAL LIFE, EUROPEAN

EUROPEAN Conference on rural life 1939. National monographs drawn up by Governments. UNITED KINGDOM. Geneva, 1939. 81 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.111.M.66.1939. Conf. E.V.R.18. European Conference on Rural Life. 19.)

—— —— HUNGARY. Geneva, 1940. 80 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.223.M.151.1939. Conf. E.V.R.27. European Conference on Rural Life. 27.)

SECOND WORLD WAR

REPUBLIC of Poland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Official documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933–1939. Published by authority of the Polish Government. London, Hutchinson, (1940). 222 p. 5s.

THE DEVELOPMENT of Finnish-Soviet relations during the autumn of 1939, in the light of official documents. Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1940. 114 p. map. 24½ cm.

MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs. The French yellow book. Diplomatic documents (1938–1939). Papers relative to the events and negotiations which preceded the opening of hostilities between Germany on the one hand, and Poland, Great Britain and France on the other. Published by authority of the French Government. New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940. 419 p. $2.50.

OVERZICHT van de voornaamste in verband met den oorlogstoestand door het ministerie van buitenlandsche zaken behandelde en voor openbaarmaking geschikte aangelegenheden November 1939–April 1940. The Hague, Ter Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1940. 53p.

DESPATCH from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris forwarding texts of speeches by the French President of the Council, Minister of National Defence and of War and of Foreign Affairs, and by the French Minister of Finance. December 1939. London, 1940. 29 p. 24½ cm. (France No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6159.) 6d.

CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Japanese Government regarding the removal of German citizens from the Japanese ship "Asama Maru." January–February 1940. London, 1940. 12 p. 24½ cm. (Japan No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6166.) 2d.

CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States regarding the censorship of mails, December, 1939–January, 1940. London, 1940. 7 p. 24½ cm. (United States No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6156.) 1d.

ATROCITIES

L'INVASION Allemande en Pologne. Documents, témoignages authentifié set photographies, recueillis par le Centre d'Information et de Documentation du Gouvernement Polonais. Avant-propos par Édouard Herriot . . . Paris, Flammarion, 1940. 127 p.

POLISH acts of atrocity against the German minority in Poland. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. 259 p.

PICTORIAL report on Polish atrocities. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. 63 p.

BELLIGERENT REGULATIONS

CONTROL of exports. List of goods prohibited to be exported from the United Kingdom under the Export of Goods (Prohibition) Orders, 1939, except under licence from the Board of Trade, 15th November, 1939. London, 1939. 18 p. 24½ cm. 3d.

—— List of goods of which the exportation from the United Kingdom is controlled under the Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1940, showing the position on the 15th January, 1940. London, 1940. 30 p. 24½ cm. 6d.

BRITISH ESTIMATES

NAVY estimates, 1940. February 15, 1940. London, 1940. Admiralty. 7 p. 24½ cm. 2d.

AIR estimates, 1940. February 20, 1940. London, 1940. Air Ministry. 6 p. 24½ cm. 1d.

SUPPLEMENTARY estimate. Air Services. London, 1940. 2 p. 24½ cm. 1d.

NAVY Estimates. Statement by Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on the 27th February, 1940. London, 1940. 7 p. 25 cm.

ARMY estimates, 1940. February 20, 1940. London, 1940. The War Office. 6 p. 24½ cm. 1d.

ESTIMATES for Navy, Army and Air Services, the Ministry of Supply and certain other services in time of war. Copy of Treasury minute dated 15th February, 1940. London, 1940. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6176.) 1d.

PRIZE COURTS

PRIZE Courts. The prize court rules, 1939. London, 1939. 107 p., caption title. 24½ cm. (U. K., Statutory Rules and Orders no. 1466.)

SILICOSIS

SILICOSIS. Proceedings of the International Conference held in Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1938. Geneva, 1940. iv, 223 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series F (Industrial Hygiene) No. 17.)

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SOCIAL INSURANCE

ACTUARIAL technique and financial organization of social insurance. Geneva, 1940. 568 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series M (Social Insurance) No. 17.) $4.00.

THE INVESTMENT of the Funds of Social Insurance Institutions. Geneva, 1939. viii, 196 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series M (Social Insurance) No. 16.) $1.25.

SOVIET UNION

ADDRESS of V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. at the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, March 29, 1940, caption title. Multigraphed. (Washington, Soviet Embassy.) 19 p. 35 cm.

SPAIN-UNITED KINGDOM

LOAN agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Spanish Government. Madrid, March 18, 1940. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Spain No. 2 (1940), Cmd. 6189.) 1d.

TRADE and payments agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Spanish Government. Madrid, March 18, 1940. London, 1940. 17 p. 24½ cm. (Spain No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6185.) 3d.

TRADE STATISTICS

ARGENTINA. Dirección general de estadística. Anuario del comercio exterior . . . 1938 . . Buenos Aires, 1939. 658 p. cuadros. 26 cm.

BOLIVIA. Dirección general de estadística. Comercio exterior. Anuario correspondiente al ano 1938; importación, exportación. La Paz, Editorial "Fénix," 1939. 1 v. cuadros (algunos plegadizos) 26 cm.

VENEZUELA. Dirección general de estadística. Anuario estadistico de Venezuela, 1938. Caracas, Lit. y tip. Casa de especialides, 1939. 532 p. cuadros. 24½ cm.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

EXTENSION of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, on H. J. Res. 407, a joint resolution to extend the authority of the President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. January 11–31, February 1–3, 1940. Washington, 1940, 3 v. 23 cm.

—— —— Index of hearings . . . Washington, 1940, 112 p. 23 cm.

—— Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 76th Congress, 3d session, on H. J. Res. 407, a joint resolution to extend the authority of the President under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. February 26–29, March 1–6,.1940 Revised print. Washington, 1940. 867 p. 23 cm.

EXTENDING the authority of the President under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended February 16, 1940. Minority views to accompany H. J. Res. 407. Washington, 1940, 37 p. 23 cm. (H. Rept. 1594, pt. 2, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.)

H. J. Res. No. 407 was enacted as Pub. Res. No. 61.

UNITED STATES

PAPERS relating to the foreign relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920. Washington, 1939, 2 vols. 23 cm. (Department of State Publication Nos. 1420 and 1421.) $3.00.

TREATIES submitted to the Senate. 1938. Procedure during 1938 on, and status of, certain treaties submitted to the Senate, 1923–1938. Washington, 1940. 15 p. 26½ cm. (Department of State Publication No. 1424.) 10c.

UNITED STATES — EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

EXTENSION of lending authority of Export-Import Bank of Washington. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 76th Congress, 3d Session, on S. 3069, a bill to provide for certain loans to the Republic of Finland by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. January 31, 1940. Washington, 1940. 78 p. 23 cm.

INCREASING the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank. February 7, 1940. . Report to accompany S. 3069. 1 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Rpt. 1185, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

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